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Abstract 
This thesis explores the debates surrounding the status of Cherokee freedpeople in the final 
four decades of the nineteenth century.  Despite being granted full citizenship in the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty signed by the United States and the Cherokee Nation in 1866, the 
nature of these rights remained constantly under debate as the Cherokee Nation attempted 
to limit their obligation to freedpeople.  In contrast, the federal government insisted 
freedpeople and their descendants be awarded the full rights of Cherokee citizens.  Repeated 
federal intervention on behalf of Cherokee freedpeople led to jurisdictional disputes and 
tensions between the two nations as the Cherokee Nation insisted that they held final 
authority over the boundaries of its citizenry and the nature of citizenship awarded to 
freedpeople.  Scholars have questioned the apparent polarity between the equal rights of 
freedmen and Cherokee sovereignty and, in 2013, Barbara Krauthamer identified the 
necessity of exploring how these two concerns became constructed as oppositional.  In the 
twenty-first century, high profile legal battles over the exclusion of individuals descended 
from freedpeople from the Cherokee Nation have highlighted the lasting importance of this 
issue.   
This thesis builds on previous research by reconsidering how Cherokee freedpeople pushed 
for full and equal inclusion in the forty years following their emancipation.  It argues that 
Cherokee freedpeople were not pawns in the disputes between the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States.  Instead, freedpeople were active agents who exploited the differing 
interpretations of citizenship held by Cherokee and federal officials to secure their own 
interests.  Furthermore, this thesis argues that the federal government only supported 
Cherokee freedpeople when it served their larger agenda of damaging the sovereignty of the 
Cherokee Nation. 
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Chapter One: Race, Sovereignty, and Silence - The Cherokee Nation and its Freedpeople, 
an Introduction 
 
Chattel slavery, and its legacy within the Cherokee Nation, has proven itself to be a 
controversial and emotionally charged topic since the institution was formally abolished in 
1866.  One of the central questions has focused on the extent to which black former slaves 
should be incorporated within the Cherokee citizenry.  Cherokee freedpeople, with the 
support of the federal government, have pursued their demand for full inclusion within the 
Nation, whilst the Cherokee leadership has attempted to either maintain a distinction 
between former slaves and the rest of the population in their citizenship privileges or exclude 
them entirely.1   Twenty-first century legal battles over the status of individuals claiming 
Cherokee citizenship through their descent from Cherokee freedpeople illustrate the 
longevity of this dispute.2  Scholarly interest in the connections between Native Americans 
and African Americans is relatively recent, however, with Black Indian Studies only emerging 
as a distinct area of research in the final decade of the twentieth century.  As a result, the 
history of Cherokee slavery and freedpeople has received limited attention within academia, 
with few scholars writing in-depth studies until the turn of this century. The absence of the 
history of Cherokee slavery and freedpeople in scholarship mirrored their disappearance 
                                                          
1 In a departure from previous scholarship, this thesis will use the term ‘freedpeople’ to refer to 
former slaves within the Cherokee Nation, as well as their descendants, rather than ‘freedmen.’  
Although the use of ‘freedpeople’ has been considered unwieldy or awkward, it is a more accurate 
term since it does not carry implications regarding the gender of the subject.  ‘Freedman’ or 
‘freedmen’ will therefore only be used to describe male former slaves or male descendants of slaves, 
unless quoting a contemporary source in which ‘freedmen’ was used to describe former slaves of 
either gender. See C. Sturm, ‘Blood Politics, Racial Classification, and Cherokee National Identity: The 
Trials and Tribulations of the Cherokee Freedmen,’ in Confounding the Color Line: The Indian-Black 
Experience in North America, J. F. Brooks, 253 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2002).  Footnote 1.  Sturm uses ‘freedmen’ for expediency despite conceding its gender bias. 
2 For a good overview of these contemporary issues see M. Barbery, ‘Slave descendants seek equal 
rights from Cherokee Nation,’ Salon, May 21 2013, accessed 10/12/14, 
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/21/slave_descendants_seek_equal_rights_from_cherokee_nation_
partner/.  Twenty-first century legal cases are considered more closely later in this chapter and in 
the epilogue. 
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from Cherokee collective memory, made evident by the twenty-first century legal battles 
that see freedpeople struggling to be included and recognised as Cherokees.   
In order to reach a closer understanding of the long-term consequences of racial 
slavery and its aftermath within the Cherokee Nation, this project explores the tensions 
between federal officials, the Cherokee government, and Cherokee freedpeople themselves 
over the status of freedpeople within the Nation in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
Importantly, it considers how freedpeople became seen as a threat to Cherokee sovereignty 
from the end of the Civil War to the dissolution of the Cherokee Nation government in 1907.  
The Cherokee Nation attempted to tightly regulate the rules that determined who was 
considered Cherokee as a means of maintaining their sovereignty and control over their 
domestic affairs in the face of increasing pressure from the United States after the American 
Civil War.  Cherokee freedpeople, with the support of the federal government, insisted that 
freedpeople be treated in the same manner as full Cherokee citizens.  A series of clashes 
proceeded between the two nations in the latter half of the nineteenth century as both 
claimed jurisdiction over the matter.  The Cherokee leadership therefore came to associate 
awarding freedpeople equal rights with federal encroachment on the autonomy of the 
Nation.  In re-envisioning this power struggle as being between freedpeople as well as the 
Cherokee and United States government, rather than just between officials of those two 
nations, this research explores how the actions of freedpeople affected their position within 
Cherokee society and the terms of the political debate within the Cherokee Nation.  The 
determination of freedpeople to claim equal rights made their status within the Cherokee 
citizenry an inflammatory point of disagreement between the United States and the 
Cherokee Nation after the Civil War.  Furthermore, the response of the Cherokee Nation 
must be considered alongside its increasingly defensive relationship with the United States.  
Debates surrounding the rights of freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation need to be 
assessed within this triangular framework to achieve a full and complete analysis.   
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This thesis establishes that the actions of Cherokee freedpeople in relation to their 
own citizenship made them active agents rather than pawns in the disputes between the 
Cherokee Nation and the United States over their status.  This thesis will therefore bridge 
the gap between two threads of scholarship pertaining to freedpeople in the Cherokee 
Nation: twentieth century research that stressed the contest between the federal 
government and the Nation over the status of freedpeople, and twenty-first century 
research that focuses on the lived experiences of the enslaved and freedpeople. In the four 
decades covered by this thesis, freedpeople exploited the differing interpretations of 
citizenship held by the United States and the Cherokee Nation to further their own goal of 
attaining full rights.  Furthermore, the selective nature by which the United States and its 
officials protected the rights of Cherokee freedpeople, most vigorously enforcing those that 
would damage the sovereignty and autonomy of the Cherokee Nation, indicated that it was 
primarily interested in fracturing the Cherokee Nation rather than improving the lived 
experience of its freedpeople.   
The citizenship status of freedpeople was politically complicated, and remains so, 
since it was caught between differing interpretations of sovereignty, citizenship, and identity 
held by the Cherokee Nation, the federal government and freedpeople themselves.  
Freedpeople appealed to the United States in increasingly organised ways in the four 
decades following their emancipation, and this thesis analyses and explains the changing 
nature of the interactions between Cherokee freedpeople, Cherokee officials, the federal 
government and its officials.  In order to facilitate this line of enquiry, this thesis is organised 
thematically.  It will explore how freedpeople sought to achieve certain rights within the 
Cherokee Nation: legal citizenship and the right to remain within the Nation; equal access to 
services provided by the Nation, specifically in regard to education; an equal share in the 
distribution of national funds; and an equal share in Cherokee land upon allotment.  Isolating 
goals within the freedpeople’s broader fight for equal rights within the Cherokee Nation 
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makes it possible to identify the nuances between how and why freedpeople attempted to 
secure each of these rights.  Since claims to land operated as an essential expression of 
Cherokee citizenship in the nineteenth century, freedpeople prioritised pursuing rights that 
established they had a legitimate claim on national land.  When the Cherokee Nation denied 
freedpeople a share of money obtained through the sale of national lands in 1883, for 
example - on the basis that freedpeople were entitled to use national land but were not 
communal land owners in the same manner as citizens ‘by blood’ - freedpeople spent five 
years lobbying to be awarded an equal share of national funds.3  When the Cherokee Nation 
failed to provide adequate schooling for the children of freedpeople, however, freedpeople 
spent less energy pushing for equal access to national services and instead resolved the 
problem themselves by creating subscription schools to meet the shortfall.4   
  This first chapter gives a brief historical background to slavery and freedpeople in 
the Cherokee Nation, from the establishment of racial slavery in the eighteenth century 
through to present day legal battles over whether the descendants of former slaves are 
entitled to Cherokee citizenship in the twenty-first century.  Exploring the historiography of 
slavery and emancipation within the Cherokee Nation will then provide a research context 
for this thesis, paying particular attention to the political sensitivity of writing about 
freedpeople and citizenship as well as the importance of the inclusion of the voices of 
freedpeople. 
The second chapter of this thesis considers how freedpeople who were legally 
classed as intruders by the Cherokee Nation solicited support from the federal government 
in the fifteen years following emancipation.  United States agents to the Cherokee Nation 
made the first federal intervention on behalf of these individuals through failing to remove 
                                                          
3 C. E. Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory: From Chattel to Citizens (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008), 169. 
4 Ibid.  164. 
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those they judged to hold a legitimate claim to Cherokee citizenship and, in 1875, issuing 
them with certificates that protected them from eviction.5  Freedpeople who cooperated 
with federal officials and convinced them of their right to stay within the Nation therefore 
gained a sort of pseudo-citizenship in the sense that they were allowed to remain within the 
Nation.  This did not translate to official Cherokee citizenship, however, as although the 
Cherokee Nation agreed to implement standardised methods to evaluate whether 
freedpeople were legally entitled to citizenship, in the form of various citizenship 
commissions, they refused to lift the January 1867 deadline for having returned to the Nation 
that the Cherokee had imposed following the American Civil War.  Through examining the 
dialogue between freedpeople, Cherokee officials and federal officials, this chapter will 
establish that the federal and Cherokee governments became increasingly oppositional after 
1866, with both governments claiming final authority over the citizenship status of 
freedpeople by 1880. 
The third chapter examines freedpeople’s attempts to secure support from the 
federal government as they tried to gain equal access to the Cherokee national school system 
and orphan asylum.  Freedpeople citizens sought to remedy their exclusion from Cherokee 
schools by complaining to the Cherokee Nation Council from 1872 and - when they received 
no response - writing a letter directly to the President of the United States requesting his 
help.6  Whereas in the previous chapter freedpeople negotiated with local federal officials, 
here we can see an attempt to reach a higher authority in the United States government. 
Federal officials demanded an explanation from Principal Chief William Ross but no further 
action was taken to redress the situation by either the Cherokee government or the federal 
                                                          
5 W. G. McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-1880 
(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 252, 253, 281, 282, 284, 293, 294. 
6 D. Littlefield, Jr., The Cherokee Freedmen: From Emancipation to American Citizenship (Westport 
and London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 52-55. 
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government.   In contrast to the action taken by federal officials in regard to the legal 
citizenship of Cherokee freedpeople, here we see federal inaction over the exclusion of the 
Cherokee freedpeople from services provided by the Cherokee Nation. 
The fourth chapter considers how freedpeople pursued their right to share in the 
distribution of Cherokee national funds in the 1880s and 1890s.  This represents their most 
formal pursuit of equal rights within the Cherokee Nation, with freedpeople first organising 
petitions and conventions, then visiting Washington in an attempt to gain the support of 
Congress.  Five years after being excluded from the initial 1883 payment to Native Cherokee 
citizens, Congress awarded freedpeople a sum of money, taken from Cherokee Nation funds 
held in trust by the United States, equivalent to their share.  Freedpeople then went on to 
win a suit against the Cherokee Nation in the U. S. Court of Claims in 1895 which affirmed 
their right to an equal share in the economic resources of the Cherokee Nation.  This victory 
was only made possible through the support of the federal government and its officials and 
the insistence of Cherokee freedpeople. 
The fifth chapter explores the passage of the Curtis Act in 1898, which brought 
about the denationalisation and allotment of the Cherokee Nation, and Oklahoma 
statehood in 1907.  This represents the moment at which the federal government claimed 
complete authority over the Indian Territory and its inhabitants.  Rolls created by the 
Dawes Commission – which brought about and managed the allotment of the Five Tribes in 
Indian Territory - defined who was entitled to allotments of land reserved for citizens of the 
Cherokee Nation, providing a definitive list of who was and who was not a Cherokee 
citizen. This chapter concludes that freedpeople gained certain victories in their pursuit of 
full and equal rights after their emancipation through utilising the support of the federal 
government but that their position remained precarious.   
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Finally, an epilogue will consider the legacy of this period in Cherokee history by 
exploring current legal cases and public debates surrounding the citizenship status of 
freedpeople.  Following continued attacks on the rights of Cherokee freedpeople 
throughout the twentieth century, freedpeople have renewed their struggle for inclusion 
within the Nation in recent years.  It will therefore argue that the oppositions solidified in 
the time period covered by this thesis continue to affect the Cherokee Nation and 
Cherokee freedpeople today. 
 
“They have been eliminating us:” the Cherokee Nation and its freedpeople 
Until the end of the twentieth century, historians of slavery and emancipation focussed 
almost entirely on the experiences of people held by white slaveholders, leaving little space 
for discussions of enslavement that fall outside of these parameters.  Non-traditional 
slaveholders, such as women, free blacks, and Native Americans, have therefore been 
overshadowed in the historiography of slavery and emancipation.  Furthermore, the Indian 
Territory and its residents have often been overlooked by scholars in relation to these issues.  
This has allowed a singular vision of slavery to develop in which slavery was a static institution 
only practiced by white male slaveholders in the south-eastern United States. Slavery was 
not homogenous, even amongst white male slaveholders, and a more nuanced 
understanding of the institution will only be achieved by incorporating settings and 
relationships outside the perceived norm into our historical analysis.  Celia Naylor has argued 
that broadening examinations of the institution, and the everyday reality for those enslaved 
within it, to include accounts that challenge the typical vision of the white male slaveholder 
raises new questions surrounding the operations of race, gender, class, culture and slavery 
in the nineteenth century.7  Differences between how the racial hierarchy was constructed 
                                                          
7 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 22. 
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in the Cherokee Nation in comparison to South Carolina, for example, may bring previously 
hidden processes to light that enhance our understanding of racial prejudice more generally.    
Scholars have made new attempts to consider slavery and emancipation within 
Native nations in response to high profile legal battles in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Furthermore, the acceptance of ex-slave narratives as viable historical sources has 
enabled scholars to include the voices of the enslaved, in the form of first-hand accounts, in 
this research.  This allows scholars to consider their perspective, providing new insight and 
meaning rather than just the views of their Cherokee enslavers.   Recent research that 
emphasises the subjective experience of Cherokee slaves and freedpeople, in accordance 
with broader trends in the study of slavery and emancipation, therefore pushes the discipline 
into new areas of study which further enhance our understanding of the dynamics of power 
and privilege in the multi-vocal histories of the United States.8  
Today, historians recognise the importance of including slavery and the enslaved in 
any investigation of the Five Tribes of Indian Territory.  Each nation had its own 
understanding of slavery and its own particular relationship with its enslaved people.  
Scholars therefore need to be careful of making generalizations about how slavery was 
practiced within Native nations.9   Racial slavery had become an “integral aspect of life” 
within the Cherokee Nation by the end of the eighteenth century but Cherokees did not 
uncritically adopt the practice of racial slavery as seen in neighbouring states.10  Scholars 
                                                          
8 E. E. Baptist and S. M. H. Camp, ‘Introduction: A History of the History of Slavery in the Americas’ in 
New Studies in the History of American Slavery, E. E. Baptist and S. M. H. Camp, eds., 4-5 (Athens and 
London: University of Georgia Press, 2006). 
9 The Five Tribes include the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek & Seminole Nations.  Refer to the 
following works for further information: D. Chang, The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the 
Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1929 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2010); B. Krauthamer, Black Slaves, Indian Masters: Slavery, Emancipation, and Citizenship in the 
Native American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); D. Littlefield, Jr., 
Africans and Seminoles: From Removal to Emancipation (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 
1977).   
10 C. E. Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory: From Chattel to Citizens (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008), 13.  See ‘Introduction’ and ‘Slavery’ in T. Miles, Ties That Bind: The 
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have drawn connections between the ‘slow’ adoption of chattel slavery by some Cherokees 
and the Cherokee practice of captive taking.  Celia Naylor argues that Cherokees did not 
simply replace war captives with African slaves (the unfree status of captives was not 
hereditary and could be lifted by adoption into one of the seven clans that comprised 
Cherokee society) but that Cherokee notions of ownership provided a “context and 
foundation” for defining Africans as outside of Cherokee society.11  In order to secure their 
own dominance during the colonial era, the British had “worked to foment apathy” between 
the enslaved and Cherokees by encouraging distrust and violence between the two groups.12  
Tiya Miles has argued that over the course of the eighteenth century Cherokees “begun to 
associate dark skin with low status” and that this was evident in their relationships with 
enslaved people within the Nation.13  The attitudes Cherokees held towards people of African 
descent were ambiguous, however, as although some acted as slave traders or began 
keeping enslaved peoples for themselves, others aided fugitive slaves in their flight.  For 
example, in 1767 the British superintendent of Southern Indian Affairs voiced his concern 
that Cherokees were deliberately failing to return fugitive slaves to their British masters 
despite a 1730 treaty agreement that they would do so.14  In contrast, a federal agent 
travelling the Cherokee and Creek nations in 1796 described one Cherokee slaveholder as 
owning 61 slaves.15   
Upon its formation at the end of the eighteenth century, the United States pursued 
a ‘civilization’ policy that put the Cherokee Nation under pressure to adopt characteristics of 
American society in order to ultimately assimilate within American society.  European 
Americans saw utilising enslaved labour as a means for Cherokees to demonstrate that they 
                                                          
Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom (Los Angeles and London: University of 
California Press, 2006).   
11 Miles, Ties That Bind, 33.  Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 8-10. 
12 Miles, Ties That Bind, 32-33. 
13 Ibid, 30. 
14 Ibid, 32. 
15 Ibid, 36. 
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were not only capable of being productive participants in the southern slave economy but 
that they could also follow the patriarchal social structures of the antebellum order which 
defined men as heads of their households with women, children and slaves as dependents.  
The ‘civilization’ policy also defined Native men as planters and Native women as 
homemakers.16  Enslaved people figured as a source of “property and wealth” for Cherokees 
who could not own land given the Cherokee practice of communal landownership.17  Given 
the “loose and flexible” practice of Cherokee slavery in the eighteenth century (which saw 
the enslaved retain some autonomy and work alongside Cherokees), Cherokee slaveholders 
did not simply replicate slavery as it was practised by their white neighbours in the 
antebellum era but instead acted according to their own understandings of labour and 
unfree people.18   
Slavery had been sanctioned in the 1827 Cherokee Constitution and the upheaval of 
forced removal from Georgia to the Indian Territory - known as the Trail of Tears -  in 1838 
consolidated slavery within the Cherokee Nation.  The number of Slave Codes and laws that 
discriminated against individuals of African descent multiplied following removal as 
slaveholders became increasingly invested in the institution and as a reaction to the 1842 
Cherokee Slave Revolt (which saw between 21 and 200 slaves run away from the Cherokee 
Nation as well as the death of one white man and one Delaware man who tried to capture 
them).19  Although in his 1849 slave narrative former slave Henry Bibb described his Cherokee 
master as “the most reasonable, most humane” slaveholder he had ever belonged to, 
scholars have largely dismissed the idea that Cherokee slaveholders were kinder than their 
Southern counterparts.20  Constituting 15% of the Cherokee Nation population at the 
                                                          
16 Ibid, 14-15. 
17 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 16. 
18 Miles, Ties That Bind, 34.   
19 McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 134. 
20 H. Bibb, ‘Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry Bibb, an American Slave’ in I was Born a 
Slave: An Anthology of Classic Slave Narratives, Y. Taylor (ed.), 76 (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 
1999). 
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beginning of the Civil War, enslaved black labourers formed a sizeable minority within 
Cherokee society and continued to figure as such after their emancipation.21    
Just as in the United States, slavery became a source of contention within the 
Cherokee Nation as the nineteenth century progressed.  Factionalism and violence had 
exploded within the Cherokee Nation following the controversial Treaty of New Echota – 
which saw the minority Treaty party sign away Cherokee lands without the approval of 
Principal Chief John Ross and the majority of the Cherokee citizenry - and the subsequent 
removal to Indian Territory but seemed resolved, at least to some extent, when the Treaty 
of 1846 formally reconciled the Treaty and Ross parties.22  Increasingly, however, the 
Cherokee Nation began to divide over the place of Euro-American institutions such as slavery 
in Cherokee society.  The Cherokee slaveholding elite held a disproportionate amount of 
political and economic power in the Cherokee Nation and understood their engagement with 
slavery and the plantation economy to be evidence of progressive attitudes and 
behaviours.23  The more traditional majority, on the other hand, deemed the accumulation 
of wealth and the ownership of slaves to be contrary to their social and cultural values.24  
Since the Cherokee elite largely comprised of children of marriages between Cherokees and 
Euro-Americans, the divide between such individuals and the wider Cherokee population 
was often (but not always) racial as well as economic.25   
                                                          
21 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 19. 
22 McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 58.  See Chapter 2, ‘Stalemate and Terrorism, 1841-1846.’  
23 T. Perdue, Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 1540-1866 (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1979) 70.  90% of Cherokee slaveholders were of mixed ancestry in 1842.  
McLoughlin argued that these distinctions continued in the years following.  McLoughlin, After the 
Trail of Tears, 39. 
24 Perdue, Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society, 70. 
25 I have avoided terms such as ‘mixed blood’ and ‘full blood' throughout this thesis, with the 
exception of quotes.  According to David Chang, "Scholars and activists correctly denounce these 
terms as racist, nonindigenous in derivation, and part of a political project that limits Indianness and 
tribal membership to biological categories instead of recognising that they are cultural categories." 
D. A. Chang, The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 
1832-1839 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 13.  Use of such terms runs 
the risk of essentialising its subjects. 
17 
 
When civil war broke out in the United States in 1861, the longstanding factionalism 
within the Cherokee Nation escalated.  Principal Chief John Ross had pledged neutrality at 
the outset of the conflict but the Nation eventually split along pro-Confederate and pro-
Union lines.  Lincoln’s 1863 Emancipation Proclamation changed the nature of the Civil War 
and, with the defeat of the Confederacy in 1865, slavery was abolished throughout the 
United States.   Although the pro-Union portion of the Cherokee Nation had voluntarily 
abolished slavery in 1863, Cherokee slaveholders who allied themselves with the 
Confederacy continued to own slaves until 1866. During the process of reconciliation, the 
United States forced the Cherokee Nation to award Cherokee citizenship to individuals who 
had formerly been enslaved within the Nation.  Like their newly free counterparts 
throughout the American South, Cherokee freedpeople were able to choose whether or not 
to stay in the vicinity in which they had been enslaved.  Those who did choose to remain 
within the bounds of the Cherokee Nation, effectively choosing Cherokee citizenship over 
United States citizenship, are the subject of this study.  
The 1866 Reconstruction Treaty that formally reconciled the Cherokee Nation and 
United States government after the Civil War delineated the abolition of slavery within the 
Nation and the incorporation of former slaves within the Cherokee citizenry.  Despite having 
pledged to afford them “all the rights of native Cherokees” within this treaty, the Cherokee 
Nation repeatedly denied any obligation to its freedpeople and endeavoured to limit their 
rights in the years that followed emancipation.26  Federal attempts to secure equal rights for 
freedpeople interfered with the domestic affairs of the Nation, representing challenges to 
the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation and its ability to govern itself.  Struggling to maintain 
sole discretion over the citizenship status of freedpeople and claiming jurisdiction over the 
boundaries of its citizenry was therefore one way the Cherokee Nation resisted the federal 
                                                          
26 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 225. 
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government’s growing power within the Indian Territory after the Civil War.27  Interactions 
between the Cherokee Nation and the United States in the fifty years following the American 
Civil War were ostensibly between two nations.  Scholars of nationalism have struggled to 
agree on a single definition of 'nation' but they do concur that a nation is a socially 
constructed group of people, an "imagined political community," and that modern nations 
began forming from the end of the eighteenth century.28  In Cherokee Renascence in the New 
Republic, William McLoughlin charted the creation of the Cherokee Nation state, arguing that 
although the Cherokees did not see themselves as a single nation in the colonial era, the 
creation of the United States necessitated adaptation and by the 1820s they had adopted 
Euro-American ideologies of nationhood and reorganised as a single nation.29 
The Cherokee Nation's status as a distinct entity had been under threat since before 
its removal to Indian Territory.  Although in 1831 the United States Supreme Court had 
declared it to be a "domestic, dependent nation," the Cherokee Nation continued to present 
itself as a separate and autonomous nation and repeatedly denied any dependence on the 
United States outside of its treaty obligations.30 The American Civil War revealed the 
vulnerable nature of Cherokee national unity and the Cherokee Nation's short alliance with 
the Confederacy provided the United States with an opportunity to escalate its attacks on 
the Cherokee Nation's legitimacy as a separate, self-governing body.  The Cherokee Nation 
therefore occupied an increasingly ambiguous and precarious position in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century since, although it declared itself to be a nation, the United States 
gradually stripped the Cherokee Nation of the rights associated with that nation status.31   
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Federal Indian policy in the years following the Civil War gradually transitioned away 
from removal and reservation policies (that had seen the Cherokees and other Native nations 
confined to reservations outside of the states) and towards an assimilationist agenda that 
denied Native nationhood and forcibly incorporated Native peoples in to American society.  
In doing so, Congress attempted to move away from the “crisis” created by the war and 
balance the demands of a citizenry that wanted to expand on to Native land against concerns 
held by reformists regarding the poor living conditions and violence faced by Native 
Americans in the nineteenth century.32  The Indian Appropriations Act of 1871 ended the 
practice of making treaties with Native nations, reflecting American assumptions of Native 
dependence and making a “paternalistic relationship” between the United States and Native 
nations federal policy.33  Given the legal power of treaty-making, this limited the ability of 
Native nations to make binding agreements and highlights the new federal goal of absorbing 
Native nations in to the United States.  By the 1880s, reformers and expansionists alike 
agreed that the involuntary allotment of land owned communally by Native nations would 
accelerate assimilation and Congress passed the 1887 General Allotment Act.34  Allotment 
saw the dispossession and exploitation of Native nations throughout United States territories 
and is the focus of the fifth chapter of this thesis.  In 1903, the United States Supreme Court 
decision on Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock officially enabled Congress to abrogate treaties made with 
Native nations and “underscored federal dominance” over Native peoples.35  In the forty 
years covered by this thesis, then, Federal Indian Policy redefined the relationship between 
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the United States and Native nations by denationalising Native nations and separating them 
from their land base.  
The Cherokee Nation's claim to political legitimacy (and therefore continued 
existence) as a nation depended on its assertion of sovereignty.  According to Joanne Barker, 
'sovereignty' is the claim to the "absolute power to govern."36  Sovereignty can originate 
from a variety of sources depending on the context, whether majority support within a 
democratic community, the divine right of a monarch or the "unique identity or culture of 
peoples."37  Amanda Cobb argues that ‘sovereignty’ is a “contested term, carrying with it 
multiple meanings and multiple implications for Native nations” and raises concerns about 
writings that use the term without interrogating its meaning.38  Where today we might simply 
use ‘sovereignty’ to refer to a nation’s government, Jack Forbes further specifies that self-
government requires “freedom from external control” and points to the relational nature of 
sovereignty as a complicating factor in its expression.39  Scott Richard Lyons expands on 
Forbes’ qualification of sovereignty and argues that “while definitions have evolved, at the 
base of every definition is power.”40  According to Lyons, sovereignty requires external 
recognition and respect from other nations since no nation exists in a vacuum.  Power 
imbalances between parties can enable one to assert control over another, effectively 
nullifying their ability to function as a sovereign nation.  In the case of the United States, its 
dominance has made its claim to sovereignty seem natural and inevitable: “the American 
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nation-state is so powerful, so hegemonic, that its cloak of sovereignty seems almost 
invisible.”41   
As is evident over the course of this thesis, however, Cherokees did not give up their 
claim to sovereignty and concede to the authority of the United States.  Cherokee insistence 
on retaining control over the citizenry (defining it as a domestic matter that should remain 
under their jurisdiction) illustrates their understanding of sovereignty as the right to govern 
their own affairs without external control.  Principal Chief Oochalata, for example, wrote in 
1877 that Cherokees had a “natural right” to make their own decisions regarding citizenship 
rights and rejected arguments made by United States officials to the contrary.42  As well as 
utilising the notion of sovereignty as freedom from outside influence, the Cherokee Nation 
offered its own definition of sovereignty that stressed collectivity and the preservation of 
their culture.  In his research on the Cherokee Nation, William McLoughlin defined 
sovereignty as "a word that does not simply mean self-government or autonomy but 
something of far deeper cultural significance, in some respects equivalent to ethnic and 
political separatism."43  Within this definition, sovereignty is less the act(s) of self-
government but rather the right to do so. For example, Principal Chief Colonel Johnson Harris 
wrote in 1894 of “one loyal citizenship, with common interest and a common destiny” when 
describing the necessity of Cherokee loyalty and nationalism in the face of pressure to give 
up their nation status.44  The Cherokee Nation therefore did not articulate a single 
understanding of sovereignty as they defended themselves against the encroachments of 
the United States but deftly gave it multiple meanings. 
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Nations comprise of citizens. According to Geraint Parry, "the most basic definition 
of a citizen is that he or she is a member of some determinate and determinable society."45 
Legal scholar Kirsty Gover asserts that a nation defines itself through the use of citizenship 
rules which create “human boundaries” and the ability to control these rules is a key 
expression of sovereignty: the “first-order question of tribal self-governance.”46  Delineating 
who is and who is not a citizen or member of a nation is therefore the most basic means by 
which that nation exerts its authority as an autonomous entity.  In questioning the Cherokee 
Nation’s authority to delineate which freedpeople were entitled to Cherokee citizenship and 
the nature of that citizenship, the United States challenged the Nation’s right to govern its 
own population and therefore its sovereignty.  Gover further argues that citizenship rules 
are a “legal manifestation of cultural production,” revealing how a community defines itself 
against other groups and “emerging from political processes of debate and contestation.”47  
Importantly, the processes by which a nation decides on its citizenship rules are internal and 
based on agreements and disagreements made within its own community: not imposed by 
outsiders. The processes of debate and contestation within the Cherokee Nation, and the 
manner in which Cherokee freedpeople attempted to influence them, form the focus of this 
thesis. 
The Cherokee Nation tried to limit the citizenship status of freedpeople in a number 
of ways.  First, the Nation denied citizenship to all former slaves who failed to return within 
six-months of the Reconstruction Treaty that secured their rights. This minimised the number 
of individuals who could claim citizenship to those who returned to the Nation by January 
1867.  As non-citizens, these ‘too lates’ were legally classed as intruders, regardless of the 
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circumstances in which they missed the deadline, and therefore risked eviction and expulsion 
by remaining within the Nation.  Second, the form of citizenship awarded to freedpeople did 
not meet the expectations of freedpeople or the federal government.  Freedpeople who 
were recognised as citizens were granted access to communal land which allowed them to 
build homes and farm any land they could manage. Unlike full Cherokee citizens, however, 
freedpeople were excluded from the distribution of the Nation’s funds and had limited 
access to services provided by the Nation, such as free education. The status of freedpeople 
therefore became contentious within the Cherokee Nation, as both freedpeople and the 
federal government pressured the Cherokee Nation to award equal rights to those who 
qualified under the 1866 treaty.  As the United States continued to threaten the very 
existence of the Cherokee Nation, eventually dissolving its government in 1907, freedpeople 
figured as a marginalised minority within a disempowered nation. 
Citizenship within the Cherokee Nation did afford former slaves and their 
descendants certain advantages that were not available to their counterparts throughout 
the United States, however. The most immediate of these advantages was their access to 
national land, since freedpeople in the United States struggled against private landownership 
practices that enabled the social and economic elite to retain control of the land.  The 
Freedmen’s Bureau was created in March 1865 to further the concerns of freedpeople in the 
United States and was specifically given the power to rent confiscated and abandoned land 
to former slaves.48  Following President Andrew Johnson’s amnesty proclamation of May 19th 
1865, however, property rights were restored to the vast majority of Confederates, signalling 
the end of land reform experiments.49  Since the majority of freedpeople could not afford to 
purchase land in the United States, many became tenant farmers and sharecroppers, 
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effectively working the land for a ‘share’ of the crop once the landholder had charged rent 
and hire for tools.  Sharecropping then ultimately left many freedpeople and their families in 
a cycle of debt and desperation that many failed to escape from. This differed greatly to the 
experiences of freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation who were able to farm and live on 
communal land freely, placing them in a much more stable and advantageous position.  
Alongside land, the Cherokee Nation also provided services such as free education and 
orphanages to its citizens.  Few freedpeople benefitted from this service, however, as they 
were only allowed to use a handful of segregated schools within the Cherokee Nation and, 
despite making complaints to the Cherokee and federal governments, many started their 
own subscription schools to meet the shortfall.  In the United States, however, education for 
freedpeople was not the responsibility of the federal government and instead it fell to the 
Freedmen’s Bureau to coordinate the efforts of Northern missionary societies and 
freedpeople who established their own schools.50 
It is evident over the course of this thesis that Cherokee freedpeople closely watched 
the United States and its relationship to its own freedpeople.  As detailed above, there were 
key differences in the opportunities available for freedpeople in the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States.  These differences undoubtedly influenced the willingness of Cherokee 
freedpeople to stay within the Nation rather than seeking opportunities elsewhere.  
Furthermore, the broader racial politics of the United States informed the decisions made by 
Cherokee freedpeople as they sought to attain equal rights within the Cherokee Nation.  For 
example, in an 1873 letter regarding the care of orphans, a group of petitioners expressed 
their desire “to avoid the possibility of such indignities being offered to their children as are 
suffered by colored students attending white institutions in the states.”51  Their knowledge 
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of the discriminatory treatment of African American orphans in institutions in the United 
States therefore encouraged them to request a separate institution for the orphaned 
children of Cherokee freedpeople.  Post-emancipation racial politics in the United States 
(which saw the promises of the Reconstruction Amendments rolled back with the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877, Redemption of the South and implementation of Jim Crow laws) are 
therefore key to contextualising the actions of Cherokee freedpeople and are elaborated on 
at various points in this thesis.  
Although freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation already held an advantageous 
position in comparison to their counterparts in the United States, the federal government 
and its officials supported their attempts to gain full rights as Cherokee citizens.  The federal 
government defended the freedpeople’s rights to legal citizenship, national economic 
resources and national land. When the Cherokee Nation denied former slaves citizenship on 
the basis of the January 1867 deadline, for example, federal officials refused to remove them 
from the Nation and even supplied certificates of protection to those they felt had legitimate 
claims to citizenship.52  The federal government interceded again in 1883 when freedpeople 
protested they had not been afforded a share of national funds distributed after the sale of 
lands, eventually securing them their payment in 1888.53  When Cherokee officials proposed 
awarding freedpeople smaller plots during negotiations regarding the allotment of Cherokee 
land, federal officials again enforced the full and equal rights of Cherokee freedpeople.54  In 
all three instances, the federal government over-rode the decisions of the Cherokee Nation 
and awarded freedpeople what they had claimed to be their due.  The Cherokee Nation 
vehemently argued that they held sole jurisdiction over decisions regarding which 
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freedpeople were entitled to citizenship and the nature of that citizenship, but found the 
United States increasingly determined to question their authority towards the final decades 
of the nineteenth century.55 
The Cherokee Nation and the United States continued to clash over freedpeople and 
their status within the Nation until the federal government passed the Curtis Act in 1898, 
making allotment of Cherokee land possible without the consent of its government and 
including provisions for the dissolution of the Nation’s government in 1907.  This was a 
catastrophe for the Cherokee Nation.  The Act divided formerly communal land amongst 
individual Cherokee citizens and in order to do so the Dawes Commission created rolls that 
classified citizens as being either ‘Cherokee by Blood,’ ‘intermarried White,’ or ‘Freedmen.’  
The racial hierarchy within the Cherokee Nation was codified in these documents through 
the use of blood quantum, expressed in fractions, used to record an individual’s degree of 
‘Cherokee blood.’56  Individuals listed on the Freedmen Roll of the Dawes Rolls were allotted 
the same size plot as those listed on the Cherokee by Blood Rolls but were assumed to have 
no Cherokee ancestry and therefore had no blood quantum recorded on the roll.  Most 
freedpeople, at least those who were phenotypically African, were therefore classified as 
separate and racially distinct from Cherokees, regardless of their actual heritage.57  As 
historians Tiya Miles and Fay Yarbrough have illustrated, however, marriages and sexual 
relationships between Cherokee citizens and individuals of African descent, whether before 
or after the abolition of slavery, did produce children with a dual ancestry.58  Yarbrough does 
not provide definitive figures as to how many freedpeople were likely to have had Cherokee 
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ancestry but asserts that those enslaved within the Nation were “often culturally Cherokee, 
and sometimes descended from Cherokees, but unacknowledged as Cherokees legally or 
racially.”59  The administrative distinction made between freedpeople and citizens ‘by Blood’ 
in the Dawes Rolls would become central to arguments surrounding the citizenship status of 
freedpeople in the twenty-first century, since it seemed to prove that freedpeople were 
always understood to be separate and racially distinct from other citizens of the Cherokee 
Nation. 
The Curtis Act had dismantled the government of the Cherokee Nation but its people 
endured, despite no longer being recognised as a sovereign nation by the federal 
government.  According to Circe Sturm, the Nation continued on “its quest to limit their 
extent of their [freedpeople] citizenship” after its government was dissolved.60  In doing so, 
the Cherokee Nation ensured that the status of freedpeople remained contentious through 
the twentieth century.  Now living on privately owned land, allotted by the Dawes 
Commission, all Cherokee citizens struggled to hold on to their formerly sovereign territory 
and maintain a sense of themselves as a distinct political community. Congress passed a 
series of laws in 1908 that renegotiated the terms of allotments awarded to citizens on the 
Freedmen Roll of the Dawes Rolls, charging tax when they had not previously and, through 
giving landowners the authority to sell their land, making them vulnerable to speculators.61  
This stood in contrast to ‘full blood’ Cherokee citizens whose properties continued to be held 
in trust by the federal government.  Furthermore, the Cherokee Nation continued to 
challenge the validity of decisions made by the federal government regarding Cherokee 
freedpeople.  In 1912 the Cherokee Nation successfully appealed a 1909 Court of Claims 
decision that had decided the Dawes Commission should have allowed freedpeople on the 
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Kern-Clifton Roll (the roll of citizens made following the 1895 Court of Claims decisions in 
favour of Cherokee freedpeople rather than the authenticated 1880 census) to enrol.62  In 
1924, Congress passed legislation allowing the Cherokee Nation to recover the money paid 
to such citizen claimants from the United States.63   The Cherokee Freedmen’s Association 
organised in the early 1940s in order to secure rights, including access to national funds, for 
members who had been denied them by Cherokee or federal officials in the first decades of 
the twentieth century.64  The Association folded in the 1960s after failing to gain any success. 
In 1971, the Cherokee Nation government was restored in alignment with federal policies of 
self-determination and the first democratic election of a Chief was held.  Citizenship in the 
Nation had remained open to any individual that could trace their ancestry to the Dawes 
Rolls discussed above and, since private land ownership had replaced the use of communal 
land, the ability to vote became the primary advantage of citizenship.   
In 1984, Reverend Roger Nero filed a class action suit against the Cherokee Nation 
in Tulsa District Court after being denied the right to vote since he was descended from the 
Freedmen Roll.  Nero feared that if the status of freedpeople was not clarified later 
generations would lose their claim to citizenship.  Nero had voted in previous elections but 
policies passed in 1977 and 1978 had limited the right to those who could prove they were 
descended from the Cherokee by Blood Roll, therefore excluding citizens who traced their 
ancestry to the Freedmen Roll alone.  Public positions were also limited to Cherokees by 
Blood, preventing freedpeople from attaining public office.  As Nero and others pursued full 
inclusion within the Nation, he argued that “over the years they have been eliminating us 
gradually.  When the older ones die out, and the young ones come on, they won’t know their 
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rights.”65  Nero’s case was dismissed as being outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court 
and an appeal garnered the same result, allowing the Cherokee Nation to continue excluding 
individuals who could only trace their ancestry to the Freedmen Roll. 
 
They Do Know Their Rights: Cherokee Freedpeople in the Twenty-First Century   
Circe Sturm, writing in 2002, considered Nero’s prediction, that the meaning of being 
descended from former Cherokee slaves would be lost for future generations, to be accurate 
but subsequent events have since proved otherwise.66  Descendants of freedpeople have 
vigorously asserted their claim to equal rights within the Cherokee Nation in the twenty-first 
century.  These rights represent considerable advantages and include not only the ability to 
vote in Cherokee elections but also access to free healthcare, and the ability to apply for 
certain education scholarships reserved solely for tribal citizens (these may be specific to 
Cherokees or open to citizens of other recognised Native nations).  In 2004, Lucy Allen filed 
a lawsuit with the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court charging that policies preventing her and 
other freedpeople from attaining full citizenship rights (particularly the ability to vote) 
conflicted with the Cherokee Constitution.  Two years later, the Cherokee Nation Supreme 
Court ruled in Allen’s favour and opened enrolment to individuals who could prove they had 
ancestors on the Freedmen Roll.   
The Allen case exposed the ongoing conflict within the Nation over the status of the 
descendants of freedpeople and marked the beginning of a series of legal clashes over the 
issue that would attract wide media attention and allegations of racism.67  In 2006, five 
freedpeople led by Marilyn Vann (president of the Descendants of Freedmen of the Five 
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Civilised Tribes organisation) filed a case with the United States Federal Court against the 
Cherokee Nation over their disfranchisement.  Far from losing their connection to the 
Cherokee Nation, then, current generations of freedpeople seem determined to preserve it.  
A year after Marilyn Vann filed her case, the Cherokee Constitution was amended to limit 
membership to individuals who could prove they were Cherokee by blood.  This overturned 
Lucy Allen’s success in the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court, and rescinded the citizenship of 
freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation.  Although plagued by jurisdictional questions and 
attempts by the Cherokee Nation to have the case dismissed, Marilyn Vann’s federal case 
remains unresolved at this time and the status of Cherokee freedpeople therefore remains 
under question.68   
In July 2014, a further class action suit was made on behalf of the descendants of 
Cherokee freedpeople against the Secretary of the Interior and Assistant Secretary of Indian 
Affairs.  The claim demanded the “accounting of money collected from the allotted lands” 
and accused the United States government of deliberately and illegally retaining revenue 
made from the lease of properties allotted to freedpeople minors at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.69  This is a notable divergence from the narrative traced within this thesis 
since it shows Cherokee freedpeople challenging the federal government rather than being 
allied with them and suggests a new assertiveness regarding the rights of freedpeople in the 
twenty-first century.  This case complicates the notion that the federal government operated 
as a supporter of Cherokee freedpeople and their rights, suggesting instead that the federal 
government and its officials were willing to exploit freedpeople in a similar manner to how 
it had exploited the Cherokee Nation.  The case can therefore be considered further evidence 
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that the federal government prioritised its own interests, and those of its citizens, in its 
dealings with the Cherokee Nation and Cherokee freedpeople. 
Media coverage of these legal cases, and the 2007 constitutional amendment in 
particular, brought the history of slavery and racial discrimination within the Cherokee 
Nation to national and international attention.70  Prior to this point, questions over the status 
of freedpeople had remained largely within the bounds of the Nation and the central part 
slavery had played in Cherokee history remained unrecognised.  In Silencing the Past, Michel-
Rolph Trouillot theorised that history is constructed, subject to the workings of power, and 
therefore straddles “knowledge and narrative.”71  According to Trouillot, silences are not 
passive absences but instead occur as the result of active processes shaping the narrative: 
they are themselves “constitutive of the process of historical production.”72  Silences may 
enter a narrative at four points: the creation of sources, the collection of sources in an 
archive, the creation of a narrative, and the evaluation of a history and its significance.73  In 
the case of Cherokee slavery, we can see this process occurring at each stage.  Not only were 
freedpeople largely invisible in historical sources, but sources such as first-hand accounts 
collected in the 1930s were deemed unimportant and as such were neglected and ultimately 
forgotten, left in local archives rather than being sent to Washington, DC. 74  Furthermore, 
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slavery and freedpeople were excluded from the historical narrative of the Cherokee Nation 
until the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
The silencing of a specific memory can be understood as an attempt to “set the limits 
on what is speakable or unspeakable about the past.”75  The prolonged media coverage of 
the disenfranchisement of Cherokee freedpeople in the twenty-first century has, however, 
made ignoring the history of slavery in the Cherokee Nation an impossibility.  In their 
exploration of silences in historical memory, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Chana Teeger 
distinguish between overt silences (a complete lack of recognition, aimed at forgetting) and 
covert silences (in which silences are obscured by a proliferation of discussion but no actual 
content).76  Covert silences therefore appear to address sensitive historical issues but 
actually set the limits of discussion to avoid certain political implications.  Acknowledging the 
practice of slavery whilst simultaneously asserting that slaves and freedpeople lived apart 
from Cherokee society deflects criticism that the Cherokee Nation censors its past yet 
continues to sidestep the difficult aspects of that history.  When Cherokee Principal Chief 
Chad Smith asserted that modifying the constitution to disenfranchise freedpeople was 
simply a question of self-government, for example, some freedpeople argued that he was 
simply trying to evade the more serious issue of racial discrimination with the Cherokee 
Nation.77 
As of September 2016, local and national American papers continue to cover the 
Cherokee freedpeople controversy and still focus on the two key issues of tribal sovereignty 
and racial discrimination.  Although there are notable exceptions, such as Marcos Barbery’s 
piece for Salon, such coverage rarely places the current debate over freedpeople within its 
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broader historical context or does so with little nuance.78  After a disputed election in 2011, 
in which freedpeople were allowed to vote due to the pending nature of the Marilyn Vann 
case, Cherokee author Steve Russell attacked the Nation in an article on the Indian Country 
Today Media Network website.  Entitled ‘Tsunami Warning From the Cherokee Nation,’ 
Russell’s article implied that the constitutional amendment of 2007 was racially motivated: 
“I cannot venture an opinion on whether most Cherokees are racists or the racists are simply 
more motivated to cast a ballot in a special election.” 79  Furthermore, Russell suggested that 
poor handling of the controversies surrounding the 2011 election, and freedpeople more 
generally, could have negative consequences for other Native Nations in the United States: 
it may invite federal intervention in domestic affairs and weaken arguments for tribal self-
government.80  It is implicit throughout Russell’s article that he believes the actions of the 
Cherokee leadership regarding freedpeople, combined with oversimplified media coverage, 
are more likely to encourage enthusiasm for federal action than provoke meaningful 
conversations about tribal sovereignty and self-government. The concerns voiced by Russell 
imply the destructive potential the silences surrounding the Cherokee freedpeople and their 
history of marginalisation hold for certain interest groups. 
 
Painful Pasts: Confronting the Silence 
As underlined above, the marginalisation of Cherokee freedpeople and their history has 
roots extending back more than 150 years.  Academics writing about racial slavery and its 
lasting impact within the Cherokee Nation, or connections between Native Americans and 
African Americans more broadly, have met with opposition from individuals who prefer to 
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maintain these silences and declare such histories to be irrelevant, false, or even dangerous.  
Tiya Miles, for example, recounted such an incident in the preface to her 2006 publication 
Ties That Bind: 
Recently when I was speaking in a public forum about black and American 
Indian relations in colonial and early America, a respected Indian elder from 
a Great Plains tribe impressed on me her strong desire that I cease speaking 
about this topic. [...]  At the end of a private conversation following the 
session, the woman said, “Don’t write your book; it will destroy us.”  I was 
pained by her words, just as she had been pained by mine.81 
The emotive nature of this exchange is revealing for two reasons.  First, the urge to let the 
political implications of Native American involvement in chattel slavery fade into obscurity is 
strong enough for an individual to speak about it candidly and passionately.  Second, the 
unnamed woman articulated the potential danger that such a revelation could ‘destroy’ her 
community today.  Miles goes on to explain that the woman feared the federal government 
would use this knowledge to discredit Native peoples and further attack their sovereignty.82  
The current position of Native nations and citizens is predicated on the recognition of an 
indigenous claim rooted before the arrival of the settler society (i.e. the United States) but 
has to meet certain criteria, including “distinctiveness.”83  The sovereignty of Native nations 
therefore remains fragile and vulnerable to allegations of illegitimacy.  In this case, the 
shared history of slaveholding by Native and white Americans could be utilised as evidence 
that Native American nations were not that far removed from the United States in the 
nineteenth century, and should not be entitled to a special status in America today.   This 
means that the past is therefore inextricably tied to the present in regard to the history of 
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slavery within Native nations, with contemporary tensions being exacerbated by its 
contentious nature.   
In contrast to Tiya Miles’s experience, the anthropologist Circe Sturm was struck by 
how deeply the descendants of freedpeople wanted their history to be told.  When 
researching Cherokee identity, Sturm asked a descendant of former Cherokee slaves what 
he thought she should write about and received an “impassioned” response: 
I think you should write about the racism [...] It is ridiculous to allow white 
people to take advantage of Indian programs because they have blood on a 
tribal roll 100 years ago, when a black person who suffers infinitely more 
discrimination and needs the aid more, is denied it because his Indian 
ancestry is overshadowed by his African ancestry.84 
Sturm’s interviewee then went on to detail how freedpeople had been subject to consistent 
discrimination since their emancipation and argued that racism continued to inform 
contemporary policies within the Cherokee Nation.  In the same manner as Miles’s 
anonymous Indian elder, the interviewee saw the history of racial prejudice within the 
Cherokee Nation through the prism of his contemporary concerns: in this case, exclusion 
from Indian programs.  Sturm’s interviewee suggested that citizenship and its benefits within 
the Nation are more accessible for individuals with white ancestry than African ancestry, 
despite there being no minimum blood quantum requirement.  Sturm’s work revealed her 
sympathy for freedpeople in light of this marginalisation: “At the center of this story is an 
absence, an exclusion, a silence where the Cherokee freedmen might have been.”85  For 
Sturm and her interviewee, then, revealing the hidden history of slavery and racism within 
the Cherokee Nation restores a voice to people who had been silenced.   
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Although Miles and Sturm identified conflicting interests from the perspective of 
academics, a short essay by Valerie Phillips reflected on her experience as an audience 
member at the “Eating Out of the Same Pot” Black Indian Conference held at Dartmouth 
College in 2000.  Phillips’s highly personal piece was included as the epilogue to a collection 
of essays exploring Black Indian experiences in the United States and considered how 
“politics, oppression, academics, too much selective silence, and personal pain mesh in the 
real world.”86  Although Phillips was optimistic in some respects, claiming that “people 
seemed on the verge of seeing each other through our own eyes,” she also argued that a 
number of presentations were “infuriating” or “perhaps even intellectually dishonest.”87  
This would suggest that, as much as there were potential opportunities for sharing ideas and 
information, this was not consistent amongst all presenters and participants.  Furthermore, 
Phillips described a confrontation between two participants at the conference that 
“threatened to spin out of control:” beginning as a disagreement over the details of a 
presentation given by Theda Perdue, their conversation quickly became heated and ended 
with shouting and tears as both left the room.88  Phillips considered this episode to be 
emblematic of enduring racial and gender attitudes within Native American communities, 
which is undoubtedly true, but it also acts as a reminder that these are sensitive subjects and 
there are tensions even amongst those who claim to share an interest in African-Native 
experiences.  For Phillips, talking through shared histories of discrimination offers a way of 
“seeing the past clearly,” moving forward and allowing people to create a future with a 
“solid, indigenous foundation.”89   
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The writings of Miles, Sturm and Phillips raise a number of questions for those 
researching slavery and its legacy within Native nations.  Scholars of Native American slavery 
are caught in contemporary conflicts over how such histories should be remembered, if at 
all: do you continue your research knowing that certain people fear you publishing it?  How 
can you be sensitive to such people without allowing your research to be skewed in favour 
of their political agenda?  Should a historian bear these issues in mind at all?  For members 
of both these disadvantaged groups, whether descendants of freedpeople hoping to secure 
equal citizenship rights within Native nations or Native Americans fearing the federal 
usurpation of tribal sovereignty, conversations surrounding slavery and citizenship in Native 
America involve high stakes.  The polarisation of these groups’ concerns gives the lie to the 
idea that disempowered people would be sympathetic to or inclusive of each other no 
matter what the consequences or future implications.  This thesis will work within the 
collective memories of both the Cherokee Nation and freedpeople claiming citizenship 
within that Nation in order to develop a broader understanding of what was at stake for each 
and how the federal government operated to exert economic and political control over each 
at various moments in the period between the abolition of slavery within the Cherokee 
Nation (1866) and the dissolution of the Cherokee Nation government with Oklahoma 
statehood (1907). 
 
“American History rightly proportioned”? The Historiography of Cherokee Slavery and 
Emancipation 
Histories of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction written in the twentieth century have 
largely ignored the residents of the Indian Territory, whose lived experience differed greatly 
to traditional narratives framed around black-white, north-south binaries.  In doing so, 
academics have maintained the silences evident within particular Native nations around this 
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issue. Notable exceptions to this scholarly trend include Daniel Littlefield, Jr. (1978), William 
McLoughlin (1974, 1993), and Theda Perdue (1979), whose work repositioned the practise 
of slavery as being central to Cherokee society in the nineteenth century.90  Although such 
scholars can be seen as anomalies, they represent the roots of Black Indian Studies as it 
stands today.  This section traces the historiography of slavery and freedpeople in the 
Cherokee Nation from McLoughlin, Perdue, and Littlefield, Jr., to the present day.  A growing 
interest in slavery in the Indian Territory was amplified by the court cases of the twenty-first 
century, prompting a new wave of research that has made considerable steps forward in its 
emphasis on the perspective of freedpeople.  This work has broadened to explore the 
subjective experience of such individuals, the construction of a racial hierarchy within the 
Cherokee Nation, and how freedpeople articulated their uniquely African and Cherokee 
identity. 
With little consideration of the practice of racial slavery among Native nations, it is 
unsurprising that the formerly enslaved do not feature heavily in historical scholarship 
pertaining to the post-Civil War era in Native histories.  In her publication of 1925, however, 
Annie Heloise Abel was the first to identify the enfranchisement of freedpeople as a key 
concern during treaty negotiations between the Cherokee Nation and the federal 
government after the Civil War.91  Abel closely considered the reconciliation of the federal 
and Indian governments, criticising the coercive manner in which federal officials furthered 
the concerns of the United States to the detriment of the Native nations.  Through her use 
of racist terms and assumptions, however, Abel adhered to the language and ideas of the 
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early twentieth century despite arguing that her work endeavoured to further an “American 
History rightly proportioned.”92  In her preface, for example, Abel described the “pitiful racial 
deterioration of the Creeks due to unchecked mixture with the negroes” as a negative 
outcome of the reconstruction treaties in the Indian Territory93  Freedpeople do not figure 
in Abel’s work as agents but rather as pawns between the federal and Cherokee 
governments.  This is arguably due to her focus on the process of reconciliation between the 
two nations, but Abel’s lack of attention to the enslaved themselves is characteristic of 
slavery scholarship produced at this time.94   
For the fifty years following Abel’s publication, little research touched on slavery or 
emancipation in the Cherokee Nation.  Edward Baptist and Stephanie Camp have pinpointed 
the 1970s and 1980s as the decades in which the study of slavery “boomed.”95  Mirroring 
wider trends in the historical investigation of slavery and the Civil War, scholarship has 
expanded to consider the practice of racial slavery by Native nations and the impact of the 
Civil War in the Indian Territory. Through their emphasis on the experiences of “ordinary 
people,” social and cultural historians made space for perspectives that had previously been 
omitted, including those of Native Americans and the enslaved.96  Scholarship on Cherokee 
slavery and freedpeople that grew out of this broader historiographical trend includes 
research by William McLoughlin, Daniel Littlefield, Jr. and Theda Perdue.  In Red Indians, 
Black Slavery and White Racism: America’s Slaveholding Indians (1974), William McLoughlin 
emphasised that the study of slaveholding within Native American nations, and of the 
relationships between Native Americans and people of African descent in general, was in its 
infancy.97  McLoughlin argued that “far too little evidence” was available to make conclusions 
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about the practice of slavery within Native nations at the time of publication, raising instead 
a number of questions that complicated assumptions held regarding Native Americans and 
slavery.98  Through pointing to accounts of violence and rebellion, for example, McLoughlin 
challenged the belief that Native American slaveholders were kinder than their white 
counterparts, before going on to highlight the impossibility of generalising Native American 
attitudes towards people of African descent by identifying the Seminoles as practicing a 
markedly different form of slavery to that in the Cherokee Nation.99  McLoughlin’s article 
therefore operated as an important rallying call for academics to pay attention to this widely 
neglected area of study. 
The first extensive study to place Cherokee freedpeople at the centre of its historical 
narrative, The Cherokee Freedmen: From Emancipation to Citizenship (1978) by Daniel 
Littlefield, Jr., asserted that the legal status of former slaves was “the most complex problem 
the tribe had to deal with from the end of the Civil War until the dissolution of the nation in 
1907.”100  Littlefield framed the freedpeople in relation to tribal sovereignty in his political 
history of the Nation and concluded that, through inviting federal intervention to secure their 
rights as full citizens, freedpeople inadvertently damaged Cherokee attempts to preserve 
their autonomy as a distinct nation.101 As a result of self-determination policies, the Cherokee 
Nation was formally reconstituted and recognised by the federal government in 1976.  At 
the time of writing, then, the enduring questions surrounding the status of freedpeople were 
unlikely to have been evident to Littlefield and he instead stressed the “great” role the 
dispute over freedpeople paid in the “destruction” of the Nation.102  Although Littlefield 
occasionally describes freedpeople as “pawns,” his work stands in stark contrast to Abel who 
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considered the tension over freedpeople to be symptomatic of larger power struggles rather 
than a genuine concern.103   
Like Littlefield, Jr., William McLoughlin largely considered Cherokee slavery and 
freedpeople in relation to Cherokee sovereignty and described them as “pawns in a much 
bigger game.”104    In After the Trail of Tears: the Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839-
1880 (1993), McLoughlin traced the decline of the Cherokee Nation’s ability to govern itself 
in the face of the United States’ massive expansion at this time.  He identified the status of 
freedpeople as a key concern, arguing that chattel slavery and the demands of freedpeople 
after their emancipation were central facets of nineteenth century Cherokee society and 
therefore a key means of exploring the workings of the Cherokee Nation.105  By showing 
Cherokee anxieties over tribal sovereignty and the expansion of the United States to be 
inseparable from their concerns regarding slavery and the status of freedpeople, McLoughlin 
illustrated how integral slavery and the corresponding racial hierarchy were to the Cherokee 
Nation. 
Although McLoughlin and Littlefield were primarily concerned with the relationship 
of Cherokee freedpeople and their descendants to issues of citizenship and sovereignty, 
Theda Perdue explored the construction of the racial hierarchy within the Cherokee Nation 
in her two influential texts, Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee Society (1979) and Mixed 
Blood Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South (2003).  In these texts, Perdue shifts 
attention to the subjective experience and perspective of freedpeople and the enslaved 
which corresponds with the social turn in historical study.106  Perdue theorised the 
development of racial prejudice amongst citizens of the Nation as being the result of 
engagement with American capitalist practices and a means of self-preservation in the face 
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of a Euro-American hierarchy that privileged lighter skin.107  Perdue also pointed to Cherokee 
involvement in the slave trade as playing a role in the creation of the class divisions and the 
political factionalism that characterised the Cherokee Nation in the nineteenth century.108  
Although Perdue’s work was primarily focused before the Civil War, the racial dynamics she 
explored were central to how former slaves were viewed within the Cherokee Nation and 
are therefore essential to understanding their struggles for inclusion after emancipation.   
 
“The Most Comprehensive View:” The Use of Twentieth Century Ex-Slave Narratives 
For much of the twentieth century, sources regarding Cherokee slavery and freedpeople 
were limited to newspaper articles, government documents (of both the Cherokee Nation 
and the United States), and court testimony.109  The sole newspaper published within the 
Cherokee Nation, The Cherokee Advocate, is helpful in considering the public debate 
surrounding the status of freedpeople but does not provide the voices of any freedpeople 
directly.  Similarly, government and court documents have proven to be revealing of what 
the Cherokee legislature, for example, thought about freedpeople, but not the opinion of 
freedpeople themselves.  The most important development in the historiography of slavery 
within the Cherokee Nation, and in the United States more generally, then, was the 
reassessment of ex-slave narratives as rich and legitimate sources starting in the 1970s.   
The ex-slave narratives were first-hand accounts collected through interviews with 
former slaves conducted by fieldworkers from the Federal Writer’s Project, which was part 
of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). The WPA was created as part of the New Deal 
and the Federal Writer’s Project, formed in 1935, and aimed to provide employment for 
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writers. Obtained in 1937, for the most part, reporters located and interviewed elderly 
former slaves and then sent the edited accounts (with the interviewer’s questions removed) 
to Washington D.C. to be preserved.  Although fieldworkers were meant to forward all 
narratives, some were never sent and remained in state and local archives.110 In 1990, fifty-
five slave narratives that had not been sent to Washington were discovered in the Archives 
and Manuscripts Division of the Oklahoma Historical Society.111  A portion of the narratives 
collected in Oklahoma were those of individuals who had been held in slavery by Native 
Americans, including Cherokees, rather than white elites.  These narratives therefore provide 
a vision of slavery that differs to those collected throughout the rest of the American South.  
Ex-slave narratives are widely cited in histories of slavery and emancipation: in 1995 
historian Donna Spindel asserted that the bulk of major revisionist studies of slavery, which 
now form an “essential component” of current understandings of the institution, “rely 
heavily” on ex-slave narratives.112  Examples of these influential works include Roll Jordan 
Roll by Eugene Genovese (1974), The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom by Herbert 
Gutman (1976), and ‘Arn’t I am Woman?’ Female Slaves in the Plantation South by Deborah 
Gray White (1985), which explore enslaved societies, families, and women respectively.113  
Ex-slave narratives have therefore been used to consider the perspective of individuals held 
in slavery rather than just that of slaveholders and continue to be essential in twenty-first 
century scholarship.114  Despite their frequent use, however, the validity of using slave 
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narratives collected in the twentieth century is often questioned.  For example, in his 1984 
article Norman Yetman identified a number of potential problems that need to be kept in 
mind when approaching ex-slave narratives.  These problems included the age of the 
interviewee, the power dynamic between the interviewee and the interviewer, and accuracy 
problems in the recording and editing of transcripts, amongst others.115  Despite these 
reservations, Yetman concluded that research into enslaved life is “enhanced immeasurably” 
through the use of ex-slave narratives.116  Donna Spindel and historian Sharon Ann Musher 
both argued that Yetman’s article is typical of evaluations of ex-slave narratives: the 
problematic qualities of the sources are acknowledged but, rather than attempt to combat 
these drawbacks, the author instead praises their richness.117   
Given how widely ex-slave narratives are used in the twenty-first century, scholars 
should continue to be critical of their potential weaknesses in the same manner they 
approach other sources.  Spindel and Musher proposed different means of approaching the 
problems of ex-slave narratives that attempt to open new areas of investigation.  Spindel 
suggested using current psychological research on long-term memory to evaluate the 
narratives and attempt to ascertain their accuracy.118  Although Spindel failed to reach a 
definite conclusion, her article emphasised how the inclusion of psychological studies added 
further questions surrounding the problems of memory.  Musher, on the other hand, used 
discrepancies between unedited and edited narratives to consider how ex-slave narratives 
collected in Texas and Mississippi were modified to provide readability, ‘authenticity,’ and a 
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paternalistic vision of slavery and emancipation.119  Through considering the weaknesses of 
the ex-slave narratives as sources, Musher therefore revealed how twentieth century racism 
operated.  The most successful uses of ex-slave narratives in the twenty-first century have 
likewise turned their potential flaws into a subject of investigation.  Edward Baptist, for 
example, argued that the ex-slave narratives were the “most important sources” for his 
research on how the formerly enslaved remember the domestic slave trade.120  In “Stol’ and 
Fetched Here,” Baptist analysed the use of language in the narratives and isolated the verb 
‘to steal.’121  Through considering memory and storytelling, the subjective nature of the ex-
slave narratives becomes the point of interest rather than a weakness.  Baptist’s approach 
enabled him to explore the recurring metaphor of theft in regard to the domestic slave trade: 
the criminal connotation of ‘steal’ carried a moral judgement that “belied any myths about 
paternalistic planters and kindly masters.”122  The implications of this conclusion are that 
former slaves understood the domestic slave trade to be morally wrong and a terrible crime.   
Theda Perdue’s work differed markedly from that of Littlefield, Jr. and McLoughlin 
in its inclusion of enslaved voices.  Her monograph, Slavery and the Evolution of Cherokee 
Society (1979), was the first instance in which such narratives were used extensively in regard 
to slavery within the Cherokee Nation and Perdue deemed them “the most comprehensive 
view of the everyday lives of African slaves owned by the Cherokees.”123  In response to the 
work of scholars such as Perdue, Littlefield and McLoughlin, as well as the attention bought 
by the media coverage of recent legal battles, scholarship considering Cherokee slavery and 
freedpeople has proliferated as academics grapple with the issues tied to Cherokee slavery 
and its legacy.  The increasing use of ex-slave narratives in such scholarship corresponded 
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with the turn towards social and cultural histories that began in the 1970s and the twenty-
first century emphasis on subjective experience was made possible through the use of such 
first-hand accounts.   
Narratives of individuals enslaved within the Indian Territory have been used 
extensively in twenty-first century research on Cherokee slavery and emancipation.  The 
publication of the first complete collection of Oklahoma WPA narratives in 1996 made these 
personal accounts more easily available to researchers.  With the exception of Theda 
Perdue’s work, most research written on Cherokee slavery and emancipation prior to this 
point used primary sources that had been produced by government officials rather than 
freedpeople.  Use of the narratives has allowed cultural historians, such as Celia Naylor, to 
analyse the food and clothing practises of those enslaved by the Cherokees before and after 
emancipation.124  In her use of ex-slave narratives as a means of exploring the day-to-day life 
of those enslaved within the Cherokee Nation, Naylor “lifts the veil” on the “seemingly 
implausible reality” of racial slavery within a Native nation.125  Through tracing the transition 
from enslaved to emancipation and citizenship, Naylor explores the vulnerable position of 
Cherokee freedpeople whilst simultaneously revealing their cultural and social links with 
citizens of the Cherokee Nation.  Cherokee freedpeople therefore do not figure as silent 
pawns between the Cherokee Nation and the United States but as individuals with a “unique 
African Cherokee cultural identity.”126  Naylor therefore emphasises the agency of 
freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation and challenges the argument that freedpeople did 
not have a share in the Cherokee culture and lived experience. Such a route of enquiry would 
have been impossible without using firsthand accounts of enslaved life and emancipation 
within the Cherokee Nation.  
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The use of ex-slave narratives within recent scholarship on the Cherokee Nation 
represents a marked attempt to combat the enduring silences regarding slavery and its 
legacy within Native nations.  Fay Yarbrough’s research on the processes of racial 
construction and national identity within the Cherokee Nation uses first-hand accounts to 
reveal how individuals negotiated these notions in the nineteenth century.  Slavery, 
emancipation and the status of freedpeople figure strongly in Yarbrough’s work, revealing 
the new importance awarded to these issues in broader histories of the Cherokee Nation.   
The scope of her research also allows Yarbrough to compare the position of Cherokee 
freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation to that of intermarried white men and individuals 
classed as intruders, further complicating their status within the Nation.  Yarbrough uses ex-
slave narratives alongside marriage records to further her analysis of how miscegenation 
laws regulated concepts of Cherokee identity and created a racial hierarchy within the 
Cherokee Nation that specifically targeted people of African descent as being unfit for 
citizenship.127 Furthermore, in using WPA narratives to explore how the enslaved understood 
interracial relationships to be more desirable with Cherokee rather than white partners, 
Yarbrough offers a rare glimpse of how the enslaved understood race and sex from their 
viewpoint.128 By envisioning Cherokee legislators as the creators of this hierarchy, Yarbrough 
returns to, and challenges, Theda Perdue’s vision of the Cherokee Nation as absorbing and 
emulating Euro-American prejudices and instead paints its citizens as active and aware 
participants in the process.   
Ties that Bind: the Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom by Tiya 
Miles is perhaps the most insightful consideration of slavery and emancipation in the 
Cherokee Nation written in the twenty-first century.  Although Miles utilises ex-slave 
narratives in her other work, in Ties That Bind she uses the history of the Shoeboots family 
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as a case study to explore the gradual hardening of racial lines described in Perdue’s work.129  
By their very nature, family histories place the lived experience of their subjects at the centre 
of the discussion rather than tangential to wider historical context: in this case, the 
descendants of Shoeboots and his enslaved partner Doll.  Family history has proven a fruitful 
way of approaching the complex issues surrounding race and citizenship within formerly 
slaveholding Native Nations and, in the case of Ties that Bind, reveal that “Cherokee” and “of 
African descent” were not always distinct categories.130  Miles employs the transition from 
enslaved to free among the enslaved within the Cherokee Nation to explore the processes 
of racial categorisation made evident by Perdue, tracing how one side of a family can attain 
citizenship whilst their relatives remain unable to prove their connection to the Nation.131     
As detailed above, scholars have pushed the study of Cherokee slavery and 
freedpeople in new directions in the twenty-first century.  In Black Slaves, Indian Masters 
(2013), however, historian Barbara Krauthamer identified the necessity of exploring how the 
inclusion of freedpeople and Native sovereignty became constructed as oppositional.132  
Krauthamer suggested paying closer attention to the “complexity and inconsistency” of 
Reconstruction within Native nations to analyse how the rights of freedpeople and the 
sovereignty of Native nations became understood as antithetical within these nations.133  
This thesis is a response to Krauthamer’s observation, and will make a marked contribution 
to the emerging field of Black Indian Studies by attempting to understand the questions 
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surrounding decisions taken on the rights of Cherokee freedpeople through the voices and 
actions of freedpeople themselves.  This thesis utilises material collected through archival 
research to revisit the four decades following emancipation.  Cherokee national records held 
by the Oklahoma Historical Society and in the Western History Collection at the University of 
Oklahoma will be used to explore the position of the Cherokee Nation in regards to 
freedpeople and citizenship whilst federal records held by the National Archives and Records 
Administration in Fort Worth, TX, and Washington, DC, will be used to consider the position 
held by the United States.  The actions and perspectives of freedpeople will be explored 
through material collected within the Cherokee and federal archives (largely in the form of 
letters received by officials of those nations) and in published ex-slave narratives.  In doing 
so, this thesis re-examines the clashes over the status of freedpeople and challenges their 
classification as pawns in work by scholars such as Littlefield and McLoughlin.  
 Exploring how much influence Cherokee freedpeople had over the debates 
surrounding their citizenship requires clarification of the term ‘agency’ as it is used within 
the thesis.  In his 2003 essay, ‘On Agency’, slavery historian Walter Johnson critiqued how 
scholars utilised ‘agency,’ which he described as the “master trope” of New Social History.134  
According to Johnson, the term has been used in two ways: as a synonym for “humanity” 
and to describe “self-directed action” or free will.135  Using agency as a synonym for humanity 
is problematic since it erases the meaning of actions (whether political, cultural or 
otherwise), limiting them to being evidence that the subject is human and in doing so 
reproducing the white supremacist question of whether enslaved people lacked humanity.  
Stressing free will, on the other hand, overemphasises liberal ideas of independence and 
assumes their universality across time and space, leading to the assumption that any action 
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reveals resistance.136  Johnson therefore cautions that the trope of agency needs to be used 
carefully since humanity should be the “simple predicate” of all historical investigation and 
any individuals’ lived experiences are “powerfully conditioned” by the circumstances or 
structures in which they find themselves: a more appropriate scholarly question would 
consider the condition of the subject’s humanity.137  Lynn Thomas, writing in 2016, suggested 
that the concerns Johnson raised in his essay remain pertinent today and urged scholars to 
avoid using agency as a conclusion rather than as a “conceptual tool or starting point.”138  
This thesis therefore does not conclude that Cherokee freedpeople had humanity but instead 
assumes that this is a given and historicises their actions.  It is made evident over the course 
of this thesis that Cherokee freedpeople acted to secure their own interests but their ability 
to affect change was circumscribed by the Cherokee Nation and the United States.  The 
agency of Cherokee freedpeople was therefore qualified by the structures within which they 
lived and the comparative power of the Cherokee Nation and the United States.  This is not, 
however, to say that Cherokee freedpeople lacked agency or free will and this thesis argues 
instead that Cherokee freedpeople gained some successes, albeit limited, through particular 
interventions and interruptions in the master narratives of both the United States and the 
Cherokee Nation. 
 
Conclusion 
The historic marginalisation of freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation facilitated a lasting 
silence around histories of slavery and racial discrimination within the Nation.  The contested 
incorporation of freedpeople within the Cherokee citizenry after the Civil War, and the 
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coercive role the federal government played in defending their rights, have figured as 
uncomfortable elements of Cherokee Nation history until the present day.  For much of the 
twentieth century, this silence was mirrored in historical scholarship.  Beginning in the 1970s, 
however, scholars have made distinct efforts to recognise the centrality of slavery and its 
legacy to Cherokee society, both in the past and the present.  Although hindered by a scarcity 
of sources, the renewed interest sparked by controversial legal battles and availability of ex-
slave narratives have prompted new and innovative research that questions and advances 
ideas first published in the 1970s. In the same vein as research focused on slavery in the 
United States, recognising the important role played by the enslaved and freedpeople in the 
social fabric of the Nation has led to a better understanding of the Cherokee Nation and its 
interactions with the United States.   As freedpeople continue to pursue their inclusion within 
the Cherokee Nation and researchers continue to analyse the significance of slavery within 
Native nations in the twenty-first century, then, these silences seem less impenetrable.  
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Chapter Two: Seeking Legal Citizenship in the Cherokee Nation 
They [Cherokee Nation] further agree that all freedmen who have been 
liberated by voluntary act of their former owners by law, as well as all free 
colored persons who were in the country at the commencement of the 
rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may return within six months, 
and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees.139 
Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, 1866 
 
The immediate challenge for freedpeople who chose to remain within the Cherokee Nation 
after their emancipation was having their claim to do so recognised by the Cherokee 
authorities.  Although the Loyal National Council had voluntarily abolished slavery from the 
Nation, they refused to offer citizenship to freedpeople until forced to do so during treaty 
negotiations with the United States.  The 1866 Reconstruction Treaty that awarded 
citizenship to former Cherokee slaves, cited above, also reiterated the duty of the United 
States to remove all non-citizens or intruders, meaning that everyone residing within the 
boundaries of the Nation had to prove their citizenship or be forcibly removed by the United 
States military.  In the face of this threat, freedpeople acted to claim the legal citizenship for 
themselves and their families which would protect them from removal.   
 Interactions between Cherokee and federal officials regarding freedpeople have 
been characterised by disagreement and tension from the end of the Civil War through to 
the present day, but the terms of this dispute were set within fifteen years of Cherokee 
emancipation as freedpeople initially sought to claim legal citizenship within the Nation.  
Those who were denied such rights, whether in court or by Cherokee census takers, sought 
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the support of federal officials who they hoped would pressure the Cherokee Nation to fairly 
assess their claims to citizenship.  Although freedpeople first acted alone to secure the rights 
for themselves and their families, by the 1870s they were appealing to federal officials both 
individually (in the form of personal letters) and collectively (by petition).140  Through 
defending their right to remain within the Cherokee Nations as citizens, freedpeople 
inadvertently created a jurisdictional dispute between the Cherokee Nation and the United 
States, both of whom claimed final authority over questions of who was and was not a 
Cherokee.  The triangular nature of this dispute is key to understanding the power dynamics 
it made evident.  Whilst the jurisdictional dispute was ostensibly between the two nations, 
it was the actions of freedpeople in the wake of claiming their emancipation and asserting 
their right to citizenship (whether as individuals or as a group) that fuelled longstanding 
tensions and distrust between federal and Cherokee officials.   
Immediately following the passage of the Reconstruction Treaty, federal officials 
respected the rights of the Cherokee authorities to determine who was and was not 
Cherokee and their obligation to remove non-citizens. However, repeated pleas from 
freedpeople who feared removal prompted these same officials to challenge whether the 
Cherokee Nation held final authority over the issue and, by doing so, questioned the 
sovereignty and autonomy of the Cherokee Nation.  Federal officials expressed concerns, 
both amongst themselves and with the Cherokee leadership, over the justice of a deadline 
limiting citizenship only to those who returned to the Nation by January 1867.  The 
disagreements between Cherokee and federal officials over freedpeople encouraged 
Cherokee resentment of freedpeople, and several accused them of acting for their own 
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interests and against the authority of the Nation.141  Although the citizenship status of former 
Cherokee slaves remained under debate for the entire period covered by this thesis (1866-
1907), this chapter considers the first 15 years following the Civil War.  This chapter therefore 
considers the dispute over freedpeople from when citizenship was awarded to former 
Cherokee slaves within the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty through to the creation of the 1880 
census, which the Nation hoped would finally resolve questions surrounding which 
individuals did and did not hold Cherokee citizenship.  During this short period, the position 
of the Cherokee Nation and the United States on the issue of freedpeople and their 
citizenship would become increasingly combative and, by 1880, a compromise appeared 
impossible. Recognised citizenship was, and remains, the foundation upon which all other 
rights were accessed in the Cherokee Nation.  Although freedpeople may have been primarily 
concerned with the right to remain within the Nation in the immediate aftermath of the Civil 
War, the importance of recognised citizenship became further apparent as freedpeople 
struggled to gain access to the rights associated with Cherokee citizenship (including 
nationally-funded education and their share of national funds) in later years.  Furthermore, 
it was through these early attempts to gain recognised citizenship that freedpeople became 
familiar with the institutions they would use to pursue access to the other rights considered 
by this thesis (education, national funds and land). 
Given the increasingly vulnerable position of the Cherokee Nation in relation to the 
United States as the nineteenth century progressed, retaining control over citizenship was a 
matter of supreme importance to the Cherokee Nation. As discussed in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis, the ability to control citizenship rules is a crucial means by which a 
nation defines itself and is therefore a key component of sovereignty: what Kirsty Gover 
                                                          
141 ‘Charles Thompson to Cherokee National Council, November 14, 1877.’ University of Oklahoma 
Libraries, Western History Collections, Cherokee Nation Papers (CNP) Microfilm Edition, Roll 3, 
Folder 213. 
55 
 
described as the “first order of tribal self-governance.”142  The Cherokee Nation resisted the 
federal government’s growing power within the Indian Territory after the Civil War through 
attempting to maintain sole discretion over the citizenship status of freedpeople and 
claiming jurisdiction over the boundaries of its citizenry.143  In doing so, the Cherokee Nation 
asserted itself as a separate nation.144  The United States challenged the Nation’s right to 
govern its own population and therefore its sovereignty, however, by questioning the 
Cherokee Nation’s authority to delineate which freedpeople were entitled to citizenship and 
the nature of that citizenship in the years following the Civil War.  Gover further argues that 
citizenship rules are a “legal manifestation of cultural production,” revealing how a 
community defines itself against other groups and representing an “expression of a 
provisional consensus within a tribal community, emerging from political processes of 
debate and contestation.”145  Importantly, the processes by which a nation or tribe decides 
on its citizenship rules are internal and based on disagreements and agreements made within 
its community: not imposed by outsiders. 
Recognition or acceptance as a citizen is the fundamental component of citizenship 
to which all other rights are attached, whether such rights are political or social in nature.  In 
his seminal work on citizenship in Europe, sociologist T. H. Marshall offered the following 
concise definition of citizenship: a “status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
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community.  All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with 
which the status is endowed.”146  Awarding or denying citizenship therefore operates as a 
means of including or excluding individuals from any given community.  Furthermore, 
citizenship is the manifestation of a relationship between the said community and its 
members, in which both have obligations to the other.  A citizen may be expected to 
participate in political processes and pay taxes, for example, whilst the institutions of their 
community may protect the rights of citizens through guaranteeing equality before the law.   
Being awarded citizenship was a necessity for freedpeople who chose to remain 
within the Cherokee Nation as without it they would be marked as outsiders and denied 
access to the rights shared by Cherokee citizens.  Although their skin colour and status as 
former slaves seemed to preclude Cherokee citizenship, by insisting on their rights 
freedpeople put forward a claim on Cherokee identity (and citizenship) that prioritised 
political and cultural affiliation over race.  As Fay Yarbrough has illustrated, over the course 
of the nineteenth century the notion of Cherokee identity had moved away from kinship or 
clan affiliation and towards a racial definition (and specifically the exclusion of individuals 
with African ancestry).147  
The rights associated with Cherokee citizenship differed in various respects to the 
rights held by citizens of the United States.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
Cherokees “wrestled with the question of their own identity and future” and moved away 
from self-governing towns and the clan kinship system, slowly and controversially 
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introducing the idea of a Cherokee nation.148  The Cherokee Nation modelled its 1827 
constitution on that of the United States, creating notions of legal citizenship that often 
conflicted with more traditional ideas of kinship and clan membership: it modified the 
document to meet its own needs.149  The Constitution guaranteed various rights to citizens: 
access to education; due process under the law; the right to vote (confined to male citizens 
over the age of eighteen); and a share in public national funds, amongst others. These rights 
were reaffirmed after removal to Indian Territory in the 1839 Cherokee Constitution.  Of 
most significance for this chapter, citizens were entitled to build on or farm any national land 
that was not being used by another citizen.  Furthermore, although citizens may not own the 
land they could lay claim to any buildings they erected on it: any “improvements made 
thereon [on Cherokee land], and in the possession the citizens respectively who made, or 
may rightly be in possession of them.”150  The Cherokee Constitution therefore protected the 
idea of “common property” rather than private property practices as seen in the United 
States.  A Cherokee citizen lost any claim to their improved land or built improvements if 
they took United States citizenship or removed from within the boundaries of the Cherokee 
Nation to reside elsewhere.  In doing so, an individual effectively rescinded their Cherokee 
citizenship and it could only be restored through making a memorial to the National Council.   
Cherokee citizenship therefore offered significant advantages for freedpeople after 
the abolition of slavery. Land was an essential resource for freedpeople who endeavoured 
to build a new life outside of slavery, since farming offered a means of producing necessary 
food items and generating an income.  In the United States, freedpeople and their allies who 
advocated land reform ultimately failed to secure their goals which left many freedpeople 
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landless and impoverished.  The Freedmen’s Bureau was created in March 1865 to further 
the concerns of freedpeople in the United States and was specifically given the power to rent 
confiscated and abandoned land to former slaves. Although Radical Republicans advocated 
huge land reform that would provide freedpeople with their own land on a permanent basis, 
schemes such as William T. Sherman’s Field Order 15, which made provisions for parcels of 
forty acres of land down the Atlantic seaboard of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida to be 
settled by families of former slaves, proved to be temporary and the vast majority of 
freedpeople were landless.151  In 1865, 40,000 freedpeople occupied land as a result of 
Sherman’s Field Order 15.  By the end of 1866, only 1565 still had possession of the land.152  
Since the majority of freedpeople could not afford to purchase land in the United States, 
many became tenant farmers and sharecroppers, effectively working the land for a ‘share’ 
of the crop once the landholder had charged rent and hire for tools.  Sharecropping afforded 
little opportunity for labourers to escape their “ dire poverty,” especially since bad harvests 
or economic depressions drove them further into debt.153   Members of the Young Men’s 
Progressive Association, a black organisation based in South Carolina asserted that 
sharecropping ensured that freedpeople remained dependent: “so long as the labor of the 
working rural people is controlled by their employer, just so long must the people be in a 
state of squalid, wretched poverty.”154  In contrast, freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation 
were able to farm and live on communal land freely since they did not need to rent or 
purchase it, placing them in a much more stable and advantageous position.155  The ability 
to immediately settle on and farm unused land in the Cherokee Nation following the passage 
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of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty therefore gave Cherokee freedpeople markedly different 
opportunities than those available to freedpeople throughout the United States.   
Although scholars are in agreement that the land practices of the Cherokee Nation 
afforded its freedpeople certain advantages in comparison to former slaves in the United 
States, Celia Naylor offers an important warning against overstating their situation.  Before 
the passage of the 1866 treaty that guaranteed their citizenship, Cherokee freedpeople 
struggled alongside Cherokees to recover but “had the additional burden of carving a free 
life out of the rubble and despair with no material resources at all.”156  During this time, 
freedpeople worked as tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the same manner as their 
counterparts in the United States and faced the same difficulties.  Once citizenship had been 
granted and freedpeople could claim land to improve for themselves, they may not have had 
to pay rent but they still had to find the necessary resources to begin their new life outside 
of slavery. Furthermore, although freedpeople did not experience the same violence as 
freedpeople in the United States, much of the Cherokee population shared similar racial 
prejudices against people of African descent.157  Anti-miscegenation laws remained in place 
following the Civil War outlawing marriage and sexual relations between African Americans 
and the Cherokee.  Fay Yarbrough argues that this law highlights the Cherokee desire to keep 
people of African descent separate from the larger population and that they did not consider 
them to be appropriate citizens or marriage partners.158   
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Crossroads: Emancipation in the Cherokee Nation 
The Civil War had decimated the Cherokee Nation, leaving “an air of ruin and desolation 
through the whole country” and deep divisions amongst its people.159  Historian Mary Jane 
Warde has described the loss of population throughout the Indian Territory as “staggering,” 
estimating that the Cherokees lost four thousand people during the conflict.160   In spite of 
this devastation, former slaves, made “forever free” by the Loyal Cherokee National Council 
on February 12st 1863 (effective June 25th 1863), could look forward knowing that their 
freedom was assured in the post-war Cherokee Nation.161  The exact terms of this freedom 
remained unclear, however, since the 1863 emancipation proclamation made no mention of 
whether former slaves of Cherokees were entitled to Cherokee citizenship.  From the 
moment they were granted their freedom, then, Cherokee freedpeople occupied a marginal 
space within the Cherokee population: neither slaves nor citizens.   Although the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the United States appeared to 
resolve this question by awarding citizenship to freedpeople and their descendants, the 
nature of this citizenship and exactly who qualified for it has remained contentious ever 
since. 
The abolition of slavery came within a broader period of drastic transformations that 
greatly affected the lived experiences of the Cherokee population at large, not just those 
who had been enslaved within its borders.162  Fay Yarbrough described the emancipation of 
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Cherokee slaves as “a moment pregnant with possibility” and a “crossroads” for the 
Nation.163  By the outbreak of the Civil War, slavery was entrenched as an institution in the 
Nation and resembled its counterpart as practiced throughout the slaveholding states. 
Cherokee society was organised around concepts of race that firmly placed people of African 
descent at the bottom of the social order.164  The abolition of slavery opened a window in 
which change was possible and the Cherokee Nation could choose to accept freedpeople as 
valued members of their community, therefore separating questions of citizenship from 
notions of race.  By adopting freedpeople as full and equal citizens, the Cherokee Nation 
could have heralded a new era of racial equality within its territory.  As is evident throughout 
this thesis, however, the Cherokee Nation refused to rethink its understanding of Cherokee 
identity and instead attempted to both limit the number of freedpeople it would incorporate 
within its citizenry and the rights these individuals would be entitled to.  It is important to 
note here that there was considerable disagreement amongst the Cherokee leadership over 
the status of freedpeople. Vocal advocates of their full incorporation included Principal 
Chiefs Lewis Downing and Dennis Bushyhead, while the Cherokee National Council and 
population at large were not unanimous in their views on the issue.  However, policies 
enacted by the Cherokee National Council and implemented by Cherokee officials served to 
minimise the rights afforded to freedpeople after the Civil War.165 
Emancipation was a confused process in the Cherokee Nation, as it was in the United 
States.  First-hand accounts collected from ex-slaves reveal the diverse experiences of 
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Cherokee freedpeople as they gained their freedom at varying points during the American 
Civil War, offering a means of more closely considering the chaotic nature of this process.  
The transition from enslaved to free was complicated by the haphazard nature in which the 
enslaved were liberated by their Cherokee masters.  Whilst some Cherokee slaves were 
liberated by the February 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, others continued to be held in 
slavery until after the end of the war in April 1865 and beyond.  Slaveholding Cherokees who 
supported the Confederacy refused to accept the authority of the Loyal National Council over 
any issue, including the abolition of slavery, and therefore continued to practice the 
institution until the ratification of the Reconstruction Treaty in 1866.  Many Confederate 
Cherokees had also left the Cherokee Nation, fleeing to Texas or other Indian nations and 
taking their slaves with them.  Leaving served dual purposes: avoiding conflict with Loyal 
Cherokees as factionalism exploded throughout the Nation, and affording better protection 
of their enslaved labourers by moving them away from Union forces.  Sarah Wilson, for 
example, was smuggled to Texas from the Nation in covered wagons after "Yankee soldiers 
got too close by in the first part of the War."166  Although some of the men travelling with 
Wilson, including her uncle, were able to use the confusion created during this removal to 
“slip off to the north” and claim their freedom, Sarah and others continued to be held in 
slavery outside the borders of the Cherokee Nation.167   
Unlike their counterparts held by Loyal Cherokees, individuals owned by 
Confederate Cherokees continued to be enslaved until their owners chose to free them (or 
until the passage of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty). Sarah Wilson continued to be held in 
slavery until after the Civil War, at which point her master received a letter from Fort Smith 
detailing the abolition of slavery.  After his daughter read the letter to him, Wilson’s master 
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“went wild and jumped on her and beat the devil out of her. Said she was lying to him.”168  
This extreme reaction underscores the casual manner in which Wilson’s master, and other 
Cherokee slaveholders, could use violence within his household and the power he wielded 
as a patriarch over his dependents.  In particular, his disbelief and ‘wild’ response illustrates 
the investment Cherokee slaveholders had in the institution of slavery.  Upon his recovery, 
Wilson’s master offered to assist his former slaves in returning to the Indian Territory, an 
offer rejected by Wilson's mother who preferred to find her own way back.  As Celia Naylor 
argues, this was an extraordinary expression of independence by Wilson’s mother that 
encompassed not only her own freedom but also an assertion of her authority as a mother.169  
Other enslaved people who had been removed from the Nation forced their former owners 
to take responsibility for them.  When Patsy Perryman’s mistress freed her slaves, for 
example, she attempted to abandon them in Texas.   After Perryman’s mother “cried so hard 
she couldn’t stand it,” however, Perryman’s mistress allowed them to ride back to the Nation 
with her on an ox wagon which saved them a long and difficult journey.170  Unlike Wilson and 
Perryman, Chaney Richardson was informed about her emancipation by Union soldiers.  
Richardson told a field worker from the Oklahoma Writers' Project that after soldiers raided 
her home, her master and mistress removed outside the Cherokee Nation, taking their 
enslaved workforce with them: "All the slaves was piled in together and some of the grown 
ones walking, and they took us way down across the big river and kept us in the bottoms a 
long time until the War was over."171  It was only as they passed through Fort Gibson on their 
way home that Richardson and other slaves she was travelling with learnt of the abolition of 
slavery from Union soldiers.  The Civil War concluded two summers after the Loyal National 
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Council had abolished slavery, meaning it is likely that Richardson and her companions had 
been held in slavery for two years longer than individuals enslaved by Loyal Cherokees.   
Individuals freed as a result of the Loyal National Council's 1863 Emancipation 
Proclamation may have been awarded their liberty earlier than those cited above, but 
claiming this freedom in the midst of war was no easy task.  Betty Robertson lived at the 
Vann plantation for the duration of the war until "Young Master Joe come to the cabins and 
say we all free and can't stay there less'n we want to go on working for him just like we'd 
been, for our feed and clothes."172  Robertson and her family journeyed for days to Fort 
Gibson, by the south-west border of the Cherokee Nation, rather than stay under those 
terms and found that "there was lots of negroes there."173  Switching between Union and 
Confederate control throughout the war, freedpeople and Cherokees alike flocked to Fort 
Gibson and sought protection against local guerrilla fighters and thieves.  Fort Gibson 
therefore repeatedly figures as a refuge in ex-slave narratives recounted by Cherokee 
freedpeople: for example, having heard that rations were being handed out, Sarah Wilson 
and her mother endured a journey that was "hell on earth" to make it to Fort Gibson.174  
Rochelle Ward describes “negroes piled in from everywhere” and Phyllis Petite found her 
“own grand mammy was cooking for the soldiers at the garrison.”175  By the end of the Civil 
War in 1865, many Cherokees and freedpeople were miles from their former homes, having 
spread throughout the Indian Territory and the United States depending on their individual 
circumstances.  Some freedpeople had ventured even further afield to escape the turmoil of 
war, travelling huge distances and bearing the consequences of hunger and disease once 
emancipated.  When Lucinda Vann's master and mistress told their slaves they were free to 
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leave, a group who were "part Indian and part colored" left the Indian Territory and headed 
for Mexico, only to return after the War to discover that "Nothing was left" and their 
"Marster and Missus was dead."176  Vann’s narrative emphasises the physical and social 
destruction wrought by the Civil War in the Cherokee Nation.  Vann and her fellow travellers 
chose to leave the Nation, seeking their fortune in Mexico again, returning to the Cherokee 
Nation years later once “everything quiet down and everything just right.”177  
Cherokee freedpeople were non-citizens for three years, from their emancipation in 
June 1863 to the agreement of the Reconstruction Treaty between the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States in June 1866.  Cherokee slaves may have been liberated by the 1863 
emancipation proclamation but that did not guarantee their inclusion within the larger 
Cherokee population.  An act passed by the Loyal National Council on November 14th 1863, 
nine months after the body first abolished slavery, attempted to clarify the status of 
freedpeople and asserted that "liberated slaves not having rights and privileges as the 
Citizens of the Cherokee Nation, shall be viewed and treated as other persons, members of 
other Nations or communities, possessing no rights to citizenship."178   William McLoughlin 
has interpreted this Act as convincing evidence that, although they voluntarily abolished 
slavery, it would be misleading to represent Cherokees as abolitionists of the "radical 
Garrisonian variety;" the Cherokee leadership were not interested in inclusion or racial 
equality.179  Despite striking down any laws specifically targeting people of African descent 
(such as being prohibited from learning to read) when they abolished slavery, the Cherokee 
National Council chose to retain its anti-miscegenation laws.180  By deliberately excluding 
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freedpeople from the Cherokee citizenry at this time (but allowing them to stay if they 
obtained work permits), Loyal Cherokees revealed that the only value they saw in 
freedpeople was their capacity as labourers.  As a direct result of the November 14th 1863 
Act, then, Cherokee freedpeople were classed as outsiders in both the Cherokee Nation and 
the United States after their emancipation, technically noncitizens in both.  
The inclusion of former Cherokee slaves was a crucial component of talks to formally 
reconcile the Cherokee Nation and the United States after the Civil War.  The 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty was the result of lengthy and difficult negotiations between federal 
officials and representatives of both the pro-Union “Loyal” majority and pro-Confederacy 
“Southern” minority.  The Civil War had reignited older tensions rooted in the decades before 
the war and the leaders of each faction denied the legitimacy of the other’s right to lead the 
Nation.  Furthermore, both Cherokee factions had their own visions of their post-war 
relationship with the United States and each other.181  Annie Heloise Abel provided the first 
sustained examination of the negotiations between the United States and the nations of the 
Indian Territory in her 1925 monograph The American Indian and the End of the Confederacy. 
Abel questioned the strategy of federal officials as they negotiated with Cherokee delegates, 
suggesting that they exploited the divisions between Southern and Loyal Cherokees to 
further their own objectives, namely the erosion of Cherokee sovereignty and territory.182  
The Reconstruction Treaty that resulted from these negotiations contained a number of 
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clauses detrimental to the autonomy of the Cherokee Nation, including but not limited to: 
the creation of a United States District Court within the Nation; making land available for the 
construction of a railroad through the Cherokee Nation; and allowing the United States to 
settle other Indian nations on Cherokee land, subject to a financial settlement.183  The treaty 
also contained certain clauses beneficial to the Cherokee Nation, including the right to 
appoint an agent to examine Cherokee accounts with the United States government and 
protection from intruders, although these are few in comparison to clauses that favour the 
United States.184  The Reconstruction treaties made with the nations of the Indian Territory 
therefore enabled the federal government to expand its power within the Indian Territory 
and represent a key moment on the path to US absorption of the Indian Territory and 
Oklahoma statehood.  
As the first legal document to guarantee citizenship for freedpeople and their 
descendants, the Reconstruction Treaty became the lynchpin around which arguments for 
and against the rights of former Cherokee slaves revolved.  Debate has largely centred on 
the coercive nature of the treaty negotiations and the ambiguous language of Article 9 which 
granted "all the rights of native Cherokees" to "all freedmen who have been liberated by 
voluntary act of their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored persons who were 
in the country at the commencement of the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who 
may return within six months, and their descendants, shall have all the rights of native 
Cherokees."185  There is a clear gap between the National Council’s rejection of freedpeople 
as citizens on November 14th 1863 and the wording of the treaty, which afforded the same 
‘all the rights of native Cherokees.’  Delegates of the United States asserted that awarding 
citizenship to freedpeople was an essential and non-negotiable component of any 
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reconciliation between the Cherokee Nation and the United States, leading to the addition 
of Article 9 to the treaty over great reluctance on the part of the Cherokee delegates.186  
Furthermore, whilst the Cherokee Nation was forced to award citizenship to its former 
slaves, Confederate states were not subject to the same conditions: they also had to abolish 
slavery but were not expected to award full citizenship to freedpeople.187  The United States 
insisted that the Cherokee Nation awarded its freedpeople citizenship two years before they 
did the same with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, giving credence to the 
argument that the Nation was penalised more severely than states that seceded from the 
Union.  Arguably, the treaty negotiations represented an opportunity for the United States 
to further its own agenda and assert its dominance in Indian Territory.  Proponents of the 
disenfranchisement of freedpeople have argued both then and now that the clause was 
included at the insistence of federal officials and at the expense of Cherokee autonomy.  
Furthermore, they argue that the ambiguity of Article 9 indicates that it was not intended to 
confer full citizenship on freedpeople in perpetuity.188 Proponents of their inclusion have 
argued, in turn, that the phrasing explicitly gives freedpeople full and equal rights and that 
the coercive nature of the treaty negotiations does not affect the justice of awarding 
freedpeople citizenship: the Cherokee Nation can choose to accept the validity of Article 9 
because they are in agreement with its principle.189       
As a result of the new attention being paid to how Native Nations both participated 
in and were affected by the American Civil War, scholars have reassessed the Reconstruction 
Treaties and the delegates which made them.  In 1925, Abel attributed the "confiscation of 
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rights," made binding in the treaty, to the "ignorance" of Cherokee delegates and "their 
refusal to profit by experience."190   Abel’s unforgiving depiction of the Cherokee delegates 
as unintelligent and stubborn firmly locates her work within early twentieth century 
scholarship.  In the twenty-first century, scholars of Native history do not share Abel’s racist 
assumptions but instead recognise both the precarious position of the Cherokee Nation (and 
the other nations located in the Indian Territory) at this historical moment and the successes 
of the Cherokee delegates.  The Cherokee Nation was relatively robust before the Civil War, 
having largely recovered both socially and economically from forced removal to the Indian 
Territory.  However, the Civil War had reduced it to a state of disarray akin to that seen during 
the first years in their new home.  During their negotiations, federal officials questioned the 
loyalty of both the Cherokee leadership and its citizenry, using Cherokee actions during the 
Civil War to compound their relatively weak position.  Federal officials used the brief alliance 
between the Cherokee Nation and the Confederacy as a justification to overturn previous 
treaties that could have been invoked to protect Cherokee interests.191  Deliberately 
overemphasising the Cherokee relationship with the Confederacy ignored the loyalty and 
military service of thousands of Cherokees to the Union and afforded the federal officials 
huge leverage with which to pressure the Cherokee delegates.   The lingering divisions within 
the Cherokee Nation made presenting a united front against these tactics impossible. 
Scholars such as William McLoughlin asserted that early on in the discussions the 
“negotiating strength lay with [Commissioner Dennis N.] Cooley” (who led the United States 
delegates). 192  McLoughlin depicts Cooley as an opportunist who capitalised on the rivalry 
between the two Cherokee factions to “squeeze[d] out of them as many concessions as he 
could.”193  Clarissa Confer agrees with McLoughlin and argues that the post-war treaty 
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negotiations left “an embarrassing record of greed, bullying and a lack of understanding of 
Indian culture on the part of the United States commissioners.”194  Despite these significant 
obstacles, the Cherokee delegates won certain successes: Principal Chief John Ross, 
described as a “formidable adversary” by Confer, fought to ensure Cherokee unity and 
protect Cherokee interests.195  Mary Jane Warde argues that Ross’s negotiation tactics 
“saved millions of acres that would have been sold to non-Cherokees.”196 These scholarly 
findings stand in stark contrast to Abel’s assessment of the Cherokee delegates which 
belittled their attempts to resist the United States and present a much more complex picture 
of the Cherokee Nation in the period of emancipation. 
The questions surrounding the passage of the Reconstruction Treaty are emblematic 
of freedpeople’s longer struggle for inclusion in the Cherokee Nation.  Article 9 can arguably 
be considered the first intervention by the federal government on behalf of freedpeople and 
their rights. The treaty ensured that Cherokee freedpeople would never be returned to 
slavery and that they would be entitled to ‘all the rights of native Cherokees.’  The 
motivations of the federal government in this instance remain questionable however: was 
their protection of freedpeople due to a sense of human justice, a means of diluting 
Cherokee resources amongst a greater number of people, or a combination of both these 
concerns? Whatever the motivation, the negotiations were carried out in an unscrupulous 
manner and provisions contained within the resulting treaty struck a serious blow against 
the sovereignty and autonomy of the Cherokee Nation.  Clarissa Confer describes the 
reconstruction treaties forged with the nations of the Indian Territory as “driving a deep 
wedge into the armor of Native sovereignty,” suggesting that they worked to usher in the 
dissolution of these nations and Oklahoma statehood within four decades.197  Federal 
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support for the rights of freedpeople must be considered in this context to fully appreciate 
Cherokee resistance to awarding them equal status within their citizenry.   
The 1866 Reconstruction Treaty was signed on the 19th of July 1866 and ratified by 
the United States Senate on the 27th of the same month.  In October 1866, Principal Chief 
William P. Ross, John Ross’s successor, began amending the Cherokee Constitution to reflect 
the provisions of the treaty and, in doing so, enshrined the citizenship rights of former 
Cherokee slaves in to Cherokee law.  Almost immediately, the citizenship status of 
freedpeople was complicated when January 17th 1867 was delineated as the deadline by 
which freedpeople had to return to the Cherokee Nation in order to be entitled to citizenship.  
This provision, the first limit placed on freedpeople who sought to claim Cherokee 
citizenship, was enforced rigorously on the part of Cherokee officials and widely debated in 
the decades following its implementation.  The tight timescale imposed by the deadline 
created an odd situation.  In theory, there was a relatively small window in which 
freedpeople could enter the Cherokee Nation and claim citizenship. As we have seen, 
according to the November 1863 Act that defined their status, freedpeople who remained in 
the Nation after their emancipation were 'viewed and treated as other persons... possessing 
no rights to citizenship.'  Although the chaos of war made enforcing this act impossible (as 
non-citizens, former slaves would only be permitted within the bounds of the Nation if they 
held a permit), many freedpeople remained in the Nation prior to the ratification of the 
Reconstruction Treaty.  Regardless of whether they had remained within the borders of the 
Cherokee Nation or had removed (and the nature of their exit from the Nation) during the 
war, freedpeople had to have returned to the Nation before January 1867 to qualify for 
citizenship.  This arbitrary date became hugely important in the decades following the Civil 
War as whether freedpeople met this stipulation became the crux of many citizenship cases.  
Freedpeople denied citizenship due to having returned after the deadline became known as 
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‘too-lates’ and their status in the Nation, specifically whether they should be adopted as 
citizens or expelled as intruders, became a point of significant contention.198   
 
“One who enters where he has no right or is not welcome”: Claiming Citizenship in the Face 
of Forced Removal from the Nation199 
Initially, having their claim to citizenship recognised by the Cherokee authorities was less 
important to freedpeople than the ability to return to their home and start building a life for 
themselves and their families outside the confines of slavery.200  Quickly, however, questions 
surrounding the citizenship status of individuals residing in the Cherokee Nation became 
urgent as federal authorities began removing non-citizens or intruders as per the provisions 
of the Reconstruction Treaty.  Although questions surrounding citizenship were theoretically 
domestic in nature, United States involvement in enforcing the distinction between citizen 
and non-citizen complicated the issue.  As in previous treaties, the Reconstruction Treaty 
affirmed the United States' obligation to protect Cherokee borders by forcibly removing all 
non-citizens:  
And all persons not in the military service of the United States, not citizens of 
the Cherokee Nation, are to be prohibited from coming into the Cherokee 
Nation, or remaining in the same, except as herein provided; and it is the duty 
of the United States Indian agent for the Cherokee Nation to have such persons, 
not lawfully residing or sojourning therein, removed from the nation, as they 
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now are, or hereafter may be, required by the Indian Intercourse laws of the 
United States.201 
No formal procedures for establishing whether an individual freedperson was entitled to 
citizenship had been outlined in either the Reconstruction Treaty or the constitutional 
amendments that made its provisions law.  When the status of a freedperson came under 
question, then, there were no clear avenues through which their claim to citizenship could 
be assessed and either affirmed or rejected.  Freedwoman Chaney McNair described having 
to “prove up; tell where you come from, who you belong to, you know, so we get our share 
of land.”202  Article 9 of the treaty established two key criteria through which freedpeople 
were entitled to citizenship: having been enslaved within the boundaries of the Cherokee 
Nation by a Cherokee citizen (which prevented freedpeople from the United States from 
attempting to gain citizenship) and having returned by January 1867.  Freedpeople had to 
meet both these criteria to avoid being classed as a non-citizen but proving they had done 
so could be difficult.  Freedpeople therefore feared being misclassified as intruders and being 
expelled from the Nation, causing them to express “alarm,” “uneasiness,” and “great 
distress.”203   
In the face of huge migration following the Civil War, Cherokee anxieties over 
noncitizens trespassing within the Nation and illegally using its resources reached new 
heights.  This placed additional pressure on freedpeople to prove the legitimacy of their claim 
to citizenship.  Many United States citizens did not respect the various laws and treaties that 
forbade them from entering the Indian Territory without express permission from the 
nations located within its boundary.  The Cherokee Nation directly bordered the state of 
                                                          
201 'Treaty with the Cherokee Nation,' in Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 235. 
202 ‘C. McNair’ in Black Indian Slave Narratives, P. Minges, ed., 45 (Winston-Salem, North Carolina: 
John F. Blair, Publisher, 2004). 
203‘William S. Madden et al. to John B. Jones, February 1872,’ National Archives Microfilm 
Publication M234, roll 105, frame 292.   
74 
 
Kansas and American citizens unashamedly entered the Nation to either remove timber or 
squat on land in anticipation of it being opened to white settlement.204  These non-citizens 
were not legally entitled to the resources of the Nation, whether using its land to farm or 
taking timber for sale in the United States, and essentially committed theft in doing so.   
William McLoughlin suggested that the failure of the United States Army to remove such 
“dangerous” intruders worked to the advantage of the United States: “it seemed that 
intruders were tolerated by the bureau as a means of destabilizing the Cherokee Nation and 
thus justifying detribalization.”205   
The actions of settlers, both illegal in the form of intrusion, and legal in the form of 
westward migration, facilitated rapid acquisition of Native lands.  According to historian 
Stuart Banner, Native land across the West was acquired by the federal government at 
"unprecedented speeds" between the 1850s and 1880s as the federal government followed 
a reservation policy that necessitated land cessions in order to secure a designated area of 
land for protected use.206  These land cessions were often coerced through violence and 
fuelled by the actions of settlers.  For example, the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and 
the subsequent rush of Euro-Americans prompted the Great Sioux War of 1875-6.  The Black 
Hills were a sacred site located within the Sioux reservation and when they refused to cede 
it to the federal government the U.S Army attacked, eventually starving the Sioux as a means 
of forcing them to give up their land.207  Eric Foner has argued that such federal Indian 
policies made possible the "economic exploitation of the west" during Reconstruction, which 
saw the destruction of buffalo, huge expansion of the railroad and an explosion of capitalism 
and industry.208   
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In Indian Territory, whether the failure to remove intruders was intentional or not, 
allowing these noncitizens to remain in the Nation placed additional pressure on Cherokee 
resources and created a number of jurisdictional questions for the Cherokee Nation and the 
United States.  Most significant, in relation to the status of freedpeople at this time, was 
whether the Cherokee Nation or the United States held the final authority over who was and 
who was not a Cherokee citizen.  The Cherokee Nation consistently claimed this authority for 
itself but the United States increasingly questioned their right and ability to do so through 
the 1870s.  Although United States officials recognised that white intruders had entered the 
Cherokee Nation illegally, they were sympathetic to former Cherokee slaves and expressed 
concern over their removal.  Freedpeople who had been denied citizenship by Cherokee 
officials therefore often found federal officials more receptive.  The uncertainty surrounding 
the status of freedpeople created a space for federal officials to increase their influence over 
questions of Cherokee citizenship and, although they had initially respected the decisions of 
Cherokee officials, by 1876 they were openly disregarding their authority.  
 With no clear processes by which citizenship was being regulated, knowing which 
freedpeople were and which were not entitled to citizenship became increasingly difficult to 
ascertain.  Federal officials began to question Cherokee requests to remove intruders as early 
as November 1867, sending lists of non-citizens they deemed entitled to Cherokee 
citizenship.209  This, combined with pressure from federal officials to implement clear 
procedures, forced the Cherokee Nation to empower its Supreme Court to examine 
citizenship cases in 1869.  The Supreme Court was supposed to settle disputes created during 
census-taking for the 1870 census, since the census-takers were given the authority to decide 
whether a freedperson was entitled to citizenship and had the power to decide adversely 
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based on their own judgement.210  Prior to this moment, whether freedpeople could stay 
within a community depended on common consent: an informal process by which 
freedpeople were either accepted or rejected by other residents or citizens rather than 
Cherokee officials or lawmakers.211  For example, freedman Cornelius Neely Nave described 
moving in to a log house with his family in a predominantly Cherokee neighbourhood 
following the war, "the real colored settlement was four mile from us."212  Nave claims he 
was never afraid of his Cherokee neighbours because his father claimed to be the son of his 
master and he lived comfortably in that home for many years.  Since a community could 
choose to accept a former slave who had been known to them regardless of whether they 
met the criteria adhered to by Cherokee officials (such as the January 1867 deadline), 
individuals who had lived undisturbed following the Civil War often found their right to do 
so under question from officials in later years.  Petitioners writing to President Ulysses S. 
Grant in 1872, for example, described finding what they “fondly hoped was our lawful home” 
under threat, having spent years living and farming in the Cherokee Nation following the Civil 
War.213  The absence of a governing body until 1869 amounted to a complete lack of 
regulation for the first four years following emancipation and historian Daniel Littlefield 
asserts that later difficulties in making accurate assessments of citizenship claims were 
largely due to the Nation’s failure to quickly react to this problem.214  
 The challenges of determining citizenship were evident immediately.  Questions 
such as how many witnesses had to affirm a freedperson had returned to the Nation by 
January 1867 before that criterion was deemed met were apparent but unanswered.  
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Similarly, if a freedperson’s former owners were deceased or unavailable, the possibility of 
a freedperson proving they had been enslaved might become difficult. The Supreme Court 
avoided these nuances by denying citizenship to all claimants except freedpeople who 
claimed citizenship through marriage to a Cherokee.215  This obviously excluded freedpeople 
who were entitled to citizenship under Article 9 of the Reconstruction Treaty.  Assessment 
of the July 1871 session is conflicting (Littlefield claims 5 families were admitted and 131 
were rejected, whereas Morris Wardell claims that 77 individuals were admitted and 131 
rejected) but it is readily apparent that the Supreme Court was not disposed to be lenient 
towards freedpeople.216 The Supreme Court had a record of acting harshly: of the 177 cases 
assessed by the Supreme Court in the winter of 1869, only 47 were approved.217  With no 
clear guidelines about how cases should be assessed, decisions were made at the discretion 
of the Supreme Court Justices.  The bias of the Supreme Court operated in direct conflict 
with the Cherokee Constitution but reflected the Cherokee reluctance to incorporate 
freedpeople.  Criticism surrounding how the Supreme Court and its successors handled its 
cases led to a series of almost continual reforms over the next decade, with the National 
Council taking responsibility for citizenship cases in 1871, the creation of a special 
commission in 1877 and the reform of this commission in 1879.   
The National Council and first Citizenship Commission were both characterised by 
unfair decision-making and practices.  In an 1883 report on disputed citizenship throughout 
the Indian Territory, U.S. Indian Inspector Henry Ward and Special Indian Agent Cyrus Bede 
detailed concerns that the successor to the Supreme Court, the Cherokee National Council, 
“in some cases acted arbitrarily and unjustly.”218  There was a clear pattern of freedpeople 
                                                          
215 McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 282. 
216 Ibid, 422 (footnote 61). 
217 McLoughlin, After the Trail of Tears, 253.  McLoughlin clarifies that each case referred to a family 
rather than an individual, so the number of freedpeople affected by these decisions were 
significantly higher than the figures given. 
218 ‘H. Ward & C. Bede to H. M. Teller, June 2 1883’ CNP Microfilm Roll 3, Folder 240, page 4.  
78 
 
who claimed to be entitled to citizenship being rejected by the Supreme Court and the 
National Council, suggesting a bias against awarding citizenship to freedpeople.  Ward and 
Bede also questioned the actions of the Cherokee National Council in 1873, in which they 
alleged some former successful applicants had committed fraud, although “no special act of 
fraud appears to have been charged,” and forced them to disprove the accusation.219  If the 
claimant could not prove that the charges against them were false their citizenship was 
rescinded, they were classified as intruders, and they became subject to removal.  This unfair 
insistence on proof placed a considerable burden on freedpeople who already struggled to 
meet the demands for evidence.  The 1877 Citizenship Commission of three Cherokee 
officials, which replaced the National Council, echoed this practice by summoning persons 
classified as ‘doubtful’ by census-takers to prove why they should not be declared an 
intruder.  Individuals that did not attend their summons were declared non-citizens by 
default.   According to Ward and Bede, many such individuals had previously been granted 
citizenship.  Of the 487 freedpeople cases assessed by the Commission, only 93 were decided 
favourably (181 freedpeople were declared intruders by default).220  In response to “severe 
criticism”, in 1879 the Commission was amended to only consider applications (ie. no longer 
permitted to issue summons) and was subsequently widely understood to be “generally fair 
and just.”221 
 Despite the improvements the amended Commission represented, in terms of 
fairness and process, the Commissioners still adhered closely to the restrictions of Article 9.  
Individual freedpeople sought relief from local federal officials after being classified as non-
citizens by virtue of either not having returned to the Cherokee Nation by January 1867 or 
being unable to prove that they had done so.  A letter sent from Agent to the Cherokees, 
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John N. Craig, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1870, reveals his uncertainty as to 
how he should respond to these freedpeople.  Craig described freedpeople approaching him 
after being denied citizenship by Cherokee census takers and then requesting legal advice as 
to whether they were entitled to citizenship and how they could protect themselves from 
removal. This placed Craig in a difficult position, since the January 1867 deadline had been 
agreed between the United States and the Cherokee Nation. Craig interpreted the 
Reconstruction Treaty as being intended to award citizenship to all former Cherokee slaves 
and argued that the deadline operated in direct conflict with this aim, since “very few were 
likely to be made aware of what had been provided for their benefit.”222  By questioning 
whether he was obligated to remove freedpeople he suspected should be granted 
citizenship, Craig challenged whether the Nation was the sole authority on who was and who 
was not Cherokee.  The Commissioner upheld the treaty and its implementation (“This 
provision is very explicit and unmistakeable in its language”) but he conceded that “while it 
may work serious hardship in many cases, this Dept is powerless to afford any relief.”223  The 
Commissioner clearly considered his department to be legally bound to act on the instruction 
of Cherokee officials regarding decisions of citizenship. Although Craig’s unwillingness to 
remove freedpeople was curtailed by the Commissioner in this instance, over the next 
decades their departmental successors would increasingly dispute decisions made by 
Cherokee officials.  
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Collective Action: Freedpeople Organise to Secure their Rights 
By 1872, just six years after they had been granted citizenship, some freedpeople were 
frustrated with what they saw as the failures of the Cherokee government to adequately 
respond to their entreaties regarding their citizenship status. In response to a notice posted 
by John B. Jones, U.S. Indian Agent for the Cherokees, on February 2nd 1872, giving non-
citizens thirty days to leave the Nation, a group of forty petitioners circumvented Cherokee 
officials and sent a memorial directly to Jones. They asked Jones to forward their memorial 
to the United States Congress, President, and General O. O. Howard of the Freedmen's 
Bureau.224  This memorial represents a pivotal moment in how freedpeople sought to secure 
their rights to citizenship: where they had previously contacted federal officials individually, 
and in relation to private concerns, this was the first instance of collective action aimed at 
the highest powers within the United States federal government.  It was also the first of 
numerous similar petitions that requested relief from what freedpeople saw as overzealous 
enforcement of the January 1867 deadline.225  The stated goal of this five-page memorial was 
to persuade these United States officials to intervene on behalf of Cherokee freedpeople, 
specifically those who had been denied citizenship by the Cherokee authorities. Whilst the 
President and Congress are perhaps to be expected, the inclusion of General Howard 
indicates that the petitioners had been monitoring the Freedmen’s Bureau and its attempts 
to secure various rights for freedpeople in the United States.  Howard had been 
Commissioner of the Bureau from its creation and championed equal citizenship for 
freedpeople. 226  The petitioners clearly recognised him as an ally of their counterparts in the 
United States who may be sympathetic to their own cause.  In the petitioners’ letter, 
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addressed to Jones, the author stressed the urgency of their situation and the fear that the 
petitioners will be removed from the Cherokee Nation before the legitimacy of their claim to 
citizenship could be fairly reassessed: "Your Notice... has caused us much alarm, and 
uneasiness.”227   In addition, they emphasised their vulnerability and claimed that military 
removal would "cause great distress and suffering to [their] families, and great loss to 
[themselves]."228  By using emotive language to elicit sympathy from Jones, the petitioners 
hoped to enlist him as an ally to their cause which would give them access to the key powers 
in Washington, DC, of which he was a local representative.   
The five page memorial the forty petitioners signed and sent to Jones is a tightly 
structured letter that methodically outlines "facts" that the petitioners hoped would 
persuade United States officials to defend the rights of freedpeople being denied Cherokee 
citizenship.229  By quoting Article 9 of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty in its entirety, the 
petitioners revealed that they were aware of the legal origins of the citizenship rights 
awarded to Cherokee freedpeople and grounded their argument in legal documents. The 
body of the memorial then went on to detail four means by which the petitioners had been 
unreasonably denied the rights of citizenship guaranteed by the treaty: strict enforcement 
of the January 1867 deadline when many freedpeople were either unable to return to the 
Nation within the timeframe or were unaware of the Reconstruction Treaty and its 
provisions; not being able to provide the evidence demanded by Cherokee officials to prove 
that they were enslaved within the Cherokee Nation at the beginning of the Civil War; men 
who married Cherokee freedwomen being denied citizenship through 
intermarriage/adoption; and the political power of former slaveowners who resisted the 
inclusion of freedpeople and used their influence to overpower the majority of the Cherokee 
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population in this respect.  When concluding the discussions of each of these issues, the 
petitioners repeat the phrase "… we are to be driven out of the Nation, as intruders." 230  This 
refrain worked to emphasise the unjust nature of their position and the outcome if the 
United States accepted their classification as intruders.   
The largest portion of the memorial asserted that the January 1867 deadline was 
unjust and illegitimate.  The deadline is awarded considerable prominence in the memorial, 
exposing it as the most substantial obstacle faced by freedpeople who hoped to claim 
citizenship.  First, the memorialists insisted that they were not made aware of the deadline 
and were unable to meet it due to circumstances beyond their control: "Some of us had fled 
North to get away from slavers, or to take our families away from the horrors and sufferings 
of the War, while we ourselves enlisted in the Union army."231  As discussed previously, 
freedpeople may have missed the 1867 deadline for a variety of reasons including long 
distances or being unaware of the Reconstruction Treaty and its provisions.  By emphasising 
how little freedom freedpeople had over their movements (whether due to their fear of 
slavers in particular or the violence of war more generally), the petitioners clearly hoped to 
illustrate that the six-month deadline was almost impossible to meet and therefore should 
be reconsidered as a means of assessing whether an individual was entitled to citizenship.  
The petitioners compounded this argument by reminding the United States officials of their 
loyalty to the Union during the war and casting themselves as being victim to the acts of 
Confederates or Confederate sympathisers.  This served to encourage sympathy and 
leniency from the intended readers of the memorial.  First, by referring to their service in the 
Union Army the petitioners implied a reciprocal relationship between themselves and the 
United States.  Second, the petitioners describe a violent clash with “rebel desperadoes” in 
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which freedpeople were killed and wounded as they attempted to return to the Cherokee 
Nation.232  As a result of this “massacre,” the petitioners claim that they failed to return by 
the January 1867 deadline “for fear of being killed, and robbed by the returning southern 
men.”233  By attributing their failure to meet the January 1867 deadline to the actions of 
Confederates, the petitioners deflect the responsibility from themselves and in doing so 
again attempt to show that strict enforcement of the deadline would be unreasonable. 
The petitioners did not consider the January 1867 deadline to be the sole obstacle 
to their inclusion within the Cherokee Nation.  When outlining their other complaints, the 
petitioners charged that they had been subject to specific and targeted obstacles to attaining 
citizenship.  First, they claimed that freedpeople who did meet the qualifications for 
citizenship had been denied it on the basis that “they had not been able to prove the fact to 
the satisfaction of the Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation.”234  The frustration of the 
petitioners implied that this was due to a bias on the part of the Citizenship Commissioners, 
who demanded considerable evidence to attain citizenship.  As seen above, the Supreme 
Court did fail to fairly assess claimants.  Second, the petitioners disputed that men who 
married Cherokee freedwomen could be denied citizenship through intermarriage.  They 
asserted that the laws of the Nation should be applied equally, “without regard to 
complexion,” and argued that ‘all the rights of native Cherokees’ include the right to confer 
citizenship on a spouse.235  By claiming that “a different construction is put on the marriage 
law,” the petitioners suggest that it has been distorted at their particular expense due to the 
colour of their skin.236  The petitioners therefore charged the Cherokee Nation with racial 
discrimination.  Third, the petitioners argued that the former slaveholding elite wielded 
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disproportionate political power to prevent freedpeople being treated fairly by the Cherokee 
National Council, leading to their petitions to that body being dismissed.  The petitioners 
reminded their readers that these “enemies” of freedpeople in the Cherokee Nation were 
“also generally the enemies of the United States & who fought to break down the United 
States.”237  This served to simultaneously discredit members of the National Council that had 
worked against the citizenship of freedpeople and encourage federal action against them.   
Littered throughout the memorial are vivid expressions of Cherokee nationalism that 
illustrated the intense attachment the petitioners felt for the Cherokee Nation and their 
community.  This, reinforced by the repetition of ‘home’ throughout the piece, attempted to 
legitimise the petitioners’ claims to citizenship.  These moments are juxtaposed with 
descriptions of forced removal which seem callous and cruel in comparison.   The following 
passage, which opens the paragraph in which the petitioners accuse former Confederate 
Cherokees of conspiring to turn public opinion and national policy against freedpeople, is a 
particularly poignant example:  
We have spent years in hard work, and have built houses, and opened 
farms, and have made property at what we fondly hoped was our 
lawful home as well as the home of our choice.  Here in the Cherokee 
Nation, we were born.  Here in times past we toiled for our old masters 
without pay. Here live our kindred, those we love.  We have no other 
home than this. Yet we are to be driven out as intruders, to leave our 
property, the homes, and comforts for which we worked so hard, so 
long, and under many difficulties.  We are to be driven out, to leave 
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our kindred, and all that we hold dear, and this, at the instigation of 
those we believe are our enemies...238 
This passage emphasised that the petitioners were connected to the Cherokee Nation in a 
number of ways: by place of birth; through personal relationships; and through labour on its 
land both before and after emancipation.  By crafting multiple connections to the Cherokee 
Nation, the petitioners implied that although they may not have Cherokee ancestry, they 
were Cherokee and should be entitled to citizenship. This rejects the notion that only those 
of Cherokee ancestry or ‘blood’ can claim a Cherokee identity and, by extension, Cherokee 
citizenship.  The petition closes with an emotive appeal for support (“In this our last resort 
we cry to you for help!”) that again uses the image of freedpeople being driven from their 
homes to reiterate their plight.239 
 The petition proved successful in eliciting sympathy from Agent John B. Jones and 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, prompting their refusal to remove freedpeople who did 
not hold Cherokee citizenship. Although this is a moment of inaction rather than action, the 
Commissioner’s decision to postpone the removal of noncitizens until their position could be 
renegotiated with the Cherokees should be understood as an escalation in the jurisdictional 
dispute over Cherokee citizenship.  In Jones’ letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 
which he enclosed the petition, he requested clarification of the subject of freedpeople being 
denied citizenship and whether he should act on instructions to remove them.  As U.S Indian 
Agent to the Cherokees, and therefore having a closer working relationship with its people 
than the Commissioner, Jones concluded that the petition provides “a very correct view of 
the matter.”240 He did, however, question the petitioners’ claim that opposition to their 
adoption as citizens is limited to the former slaveholding minority: “if that would be the case 
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they [the former slaveholding elite] would be in a powerless minority. Many of the full blood 
Cherokees share their sentiments.”241  Jones alluded to ongoing debate within the Nation “as 
to what course justice, humanity & expediency require the Cherokees to take with regard to 
these [freed]people.”242   Like his predecessor, John N. Craig, Jones advocated the 
incorporation of all freedpeople and argues on their behalf: “They [Cherokees] do not take 
in to account the fact that these colored people & their ancestors have labored for Cherokees 
unpaid, for many years, & that the fruits of such unpaid toil have afforded the means of 
defraying the expense of educating many of the most highly cultivated Cherokees.”243  In his 
response to Jones’s letter and the petition, the Commissioner concluded that his office “does 
not deem it expedient that its provisions [removal] should be pressed upon the colored 
citizens referred to at present, as it is hoped some arrangement may be made by which they 
will be allowed to remain in the Indian Territory.”244  This represents a significant departure 
from the orders his office had issued in 1870: whereas the provisions of the 1866 treaty were 
affirmed in the 1870 letter to Craig (albeit reluctantly), here it is evident that federal officials 
were attempting to insert themselves in to the decision making process. 
 Throughout the 1870s, freedpeople refused to accept their classification as intruders 
by Cherokee officials and continued to send letters and petitions seeking “advise [sic] and 
protection” and “fair play” from the Cherokee Indian Agency in relation to their citizenship 
status.245  In response, federal officials took an increasingly active position against the 
removal of freedpeople declared non-citizens by the Cherokee National Council.  In an 1873 
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letter to the Secretary of the Interior, freedman Woodson Parker Lowe claimed that the 
attention of the Secretary of the Interior to the issue of unrecognised Cherokee freedpeople 
would “greatly relieve our distressed people as well myself.”246  Lowe described a functioning 
community of freedpeople who had established homes, livelihood and a local school, the 
loss of which “would crush us, almost if not quite hopelessly.”247  Although Lowe’s letter was 
primarily focused on the concerns of his immediate community, he positioned himself within 
a broader struggle for inclusion being waged by other freedpeople in the Nation.   
Freedpeople continued to come forward with citizenship claims until the end of the 
nineteenth century, having previously escaped the attention of Cherokee officials.  Such 
freedpeople often did so when it became apparent that they could not access the rights 
available to recognised citizens.  One key instance which prompted many freedpeople to 
place claims with the National Council was their exclusion from the 1875 ‘bread money’ 
payouts, paid in response to the 1873-1874 famine.248  Without fail, freedpeople making 
these claims referenced their exclusion from these payouts as one of the rights of which they 
had been “unjustly and unlawfully debarred.”249  Andrew Daugherty’s deposition is fairly 
typical of those recorded by the Citizenship Commission in 1875.  Having previously been 
denied a hearing by the Supreme Court and the Cherokee Nation, Daugherty applied to the 
commission on behalf of himself, his wife and his daughter after travelling to Tahlequah to 
collect their payments and being turned away.250  Daugherty and others like him requested 
that their claims to citizenship be recognised and that action be taken to secure the “equal 
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rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the Cherokee Nation and the 
proportional amount due him and his family be paid him and his family that was withheld.”251  
 Continued appeals from freedpeople such as Woodson Parker Lowe and Andrew 
Daugherty prompted George Ingalls, who replaced John B. Jones as Agent to the Cherokees 
in 1874, to actively work to protect freedpeople from expulsion throughout his tenure.  
Horrified by his discovery of “evidence of marked partiality” and deliberate legal 
manoeuvring against freedpeople by the National Council, Ingalls quickly advocated federal 
intervention with the declaration that this “matter of citizenship calls for Congressional 
action!”252 Upon his arrival in 1874, Ingalls requested that he would not be personally 
required to expel such intruders.  Then, with the approval of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Ingalls began investigating non-citizens who claimed to have been misclassified and 
giving certificates of protection to those he deemed held a legitimate right to citizenship.253  
Freedpeople who cooperated with federal officials and convinced them of their right to stay 
within the Nation therefore gained a sort of pseudo-citizenship in the sense that they were 
allowed to remain within the Nation.  However, this did not translate to legally recognised 
Cherokee citizenship and the Cherokee leadership were infuriated that federal officials 
would override decisions made within the Nation. 
Their insistence on staying in the Cherokee Nation and persistence in seeking 
recognition as citizens kept the status of former slaves at the attention of federal officials.  
Cherokee citizens and officials remained equally determined to have non-citizens removed 
from the Nation, however, and wrote petitions of their own requesting that the United States 
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met its treaty obligations.254  The dispute over intruders claiming citizenship through Article 
9 of the Reconstruction Treaty escalated as the Cherokee Nation and the United States 
continued to disagree over who held ultimate authority: the Cherokee Nation or the United 
States, whose military was obligated to remove them. An exchange between the Cherokee 
Principal Chief Oochalata (also known as Charles Thompson) and John Q. Smith, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, exemplifies the stalemate in which the Nation and the United 
States found themselves over this issue.  In an 1876 letter to Oochalata, Commissioner Smith 
refused to remove any freedpeople classed as non-citizens until the Nation implemented 
uniform and defined procedures by which citizenship could be established.  At this point, the 
Cherokee National Council was empowered to assess claims to citizenship, having replaced 
the Supreme Court.  Commissioner Smith questioned the competency of Cherokee officials 
and lawmakers and suggested that “the failure of the National Council to protect the rights 
of individuals by a just and equitable system of laws, impartially enforced,” could be 
considered “evidence of the inability to properly govern the people within its national 
limits.”255  Smith went on to insist that the Cherokee Nation instated new processes for 
determining citizenship, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, which 
represented an effort to influence internal processes within the Cherokee Nation.  The 
necessity of obtaining the approval of the Secretary of the Interior suggested that the federal 
government held final authority over questions of citizenship.  Recognising this as an attack 
on the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation, Oochalata authored a 125 page reply, in which 
he rejected the intervention of United States officials, asserted the rights of the Cherokee 
Nation to self-government and clarified the treaty obligations of the United States.  A portion 
of Oochalata’s reply was published in the Cherokee Advocate and therefore made visible to 
the Cherokee population. 
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In his letter, Oochalata vigorously defended the right of the Cherokee Nation to make 
their own decisions regarding who was and who was not entitled to Cherokee citizenship, 
eloquently arguing that the Nation held final authority.  First, Oochalata denied the right of 
the United States to interfere in questions of Cherokee citizenship and explicitly limited his 
arguments to the topic of intruders in the Cherokee Nation: which he claimed was the real 
concern, not the citizenship status of said intruders or the justice of the January 1867 
deadline by which freedpeople could be excluded.  Oochalata described the growing number 
of intruders in the Cherokee Nation as “a source of annoyance” and “an alarming intolerable 
evil,” asserting that the United States failure to remove them amounts to “virtually 
suspending the operation of existing treaties.”256  Through this letter, then, Oochalata 
articulated the anxiety and urgency with which the Cherokee Nation viewed the intruder 
problem.  By simply refusing to engage with Smith over who was entitled to citizenship, 
Oochalata attempted to keep the topic of intruder removal at the forefront of their 
interaction and confine debate surrounding who was entitled to citizenship to within the 
Cherokee Nation.  Furthermore, Oochalata dismissively rejected Smith’s legal grounds for 
interfering with how the Cherokees award citizenship on the basis of the Reconstruction 
Treaty, describing Smith’s argument as a “strained construction that will not stand the test 
of proof.”257  In doing so, Oochalata framed any attempt to encroach on Cherokee jurisdiction 
as being outside of the law.   
Second, Oochalata argued that the Cherokee Nation was the sole authority on 
deciding who was and who was not entitled to remain within the Cherokee Nation due to its 
nation status, ultimately claiming it is an essential expression of sovereignty and nationhood.  
Through charting the use of the term ‘intruder’ in previous treaties made between the 
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Cherokee Nation and the United States, Oochalata established the long history of the 
commitment of the United States to removing intruders and the Cherokee right “to be the 
judges of who were intruders.”258  Oochalata argued that since this “power” had never been 
expressly denied the Cherokee Nation by treaty, it cannot be claimed by the United States.259  
He also asserted that since the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty was written in the language of 
the United States it should be interpreted through its own definitions. Using the Webster 
Dictionary, Oochalata referenced the American definition of an intruder (“one who intrudes, 
one who thrusts himself in or enters where he has no right or is not welcome”).260  This 
definition served to buttress Oochalata’s argument as it is implicit that the community which 
is intruded upon gets to determine who is not welcome.  Furthermore, Oochalata argued 
that it was “the natural right of the Cherokee as a separate and distinct people, to judge and 
determine who are of their own race and nation, and entitled to the right and benefits of 
membership among them.”261  By claiming that the Cherokee Nation held the right to 
determine its citizenry through its treaties with the United States as well as its sovereign 
status, Oochalata clearly hoped to make the matter indisputable.     
By the end of 1870s, federal and Cherokee officials alike were frustrated by their 
inability to resolve the dispute over Cherokee intruders and citizenship.  Their anger is 
evident in their communications.  Although federal officials hoped to renegotiate the status 
of freedpeople, the Cherokee Nation repeatedly argued that it held sole jurisdiction over 
questions of citizenship. There was notable internal debate over whether all freedpeople 
should be awarded citizenship, regardless of when they returned to the Nation, but Cherokee 
officials continued to rigorously enforce the January 1867 deadline and request the removal 
of individuals who claimed citizenship through Article 9 of the Reconstruction Treaty but had 
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not returned by the deadline.262  In response, freedpeople continued to seek recognition as 
citizens and enlist federal officials in their attempts to do so.  This enraged Cherokee leaders, 
further exacerbating existing tensions between the Nation and the freedpeople seeking 
citizneship: 
...the fault lay with them [freedpeople], and not with the Cherokee 
authorities, and their appeal to the US Government must be regarded 
as disrespectful to our government and an act of contumacy.  The 
effect of this is to place us in a false position before the United States, 
and bring upon us undeserved censure and consequent disrepute as a 
nation of which we should clear ourselves.263 
In the above message to the National Council, Oochalata depicted freedpeople as rebellious 
liars that refused to accept the authority of the Cherokee Nation.  He therefore discredited 
their attempts to secure citizenship and instead reinforced the legitimacy of the Cherokee 
Nation and its actions.  Similarly outraged, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs railed against 
the Cherokee Nation’s refusal to concede authority to the United States in a letter to the 
Secretary of the Interior: 
Have the Cherokee National Council such “original right of 
sovereignty over their country and people” as to vest in them 
the exclusive jurisdiction of all questions of citizenship in that 
Nation, without reference to the paramount authority of the 
United States? 
[...] 
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If [freedpeople] are not recognised as citizens by the Cherokee 
authorities, it must certainly follow that the United States in its 
sovereign capacity as a party to the treaties and having the 
Cherokees under its guardianship, has the right, and in justice 
must intervene and secure a recognition of such rights to each 
member of the tribe.264 
Commissioner Hayt’s letter completely dismissed Cherokee sovereignty and their right to 
self-government in the face of ‘the paramount authority of the United States.’  Within the 
body of the letter, Hayt described overwhelming evidence that the Cherokee Nation had 
been denying citizenship hearings, classing legitimate citizens as intruders and rejecting 
claimants that provide adequate evidence “in direct conflict with the treaties and laws.”265 
His insistence that the United States should intervene reads less like an assurance of 
inclusion for freedpeople than a deliberate extension of federal power in to the Cherokee 
Nation, however.  Although Hayt refers to a 1878 petition from freedpeople requesting his 
protection, his letter was preoccupied with the ‘paramount authority’ of the United States 
and repeatedly ignored the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation.  By returning to notions of 
‘guardianship’ and the Nation being a “domestic, dependent people” placed upon the 
Cherokee Nation by the United States Supreme Court, Hayt insisted upon Cherokee 
deference to the power of the United States.266  
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Irreconcilable: Failed Attempts to Resolve the Jurisdictional Dispute  
As has been illustrated above, although federal officials initially respected the right of the 
Cherokee Nation to assess the citizenship status of freedpeople, by the end of the 1870s the 
Cherokee Nation and the federal government were at a stalemate regarding who could claim 
jurisdiction over Cherokee citizenship.  The Cherokee Nation refused to concede any 
authority to the United States and continued to insist that the United States military remove 
any individuals deemed intruders by Cherokee officials.  Federal officials argued the 
opposite: they would not remove individuals from within the Cherokee Nation who they felt 
held a valid claim to Cherokee citizenship.  Daniel Littlefield has argued that the belligerence 
of federal officials in refusing to honour treaty obligations and respect the jurisdiction of the 
Cherokee Nation represented “the most profound inroad on Cherokee autonomy in the post-
Civil War period.”267  The high stakes of this dispute, which could have considerable 
implications for the relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the United States, 
encouraged the two parties to seek its conclusion. 
 In an attempt to end this disagreement between the Cherokee Nation and the 
Department of the Interior, both agreed to resolve the “existing difficulties and 
embarrassments” over the status of Cherokee freedpeople.268  After his suggestion of a joint 
citizenship commission (which would deny the Cherokee Nation final authority) was firmly 
rejected, however, Carl Schurz, the Secretary of the Interior, sought the advice of the 
Attorney General of the United States in relation to the dispute.269  With the permission of 
Principal Chief Dennis Bushyhead, Schurz reiterated that both parties hoped to reach a final 
decision. In his letter, within which questions were also asked on behalf of Bushyhead, Schurz 
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depicted his own officials as diligent and reasonable in opposition to the demands of 
Cherokee officials who were cast as presumptuous and erroneous: 
The whole question may be said lie in the enquiry whether, in carrying 
out in good faith the provisions of the executor treaties named, the 
United States are bound to regard simply the Cherokee law and its 
construction by the Council of the Nation, and answer the call the 
officers of that Nation for the removal of all persons whom they may 
pronounce intruders or on the contrary whether being called on to 
effect the forcible removal of such alleged intruders, the facts upon 
which the allegation rests may not with propriety, both by virtue of 
superior and paramount jurisdiction and in obedience to National 
obligation be inquired into and determined by our very own National 
tribunal.270 
In presenting his question in this manner, Schurz implied that his office should be afforded 
the authority to independently consider whether individuals were entitled to Cherokee 
citizenship or not, rather than being subservient to officers that were often unable to provide 
evidence to support their decision.  The image of federal officials having to act at the behest 
of incompetent Cherokee officials seems ridiculous or even dangerous in Schurz’s vision of 
these exchanges (especially given the ‘superior and paramount jurisdiction’ of the United 
States) since it implied Cherokee authority. In his reply, also forwarded to Bushyhead, 
Attorney General Charles Devens concurred with Schurz, arguing that “it is quite plain” the 
Department of the Interior should be able to “determine for itself, under the general law of 
the land, the existence and extent of the exigency upon which such requisition is founded.”271  
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This came as a blow to the Cherokee Nation, which had expected to receive an opinion 
recognising it as the ultimate authority over citizenship.272 McLoughlin argues that, instead, 
Devens’ opinion had wider repercussions and “served as a coffin nail in the concept of 
Cherokee sovereignty and self-determination.”273 Although Devens did not comment on the 
capabilities of Cherokee officials or the validity of Cherokee citizenship rules, he effectively 
awarded federal officials the final decision regarding claims to citizenship.  The criteria upon 
which such officials would make this decision remained unclear, however, since “under the 
general law of the land” is incredibly ambiguous as to whether officials would follow their 
interpretations of laws made by the Cherokee Nation or the United States.   
    Refusing to accept the judgement of the Attorney General, the Cherokee Nation 
hoped the creation of their 1880 census would resolve the disputes over citizenship that had 
characterised the fifteen years following the Civil War.  Although they had sought to 
negotiate an agreement with the United States, Charles Devins’ 1879 opinion revealed that 
the United States still claimed absolute authority over citizenship and the removal of 
intruders.  Having rejected federal offers of collaboration, the census was carried out solely 
by Cherokee officials and the Nation envisaged their census as accurate, complete and final.
 The census recognised 1976 freedpeople as citizens in a population of 20,086, 
making freedpeople approximately ten percent of the citizenry.274  These freedpeople were 
found in disproportionately high numbers in the Cooweescoowee, Tahlequah and Illinois 
districts of the Nation.  Importantly, these figures do not take in to account unrecognised 
non-citizens who claimed their citizenship though Article 9 of the 1866 Treaty.  Figures 
indicate there were almost 2000 non-citizens located within the bounds of the Cherokee 
Nation when the census was taken, 757 of whom were of African descent.275 
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Conclusion 
Although the Cherokee Nation considered the 1880 census to be the complete list of all 
individuals entitled to Cherokee citizenship, freedpeople and others left off the census 
continued to dispute their classification as non-citizens until the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Rather than resolving the issue of citizenship, then, the 1880 census became yet 
another arena around which battles for recognition were fought.  757 freedpeople remained 
at risk of removal when the census rolls were closed, almost a third of the total number of 
freedpeople residing within the Cherokee Nation.  As this chapter has documented, by the 
end of the 1870s the positions of the Cherokee Nation and the United States in regard to the 
citizenship status of freedpeople seemed irreconcilable.  Whilst the Cherokee Nation had 
firmly asserted its authority over questions of citizenship following the passage of the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty, and largely expressed them by limiting the number of freedpeople it 
awarded citizenship to through various means, the appeals of freedpeople increasingly 
encouraged support from federal officials.  Whereas previously the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs had respected the treaty obligations of his department, in terms of removing 
intruders, by 1876 Commissioner John Q. Smith openly denied the Cherokee Nation sole 
jurisdiction over Cherokee citizenship.  The Attorney General’s 1879 opinion represented the 
absolute refusal of the United States to concede any authority to the Cherokee Nation in 
respect to defining who was and who was not Cherokee.  Although questions of citizenship 
continued to plague freedpeople and the Cherokee Nation until the beginning of the 
twentieth century, we can therefore see the terms of this dispute being set in the first fifteen 
years following emancipation. 
 Citizenship within the Cherokee Nation afforded individuals with access to national 
services and resources as well as the right to reside within and improve the land of the 
Cherokee Nation discussed within this chapter.  Freedpeople who managed to claim 
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citizenship in the years following their emancipation hoped to gain access to these services, 
particularly in relation to the free education provided by the Nation and the orphan fund.  
Cherokee reluctance to extend these services, offering freedpeople only a limited number of 
segregated schools and denying them any access at all to the Orphan Asylum constructed in 
1872, encouraged freedpeople to protest to both Cherokee and federal officials that their 
rights had been abrogated.  Federal officials took little action to secure these rights for 
freedpeople, however, leaving freedpeople with little leverage against the Cherokee Nation.  
Although this chapter has detailed how federal officials took an increasingly strong position 
against what they saw as treaty violations in regard to the classification of ‘too lates’ as 
intruders, then, the next chapter highlights how unreliable the federal government was as 
an ally to freedpeople.    
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Chapter Three: “Didn’t get much learning” - Freedpeople and their Attempts to Secure 
Education after Emancipation276 
the Cherykees is down on the darkeys the Cherykees say they ainte in favour of 
the blake man havin any classes that they had rather any body else have a rite 
than us pore blakies… we donte thinke it rite we have made them rich and bulte 
his land doo you thinke it rite277 
Freedman Louis Rough writing to President Ulysses Grant in 1872 
Supposedly all Cherokee citizens were entitled to certain social rights unique to the Cherokee 
Nation, including access to its public education system and nationally funded care for 
orphans (both managed by the Cherokee Board of Education).  Since the 1866 Treaty secured 
freedpeople “all the rights of native Cherokees,” they pushed to be afforded access to 
Cherokee schools and the national orphan fund rather than accept a lesser form of 
citizenship that did not include the services made available to other citizens.278  Freedpeople 
such as Louis Rough, cited in the opening vignette to this chapter, therefore insisted that 
they were afforded all the rights attached to Cherokee citizenship.  Rather than allowing 
freedpeople to attend the already established public schools, however, the Cherokee Nation 
adopted a system of segregation and opened the first schools solely for use by the children 
of freedpeople in 1869.  The segregation of freedpeople’s schools placed them at a 
considerable disadvantage within the Nation as the schools were limited in number and 
freedpeople struggled to meet the attendance requirements set by the Board of Education 
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to ensure the continuance of such schools.  Similarly, orphans of freedpeople were denied 
access to the national orphanage. 
Frustrated at being excluded, freedpeople made protests to both the Cherokee 
National Council and the federal government which yielded small victories but little real 
change. Subsequently, Cherokee freedpeople still had fewer opportunities for education 
than those living in the former Confederacy.  Federal officials did not demonstrate the same 
level of support for the education or welfare of freedpeople as they did in relation to legal 
citizenship and the right to reside within the Cherokee Nation, suggesting that they saw the 
education of Cherokee freedpeople to be unimportant. It is likely that federal officials did 
not appreciate that access to education had been established as a distinct right in the 
Cherokee Nation since before the Civil War.  No national public education system was 
established in the United States at this time and freedpeople were instead educated through 
the combined efforts of the Freedmen’s Bureau, northern benevolent associations and the 
former slaves themselves.  Free education may have been considered an admirable goal in 
the United States but was not considered an essential right or state responsibility.  The lack 
of interest federal officials displayed in the social rights of Cherokee freedpeople is therefore 
likely to be due to a misunderstanding of the role education played in Cherokee citizenship 
and their attitude to educating those thought to be inferior in intelligence and reason.  
Scholars have not, however, explored the motivations of federal officials over this issue 
despite how it deviates from the more zealous manner in which the federal government 
protected the rights of Cherokee freedpeople that were attached to landownership and 
national resources.279  This chapter makes evident that the federal government was unwilling 
to support freedpeople over issues that did not further the federal agenda. 
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The Education of Freedpeople in the United States 
It is likely that the inaction of the federal government in relation to the exclusion of Cherokee 
freedpeople from national education and orphan care was due to how such services were 
understood in the United States.  The Cherokee Nation saw access to education to be a 
national responsibility whereas the United States had no national education system. 
Furthermore, the Cherokee Nation did not legislate against teaching the enslaved how to 
read and write until 1841 - later than many of the slaveholding states had done so - and 
therefore had a shorter history of denying the enslaved an education.280  Doing so served to 
legitimate slavery since it denied the enslaved a medium with which they could assert and 
demonstrate that they were people rather than property.  Heather Andrea Williams has 
argued that anti-literacy laws were implemented as part of the greater control and 
surveillance of the enslaved and in response to growing abolitionist sentiment in the 1830s, 
since “the presence of literate slaves threatened to give lie to the entire system.”281   Despite 
the efforts of slaveholders and legislators, some of the enslaved did learn to read and write, 
albeit covertly.  Most famously, the abolitionist Frederick Douglass considered illiteracy to 
be “the white man’s power to enslave the black man” and credited learning to read with 
sparking his determination to escape slavery.282  Upon the abolition of slavery with the 13th 
Amendment in 1865, the formerly enslaved immediately sought education throughout the 
former Confederacy.  In his 1901 autobiography Up From Slavery, Booker T. Washington 
described “a whole race beginning to go to school” and his own “determination to secure an 
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education at any cost.”283  Washington therefore situates his own account within a collective 
drive for education expressed by all freedpeople.  Ronald Butchart has argued that “there is 
no historical precedent to the African American demand for access to knowledge or historical 
equivalent to the black effort to ensure that access.”284  
 Whereas older scholarship largely focused on the actions of white northern teachers 
in reference to the education of former slaves, more recent research has stressed the central 
role played by freedpeople in attaining this right.  Williams has argued that it is 
“overwhelmingly clear, for example, that freedpeople, not northern whites, initiated the 
education movement in the south while the Civil War was being fought.”285  Freedpeople 
were not the beneficiaries of white northern action, then, but seized opportunities for 
education themselves.  In Eric Foner’s groundbreaking Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished 
Business, he describes schools established by freedpeople as early as 1861 and 1862.286  In 
some instances, such as in the case of a school taught by a black cabinetmaker in the Sea 
Islands, teachers who had previously taught covertly were now simply able to do so without 
fear of repercussions.287  As freedpeople looked to their future outside of slavery, education 
represented a means of securing freedom and equality.  Ronald Butchart has argued that 
education was widely seen as providing preparation for franchise and “freedpeople 
understood that if the full promise of emancipation was to be realized, they needed the skills 
to engage in a variety of enterprises and needed information to protect themselves against 
fraud.”288 Freedpeople therefore took advantage of the first opportunities they came upon 
to claim the education they had previously been denied and this determination to gain an 
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education characterised the actions of freedpeople for the rest of the nineteenth century.  
Freedpeople went to great lengths to gain an education.  Freedwoman Alice Alexander, for 
example, travelled widely in pursuit of education.  Leaving Louisiana after the conclusion of 
the Civil War as an adult, Alexander began her education in Memphis then travelled to 
Oklahoma: “I got a pretty fair education down there but didn’t take care of it.”289  Alexander’s 
inability to ‘take care’ of her education highlights the difficulty some freedpeople had in 
retaining their new knowledge: “what little I learned I quit taking care of it and seeing after 
it and lost it.”290  Freedman J. L. Pugh, who was still learning basic mathematical skills from 
classmates at the age of 20, described having “died twice, physically, also mentally” in his 
pursuit of an education.291  After teaching in Oklahoma and Colorado, Pugh went on to 
complete a degree at Langston University in 1915.  He also spoke proudly of the 
accomplishments made by his daughter, commenting that: “whatever is thoroughly worked 
out in the parent is an inheritance to the child.”292  
Whereas the Cherokee Nation had an established system for providing free 
education for its citizens, the United States did not.  Many of the schools established for 
freedpeople were therefore subscription schools and charged their students tuition.  
Scholars are in agreement that the enthusiasm with which freedpeople pursued education 
quickly outstripped the available resources to provide it, leading to collaboration with 
northern benevolent societies and the Freedmen’s Bureau.293  The Freedmen’s Bureau, 
within its broader remit of assisting former slaves in the transition from slavery to freedom, 
was directed to encourage and distribute funds to schools for freedpeople.  The Bureau’s 
Commissioner, General O. O. Howard, was convinced that education was the “foundation 
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upon which all efforts to assist freedmen rested.”294   The Bureau did not establish schools 
itself but operated alongside northern benevolent societies (often religious in nature) to 
make education as widely available as possible: by 1869 schools reporting to the Bureau 
taught over 150,000 students.295 This often led to conflict and the compromise of African 
American control over their own education and that of their children.  For example, the 
Savannah Educational Association, established by freedpeople in January 1865, raised $730 
from local people and was teaching 600 students by the middle of 1865.296  Although this 
represented an incredible achievement, officials from the American Missionary Association 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau refused to provide additional support since they believed the 
school system to be inferior to that which they could provide.  Encountering financial 
difficulties, the Savannah Educational System handed management of their schools to the 
American Missionary Association in exchange for relief.   
As the experiences of the Savannah Educational Association suggests, the 
involvement of the Freedmen’s Bureau and northern benevolent associations complicated 
the operation of schools for freedpeople in the United States.  Freedpeople found it difficult 
to balance their desire for self-sufficiency with the necessity of seeking resources.  It thus 
made their relative powerlessness painfully apparent.297  Furthermore, the leadership of 
such organisations often viewed African American efforts to manage their own schools to be 
inherently inferior to their own and many white teachers refused to interact with or share 
quarters with black teachers.298  The problems of education organisation and management 
were compounded by hostile white Southerners who recognised that educating freedpeople 
had the potential to challenge the racial order.  Ronald Butchart describes acts of 
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“harassment and obstruction,” as well as more violent acts such as arson, being committed 
against schools and teachers, especially in areas of limited federal influence and becoming 
more common in the years following Reconstruction.299   Williams has attributed the 
struggles of black schools after Reconstruction to losing the support of federal and local 
governments and the waning financial support of benevolent associations, as well as the rise 
of racial hostilities and Jim Crow.300  Butchart points to the race riots in Memphis (1865) and 
New Orleans (1866), however, to indicate that later violence was not new but rather old 
hostilities becoming visible again.301  Despite the problems made apparent in the attempts 
to provide education for freedpeople in the former slaveholding states, the system 
established by the United States is considered to have been a qualified success.  The huge 
effort to educate freedpeople “lay the foundation for Southern public education” and led to 
education being increasingly considered the responsibility of the state by 1880s.302  
 
 “The means of education shall always be encouraged in this nation”: Education in the 
Cherokee Nation before the Civil War303 
Unlike the federal government, the Cherokee Nation could claim a proud tradition of 
providing public education for its citizens.  As part of a wider attempt to assert sovereignty 
and autonomy after its removal to Indian Territory, the Nation had established their own 
school system in 1840 rather than continue relying on those provided by white missionaries 
from the United States.    Although the majority of Cherokees had shown an interest in 
learning to read and write English when missionary schools first appeared at the beginning 
                                                          
299 Butchart, Schooling the Freed People, 164. 
300 Williams, Self-taught, 199. 
301 Butchart, Schooling the Freed People, 170. 
302 Foner, Reconstruction, 368. 
303 Compiled Laws of the Cherokee Nation (Tahlequah: National Advocate Print, 1881) 25. 
Sourced from https://archive.org/stream/compiledlawsche00adaigoog#page/n30/mode/2up  
30/10/15 
106 
 
of the nineteenth century, attendance began to decline by the 1820s.  Traditional Cherokees 
were ambivalent at best in regard to the religious agenda of the various missionaries and 
preferred that their children were only given an academic education and parents of English-
speaking children who could already read and write could see little advantage in allowing 
their children to attend.304  This conflicted with the goals of missionaries who often conflated 
teaching and preaching.  Missionaries also inadvertently encouraged social division between 
those Cherokees who favoured acculturation and Christianisation, and the traditional 
majority that endeavoured to retain Cherokee cultural practices.  By showing a preference 
for English-speaking (and in their minds ‘progressive’) Cherokees and differentiating 
individuals and their capabilities by skin colour, missionaries alienated the majority of the 
Cherokee population.305  William McLoughlin described the creation of the Cherokee public 
education system as “a major effort to restore national pride” that would provide evidence 
of self-reliance and restore cohesion to a Cherokee citizenry torn apart by the sectional 
violence of the 1830s.306   
The importance of education was enshrined in the 1839 Cherokee Constitution 
which stated that: “Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government, 
the preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged in this Nation.”307  The clause made explicit the notion 
that education makes better citizens who were capable of enlightened and ‘good’ 
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government, whether through holding office or through engagement with the democratic 
processes of the Cherokee Nation in a more general sense.  By taking control of the education 
available to its citizens, the Cherokee Nation would be able to further its own national 
interests rather than those of missionaries and other outsiders.  This was incredibly 
important in regard to interactions between the Cherokee Nation and the United States.  
Forced removal made the power of the United States to enact its expansionist agenda 
painfully evident.  For some Cherokees, an education in English held the potential to act as a 
“form of self-protection against the menace of white aggression,” a tool that would enable 
them to more effectively communicate and respond to federal officials in the United 
States.308  Others rejected the Euro-American language and customs, preferring to raise their 
children in a more traditional Cherokee manner and therefore showed little interest in 
learning English at all.309  Sequoyah’s syllabary, created in 1821, offered a means of 
communicating the Cherokee language in written form and was embraced by the traditional 
or ‘full blood’ majority who were largely unable to speak or read English.  At this time, 
education was available in both Cherokee and English.  Relatively easy to master, the 
majority of the Cherokee population could read and write in Cherokee by 1825 and, by 1828, 
all laws passed by the Cherokee Nation and its national newspaper were published in both 
English and Cherokee.310  Much of the Cherokee leadership was comprised of progressive 
men who championed the advantages of a formal, Anglo-American education so reforming 
Cherokee schooling was a priority as the Cherokee Nation reorganised itself in the Indian 
Territory.   
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The plan approved by the National Council in 1840 was a departure from previous 
educational practices within the Nation in its scale and ambitions.311  The Act Relating to 
Education established a Board of Education consisting of three persons, nominated by the 
Principal Chief then confirmed by the Senate, who would govern an enlarged Cherokee 
school system.  As well as dealing with the larger organisation of the school system 
(distributing funds, for example), the Board of Education was responsible for monitoring the 
quality of education received by students and was therefore tasked with visiting the national 
schools on an annual basis to ensure they were meeting their obligations. Whereas the Old 
Settlers (Cherokees who had voluntarily relocated to Indian Territory in the years before 
forced removal) had established four schools in 1832, this new plan made provisions to 
establish eight schools in the first year and further expand as funds and resources became 
available.  To avoid the tensions exacerbated by missionary schools, Cherokee schools 
established by the Board of Education were ostensibly secular and other institutions of 
education were only permitted to operate within the Nation with the express approval of 
the National Council.312  The public schools would therefore be complemented by a small 
number of missionary schools but only at the discretion of the National Council.  The national 
schools would be funded entirely by the National Treasury and, despite being limited by 
financial considerations, the Council clearly hoped to eventually provide a free education to 
all children of Cherokee citizens who wished to attend school (non-citizens were allowed to 
attend the missionary schools but not the national schools).  Students were therefore not 
charged tuition but school buildings were built and maintained by the local community.  
Furthermore, if a school did not have an average attendance of at least twenty-five students 
it would be relocated to an area with higher demand for education.  These measures served 
to minimise costs and ensure that the education system remained a viable long-term 
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investment. The education provided by these schools was aimed at students aged from six 
to sixteen, provided in English, and included “reading, writing, and spelling in English as well 
as geography, arithmetic, and history.”313  The decision to solely teach in English is telling as 
it reveals the importance that the Cherokee leadership placed on the ability to speak and 
read English after removal. This was made explicit in Section 1 of The Act Relating to 
Education which stated the goal of providing an education for all Cherokee children, with a 
particular emphasis on  “enabling those who speak only the Cherokee language, to acquire 
more readily a practical knowledge and use of the English language.”314  In practice, this 
meant that although the four schools established by the Old Settlers had taught both English 
and Sequoyah’s syllabary, Cherokee schools did not teach their students how to write 
Cherokee and taught all subjects in English after 1840.   
William McLoughlin has argued that the 1840 plan to establish a public education 
system was “very effective” but in reality consolidated the division between Cherokee-
speaking and English-speaking Cherokees rather than encouraging unity. 315  The removal of 
the Sequoyah syllabary from the curriculum, compounded by the difficulty of learning English 
from teachers who largely spoke no Cherokee, discouraged Cherokee-speaking students 
from attending their local school.  According to McLoughlin, such children often stopped 
attending after becoming “frustrated” with the problems of communicating with and 
learning from their teachers, as well as having been “subject to ridicule by children of English-
speaking mixed-blood parents.”316  Furthermore, traditional Cherokee-speaking families 
tended to be poorer and often required the assistance of their children, whether for 
household duties (girls) or on the farm (boys).317  The ability to learn written and spoken 
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English therefore continued to operate as a marker of wealth and social status after removal, 
a problem which the schools often highlighted rather than combatted.  Rather than being an 
institution for all Cherokees, then, the studentships of public schools quickly became 
dominated by English-speaking children, who tended to have “mixed” ancestry and often 
came from wealthier backgrounds than their Cherokee-speaking counterparts.   
The plan put into effect by the 1840 National Council may have been ambitious but 
it was starting to bear fruit as the American Civil War loomed.  There were twenty-one 
primary schools in the Nation in 1846.  By 1860, this had risen to thirty schools which served 
1,500 students out of a total population of 17,048, a number which dwarfed the 200-250 
students being taught when missionary schools were at their most popular.318 The 
establishment and fast expansion of the school system led to a high demand for teachers.  In 
order to produce Cherokee teachers rather than continue hiring teachers from New England, 
and in doing so counter accusations that the education system did not benefit Cherokee-
speaking children, two seminaries opened in 1851 (one for either sex).319 The establishment 
of these institutions of higher education created a platform for the Cherokee elite to 
demonstrate to their critics throughout the United States that they, and by extension 
Cherokees more generally, were capable of intellectual ambition and achievement.  The 
seminaries educated their students to high school level and encouraged them to conform to 
the gender ideals prized in the United States, attempting to develop young boys into 
gentlemen and young girls into “pious homemakers” that would prove the potential of 
Cherokees to acculturate.320  Work by Theda Perdue on Cherokee women and Greg O’Brien 
on Choctaw men illustrates that this was not a new phenomenon and that interactions 
between Native peoples and Euro-Americans had brought about significant changes in 
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gender roles from the eighteenth century.321 Like the primary schools, however, the 
seminaries were quickly understood to primarily benefit the wealthy elite and the high cost 
of running them led to temporary closures before the Civil War.322  Despite the problems 
attached to the Cherokee education system, it “flourished until Oklahoma achieved 
statehood” leading to relatively high literacy rates within the Cherokee citizenry.323   The 
advantages of the Cherokee education system were only felt by Cherokee citizens, however, 
as non-citizens were not permitted to attend. This included individuals held in slavery by 
Cherokees who were not only non-citizens but were also explicitly prohibited from learning 
to read or write.  
 
Reserving Literacy for Cherokee Citizens Only: An Act prohibiting the Teaching of Negroes 
to Read and Write 
There was no way to learn reading and writing; I was a big girl when I learn the 
letters and how to write, and tried to teach mammy but she didn’t learn, so all 
the writing about allotments had to be done by me.  I have written many letters 
to Washington when they gave the Indian lands to the native Indians and their 
Negroes.324 
Patsy Perryman, WPA Interview 
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As this quote from Cherokee freedwoman Patsy Perryman underscores, people enslaved 
within the Cherokee Nation were expressly prohibited from acquiring any literacy skills in the 
same manner as their counterparts throughout the slaveholding states.  They had no access 
to the national school system established by the Cherokee Nation in Indian Territory.  The 
Cherokee Nation did legislate to prohibit the education of their enslaved population 
relatively late, however, having previously allowed them to attend missionary schools with 
Cherokee children prior to removal.  Georgia, for example, legislated against teaching anyone 
of African heritage how to read and write in 1829.325  The presence of enslaved children in 
missionary schools at this time became a source of conflict as the state of Georgia attempted 
to force the Cherokee Nation to concede to their authority.  Historian Duane King described 
an incident which illustrates how vehemently the Georgian authorities opposed the teaching 
of enslaved children.  In 1832 the Georgia state guard interrupted a class, informed the 
teacher that she was breaking the law by allowing two enslaved children to attend and 
threatened to prosecute her if she continued to teach them.326  After removal to Indian 
Territory the Cherokee Nation limited the freedoms it had previously afforded to its enslaved 
population. Previously, Cherokee slaves had been able to attend mission schools and were 
encouraged to teach their masters how to read and write in English, despite being subject to 
laws that defined them as property, denied them the right to own property and prevented 
them from marrying Cherokee citizens.327  Tiya Miles has argued that these prohibitive laws 
were rooted in the slaves’ lack of clan affiliation rather than notions of racial inferiority.328  
As Cherokees increasingly defined themselves against blackness, and after the 1842 
Cherokee Slave Revolt suggested their limited power over their enslaved population, the 
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Nation passed a number of laws that resembled those seen throughout the slaveholding 
states.329  Academics widely consider this post-removal period to be the moment at which 
Cherokee slavery and racial prejudice against individuals with African ancestry were 
consolidated, as blackness and slave status became synonymous where they had previously 
been more fluid.330  Laws passed at this time therefore attempted to more tightly control the 
enslaved population and any free black residents.  For example, the marriage law was 
expanded to prevent Cherokee citizens from marrying anyone of African heritage not just 
slaves and the Cherokee rape law was amended to make the rape of any free woman by a 
black man (enslaved or free) punishable by death.331   
In 1841, as part of this larger effort to more closely regulate slavery and residents of 
African descent, the Cherokee Nation prohibited the teaching of all enslaved and free black 
residents for the first time: 
Be it enacted by the National Council, That from and after the passage of this 
act, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons whatever, to teach any free 
negro or negroes not of Cherokee blood, or any slave belonging to any citizen 
or citizens of the Nation, to read or write. 
Be it further enacted, That any person or persons violating this act, and 
sufficient proof being made thereof, before any of the Courts, in this Nation, 
such person or persons upon conviction, shall pay a fine for every such offence 
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in a sum not less than one, nor over five hundred dollars, at the discretion of 
the Court, the same to be applied to National purposes.332 
An Act prohibiting the Teaching of Negroes to Read and Write 
     
This brought the Cherokee Nation into alignment with slaveholdings states throughout the 
American South, such as Georgia.  Heather Andrea Williams has described anti-literacy laws 
as a component within the larger attempt by slaveholders to “control their captives’ thoughts 
and imaginations, indeed their hearts and minds.”333 Literacy had the potential to enable the 
enslaved to claim intellectual liberation and actual freedoms in the form of forged passes 
and documents.  Literacy could also give the enslaved access to materials or information that 
slaveholders viewed as dangerous, “subvert[ing] the master-slave relationship” and 
therefore acting as “a weapon of resistance and liberation.”334 Denying the enslaved literacy 
was therefore an attempt to retain power and consolidate the institution of slavery.  As we 
can see above, the penalties delineated within this Act were considerable and, in an  
interview with the Federal Writers’ Project in the late 1930s, Betty Robertson remembered 
how carefully Cherokees observed the law: “we couldn’t learn to read or have a book, and 
the Cherokee folks were afraid to tell us about the letters and figgers because they have a 
law you go to jail and a big fine if you show a slave about letters.”335 
 Betsy Robertson was not alone in highlighting the exclusion of Cherokee freedpeople 
from the Nation’s school system within the course of these interviews.  Many others felt 
aggrieved at the consequences of this exclusion, particularly in relation to the illiteracy 
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imposed on them as a result.  Patsy Perryman was careful to attribute her lack of education 
as a child to the laws of the Cherokee Nation, recounting that “there was no way to learn 
reading and writing.”336 Illiteracy was widespread and Chaney Richardson, like Betty 
Robertson, was frank about her lack of education: “The negroes didn’t have no school and 
so I can’t read and write, but they did have a school after the War, I hear.”337  A young 
teenager when the Civil War broke out, Richardson was not permitted an education when 
she was enslaved and was too old to attend any of the primary schools later established for 
freedpeople.  Within these interviews it is apparent that the freedpeople understood 
prohibitions against teaching the enslaved to be a means of controlling the entire enslaved 
population. Morris Sheppard, for example, recognised the Cherokee law regarding slave 
literacy as an attempt to subjugate everyone with African ancestry: “We never had no school 
in slavery and it was agin the law for anybody to even show a negro de letters and figgers, so 
no Cherokee slave could read.”338  Celia Naylor has subsequently argued that the space 
freedpeople afforded the issue of education in these interviews, collected seventy years after 
the abolition of slavery, reveals the lasting injustice freedpeople felt at being denied an 
education.339 
Interviews such as Sheppard’s also reveal that being denied an education felt deeply 
personal and had wider implications beyond the inability to read or write.  After the war 
Sheppard married Nancy Hildebrand, a former Cherokee slave and devout Christian, and he 
suggests that his illiteracy limited his ability to share in her churchgoing ways. Sheppard’s 
wife and eleven children attended church but Sheppard did not.  Despite believing that “all 
should look after saving their souls,” Sheppard connected his lack of formal churchgoing to 
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not being taught to read when he was enslaved: “We never had no church in slavery, and no 
schooling, and you had better not be caught wid a book in your hand even, so I never did go 
to church hardly any.”340 In Sheppard’s experience then, exclusion from one institution 
brought about a lasting exclusion from the other.  Throughout the WPA interviews 
discussions of schooling and churchgoing appear together, connected by the act of reading 
or being read to.  Given the widespread use of the Sequoyan Syllabary at this time, there was 
no guarantee that the Bible would be read in English and unable to read herself, Chaney 
Richardson shared fond memories of hearing Cherokee read: “[I] love to hear songs and parts 
of the Bible in it, because it make me think about the time I was a little girl before my mammy 
and pappy leave me.”341  The loss of her parents - Richardson’s mother was a casualty in the 
sectional violence preceding the Civil War and her father was killed serving with the Union 
Army in Arkansas - represent pivotal traumas in Richardson’s narrative and explain the 
nostalgia she felt for a time when the Cherokee language was more widely spoken.  Although 
Sheppard felt unable to participate in the churchgoing experience due to his illiteracy, then, 
Richardson remembers being read to as a moment of inclusion and comfort.    
  Sheppard’s comment about being caught with a book (‘you had better not be 
caught wid a book even’) highlights that Cherokee slaves were not just excluded from formal 
education, the law also made it a crime for anyone to teach a slave even rudimentary reading 
and writing.  Even just holding a book, no matter if you were able to read it or not, was 
subversive enough to elicit punishment from masters or mistresses.  Sarah Wilson 
remembered the danger of doing so, for both the enslaved and any Cherokee who was willing 
to teach them: “you better not let them catch you pick up a book even to look at the pictures, 
for it was against a Cherokee law to have a Negro read and write or to teach a Negro.”342  The 
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desire for education is evident throughout the ex-slave interviews discussed here, however, 
and despite the criminalisation of teaching the enslaved to read and write it was possible for 
some keen prospective students to find opportunities to become literate.  When the children 
of R. C. Smith’s former master came home from school, for example, they would try to “learn 
us everything they learned at school.”343  Although Smith conceded that he “couldn’t be still 
enough to learn anything,” both his parents learnt to read and write from the children and 
Smith later learned to do so as an adult.344  Accounts such as Smith’s, alongside others that 
may not directly discuss schools or education but reveal an ability to send and receive letters 
prior to the end of the Civil War, indicate that a small minority of Cherokee slaves did manage 
to become literate of their own accord.345   
After the abolition of slavery, freedpeople throughout the Indian Territory and the 
United States would actively pursue education in an attempt to redress the illiteracy imposed 
upon them under the institution of slavery.  Attaining literacy was often difficult but 
rewarding.  For example, the empowering nature of literacy is made evident in Perryman’s 
narrative, cited above, since she describes being able to write letters to federal officials on 
behalf of herself and her mother regarding the allotment of Cherokee land. 346  Education 
therefore enabled Perryman to pursue her own interests and defend her citizenship rights 
herself, rather than relying on a third-party.  Not all freedpeople attained literacy after 
slavery, however, on account of the limited opportunities made available by the Cherokee 
Nation who proved reluctant to give the formerly enslaved equal access to the services of 
the Nation in the years following emancipation.    
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“We hav bin deprived”: Freedpeople and the Cherokee National Schools 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the Loyal National Council struck down any laws that 
specifically targeted people of African descent, including the ‘Act prohibiting the Teaching of 
Negroes to Read and Write,’ when they abolished slavery in 1863.  The passage of the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty that afforded freedpeople citizenship and ‘all the rights of native 
Cherokees’ therefore theoretically gave freedpeople access to the national schools. 
However, freedpeople quickly found that their access to this component of citizenship was 
limited in much the same way as recognition of their citizenship status was in the years 
following emancipation.  Reluctant to provide freedpeople with the same standards of 
education as the larger Cherokee population, the Nation placed considerable obstacles in 
the way of freedpeople and their children.  They did so by unofficially implementing a 
segregated school system yet insisting that schools open to freedpeople met the same 
attendance figures as demanded from schools reserved for Cherokee and white students.  
Celia Naylor has argued that the actions of the National Council and the Board of Education 
“speak[s] directly to Cherokee leaders’ unwillingness to accept freedpeople as citizens with 
legitimate rights to the same services provided to other Cherokees.”347  Denying freedpeople 
the same standard of education therefore operated as one of the means by which the 
Cherokee Nation attempted to implement a lesser form of citizenship for freedpeople.  Since 
the Cherokee public schools were only accessible to citizens, the debates surrounding 
citizenship and education went hand in hand: if a freedperson could not prove they were the 
child of recognised citizens they would not be admitted to their local school (if they were 
fortunate enough to have one within a reasonable proximity).  Gaining a public education in 
the Cherokee Nation was therefore an impossibility for children of the ‘too-lates’ discussed 
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in the previous chapter and difficult even for those whose citizenship had been affirmed by 
the Cherokee authorities. 
Records detailing the Cherokee school system are incomplete but it is fair to argue 
that it did not meet the hopes of freedpeople.348 The Cherokee Nation reinstated its public 
school system after the Civil War but did not allow freedpeople to attend schools alongside 
Cherokee and white children.  Instead, the Nation unofficially adopted a policy of segregation 
that educated children with African heritage separately.  Although Cherokee children with 
white ancestry were admitted to the national schools, children with African ancestry were 
not (regardless of whether they could claim Cherokee ancestry).  Interestingly, other citizens 
could attend the schools established for freedpeople if they chose to (although the number 
that did so was small and some schools only recorded children of freedpeople as students).349 
The first two schools for children of freedpeople, known as ‘Colored schools,’ opened in 1869 
and three were in operation by 1871.  Celia Naylor notes that not only did the Cherokee 
Nation respond more slowly to the demands freedpeople made for education than the 
United States did but they also provided fewer opportunities for freedpeople to attend 
schools: 56 schools admitted Cherokees “exclusively” in 1871.350  Out of a total of 59 public 
schools in 1871, then, the entire freedpeople population of the Cherokee Nation, numbering 
1500 recognised citizens, was served by only three schools.351  This gave freedpeople access 
to a disproportionately small number of national schools. 
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The rules regarding average attendance represented an additional pressure for 
Cherokee freedpeople who struggled to meet the same standards as the rest of the 
population. According to Daniel Littlefield, schools established for freedpeople were often 
unable to maintain an average of twenty-five attendees, leading to instability and constant 
changes in the number and location of schools.352 Historians such as Littlefield and Celia 
Naylor have attributed the low attendance of schools for freedpeople to the largely rural 
nature of the Cherokee Nation since freedpeople often had to travel long distances to reach 
the nearest school that would admit them.353  For many children of freedpeople this would 
have required travelling past national schools in which they were not welcome, especially 
given the scarcity of coloured schools in comparison to the total number in operation.  Since 
many freedpeople families lived a subsistence lifestyle through necessity, the effort of 
getting their children to school and the necessity of using their labour on the farm often led 
to many parents keeping their children at home, regardless of how highly they valued 
education.354  Fluctuating numbers of children therefore led to school closures.  By 
continuing to segregate schools and enforce the twenty-five student average, the Cherokee 
Nation therefore put freedpeople at a considerable disadvantage.   
It was apparent almost immediately that the Cherokee Nation were unlikely to offer 
freedpeople the same access to education afforded to the rest of the Cherokee citizenry 
without action by freedpeople to secure it for themselves. Some communities established 
their own subscription schools when the Cherokee Nation failed to do so.  Such schools were 
limited by the scarcity of funds and resources but were often a source of pride.  Academics 
largely agree that subscription schools could not match the quality of the public schools, 
using Johnson Thompson as an example of a subscription school student who “didn’t get 
                                                          
352 Littlefield, The Cherokee Freedmen, 53.  
353 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 163. 
354 Naylor, African Cherokees in Indian Territory, 164. 
121 
 
much learning.”355 In his 1873 letter to the Secretary of the Interior, however, Woodson Lowe 
Parker described a subscription school established by himself and other freedpeople in which 
they “are seeking enlightenment and the elevation which arises from and follows thorough 
education.”356  As discussed in the previous chapter, the goal of Parker’s letter was to 
encourage federal intervention to secure citizenship for himself and other local freedpeople: 
Parker described the subscription school in glowing terms, using it as evidence of how well 
his community was established and their commitment to the intellectual advancement of 
their children.  In Parker’s eyes, then, the school represented positive action and success 
rather than an inferior counterpart to the national schools.  In depicting his community in 
this manner, Parker attempted to signal to the federal government that, now free, himself 
and others were capable of flourishing within the Cherokee Nation as its citizens. 
Some freedpeople refused to accept that it was their own responsibility to establish 
subscription schools and instead pressured the Cherokee Nation to fulfil its obligation to 
provide the same educational opportunities as those available to other citizens.  In the 
opening vignette to this chapter, Cherokee freedman Louis Rough wrote directly to President 
Ulysses Grant in 1872 to protest the lack of education provided to freedpeople by the 
Cherokee Nation: 
Pleas give me a little information what the dark popution is to doo about that 
school funds to have our children educated are we to stay here and rais them 
like up lik hethens we have bin deprived of five years school the rebels took our 
books and een acordin to the sixty six trety we want u say so what to doo if it is 
lefte to the Cherykees we never will have nothing done… the Cherykees is down 
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on the darkeys the Cherykees say they ainte in favour of the blake man havin 
any classes that they had rather any body else have a rite than us pore blakies… 
we donte thinke it rite we have made them rich and bulte his land doo you 
thinke it rite357 
Rough may have been limited by his own levels of literacy but he encouraged Grant to 
intervene and secure education for freedpeople in two interesting ways.  Firstly he cast the 
education of freedpeople as important, whether to prevent the next generation from 
growing up as ‘hethens’ or simply as a matter of human justice since “We have made them 
rich.”  It was widely held at this time that the acculturation and assimilation of Native 
Americans into white American society could be achieved through effective and prescriptive 
education, which would act as “the great emancipator.”358 In his use of ‘hethen,’ Rough 
therefore drew a connection between the larger civilising project being undertaken by the 
United States and the education of Cherokee freedpeople.  Rough explicitly states that the 
wealth of the Cherokees was largely made possible through enslaved labour and lays a claim 
to the advantages of citizenship made possible by that wealth.  Second, Rough stressed that 
through denying education to freedpeople, the Cherokee Nation was abrogating the terms 
of the 1866 treaty which afforded them full citizenship rights.  This would suggest that the 
United States could justify any intervention on behalf of freedpeople through the 1866 treaty 
to which they had been party.  Having already been deprived of an education for five years, 
Rough claimed that the Cherokee Nation would continue to deny freedpeople an education 
unless the United States government pressured them to fulfil their obligation.   
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In his letter, Rough attributed the actions of the Cherokee leadership regarding the 
education of freedpeople to the racial prejudices held by Cherokees who were ‘down on the 
darkeys.’  Principal Chief William P. Ross passionately argued that there was no 
discrimination in the Cherokee Nation, however, and that nowhere “had so little trouble 
occurred since the war in relation to color.”359  Although scholars are in agreement that there 
was considerably less violence against freedpeople in the Cherokee Nation than seen in the 
former slaveholding states, boundless evidence refutes Ross’s claim that there was no 
prejudice at all.360  Murray Wickett, for example, recounted an incident that occurred before 
the establishment of the Colored High School in 1889: Chief Bushyhead intervened after a 
freedman was admitted to the School  and “it was found later that the Indian students had 
procured one hundred feet of one-inch rope and stashed it in the attic, admitting freely that 
they would have lynched any blacks attempting to attend their school.”361  Teachers of 
African descent, whether Cherokee freedpeople or African Americans from the United 
States, were also subject to racial prejudice from their Cherokee colleagues.  Emma Dunbar, 
a teacher at the Orphan Asylum, attended the Cherokee Teachers’ Institute and asserted 
that Cherokee teachers considered black teachers to be inferior: they would often refuse to 
engage with black teachers and would walk out if black teachers spoke within their classes.362  
The racial prejudices held by certain portions of the Cherokee Nation therefore pervaded its 
school system, affecting both students and teachers. 
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Freedpeople and the Orphan Asylum 
The frustration freedpeople felt at being offered only limited access to education was 
compounded by their exclusion from the national orphan fund and asylum.  The national 
orphan fund, established as part of the 1841 Act Relating to Education, initially awarded 
schools with 200 dollars to place orphans with acceptable families and pay for their board.  
Orphans had previously been cared for by kin but in creating the orphan fund the National 
government assumed that responsibility as it expanded its power in the nineteenth 
century.363  Whereas Cherokee society had previously been organised around clan 
membership and kinship ties, the notion of citizenship slowly replaced these as the 
government formalised who was and who was not Cherokee.  Traditionally, individuals 
enslaved by Cherokees had no clan membership and could not claim its advantages.  Julie 
Reed argues that although ‘citizen’ came to replace ‘clan member,’ the exclusion of children 
of freedpeople revealed that although the Cherokee Nation may have recognised them as 
citizens they did not see them as kin and were unwilling to extend to them its associated 
benefits.364   
  At its pre-Civil War peak the fund provided for 120 orphans but the conflict left 1,200 
Cherokee children without parents.365  This was an unmanageable increase and in order to 
more effectively provide care for so many orphans, the Nation established an Orphan Asylum 
in 1872.  The asylum provided board, a primary school education, encouraged industry, 
family values and nationalism and was modelled on the ideal Cherokee home.366  The subject 
of great public interest, the asylum quickly gained a reputation for providing both excellent 
care and a good education.367  By 1873, there were ninety residents at the Orphan Asylum, 
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none of which were freedpeople.368 Having previously been given a share in the Orphan fund 
following emancipation, freedpeople were also cut off from the fund after the establishment 
of the Orphan Asylum and therefore assumed the responsibility of caring for orphaned 
children themselves.  They did, however, voice their discontent at this exclusion.  In 1873, 
after receiving no response from the Orphan Asylum or the National Council, a group of 
freedpeople petitioned Agent John B. Jones to seek the support of the United States as a 
“last resort.”369  Although he did not forward their petition, citing “blunders and defects” for 
this oversight, Jones outlined their arguments in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs.370  According to Jones, the petitioners argued that as citizens by virtue of the treaty 
of 1866 they are entitled to share in “the very important privilege of having their orphan 
children participate in the benefits of Orphan Funds of this Nation.”371  Although the original 
text of the petition has since been lost, it is possible to draw certain conclusions based on 
Jones’s letter.  The petition echoed Louis Rough’s letter to President Grant in two key ways.  
First, these freedpeople have also concluded that their own actions are unlikely to affect 
change and hope that pressure from the United States will force the Cherokee Nation to 
reconsider their position.  Second, the freedpeople considered racial prejudice to be a factor 
in their exclusion from the Orphan Asylum and would therefore prefer that the orphaned 
children of freedpeople be cared for through other means: 
They further state: That owing to the prejudice existing in the minds of many of 
the Cherokees against associating with people of African blood they do not urge 
or even request, that their orphans be taken into the Cherokee Asylum, for they 
do not wish to obtrude any portion of their people on those who dislike to 
associate them.  
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[…] 
 …they wish to avoid any unpleasant feelings among the Cherokees which the 
presence of colored children in the Asylum might cause, and also to avoid the 
possibility of such indignities being offered to their children as are suffered by 
colored students attending white institutions in the states.372 
In this passage, Jones’s letter reveals that the petitioners fear those who ‘dislike to associate’ 
with freedpeople may react negatively if forced to open the asylum to orphaned children of 
freedpeople.  Doing so may have ramifications for both freedpeople generally (who might 
have been subject to resentment or ‘unpleasant feelings’) and the children themselves who 
may become victim to ‘indignities’ within the asylum.  Already vulnerable by virtue of their 
orphan status, then, such children would be made more so by the colour of their skin.  
Interestingly, the petitioners reveal an awareness of how orphaned children of freedpeople 
were treated outside of the Cherokee Nation by referring to ‘white institutions in the states’.  
This suggests that Cherokee freedpeople themselves were actively monitoring policies 
towards freedpeople in the United States and were concerned about being subject to the 
same conditions.  
 Jones’s letter and the petition he described appear to have affected no response on 
the part of the Cherokee Nation.  In October 1874, another petition was sent by twenty-four 
freedpeople from Four Mile Branch to the General Council seeking relief.  Within the letter 
the petitioners again protested the exclusion of their children from the Orphan Asylum and 
demanded it as their right: “By the treaty of 1866 provision was made for us to enjoy all the 
rights and privileges of Cherokee citizens.”373  In doing so, the petitioners insisted on equal 
treatment and refused to accept the inaction of the Cherokee elite.  Despite repeated 
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attempts to secure support for the orphaned children of freedpeople, however, such 
children were never permitted to enter the Orphan Asylum.  Reed has argued that the 
Cherokee leadership may have been unwilling to recognise freedpeople as kin, only citizens, 
but compromised by meeting “the minimal needs of freedmen.”374  Although pressured by 
the United States to admit that they had excluded freedpeople from the asylum, the Nation 
instead claimed that they could not care for all orphans and in 1895 established a residential 
primary department in the Colored High School that was open to orphaned children of 
freedpeople.375   Over twenty years after the Orphan Asylum opened, then, the Nation met 
its obligations under the 1866 Treaty but did not admit people to the Cherokee family writ 
large.  
 Like Cherokee freedpeople, freedpeople throughout the United States struggled to 
gain access to orphanages.  Unlike the Cherokee Nation, however, the federal government 
did not claim responsibility for the care of orphaned children and this responsibility fell to 
families and communities.  The first orphanage in the United States was established by 
Ursuline (Catholic) nuns in New Orleans in 1798 and was intended to address the hardships 
faced by children growing up in poor houses.376  Orphanages were established slowly 
between 1800 and 1830, then rapidly from the 1830s as they gained a reputation for being 
“ideal institutions,” and were placed under huge strain by the carnage of the Civil War.377  
According to historian Geraldine Youcha, African Americans struggled to gain access to 
orphanages or support more generally from charitable organisations that assisted the poor 
since they were largely set up by white Americans to care for white Americans.  Girard 
College orphanage - established in Philadelphia in 1848 - only began admitting boys of colour 
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in 1967, for example.378  Although some orphanages were set up specifically to cater for the 
needs of African American children, they were often vulnerable to the racial tensions of their 
locality.  The first students of the Colored Orphan Asylum in New York, for example, walked 
across the city to move in when it opened in 1836 because coach drivers would not allow 
them to board the coach.379  During the Civil War Draft Riots of July 1863, rioters burnt down 
the orphanage after anger at the Conscription Act became directed at the black residents of 
the city.380  In the years following the Civil War the number of orphanages open to the 
children of freedpeople remained few and the care of orphans remained a local or a private 
matter rather than the responsibility of the federal government.  This is likely to have 
informed the indifference of federal officials towards the exclusion of Cherokee freedpeople 
from the Cherokee Orphan Asylum: there was no corresponding rights or service provided 
for citizens of the United States. 
 
‘Your Humble Petitioners’: Seeking Relief from the Federal Government 
By 1872, United States officials were aware that freedpeople were struggling to gain access 
to the same services open to other Cherokees.  That year, federal officials wrote to Principal 
Chief William Potter Ross demanding an explanation of the exclusion of freedpeople from 
the Orphan Asylum and the lack of schools providing for freedpeople.381  There is no record 
of a reply. The next year, within his report on intruders and the citizenship status of 
freedpeople in the Cherokee and Creek nations, Superintendent W. N. Nicholson of the 
Central Superintendency included a list of 290 children of freedpeople who claimed to have 
been “deprived of school privileges and of the benefits of the school fund by the Cherokee 
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authorities.”382  As well as being concerned about the broader implications of freedpeople 
being denied access to education, United States officials also became involved in questions 
over individual schools. In May 1877, U. S. Indian Agent S. W. Marston from the Union Agency 
wrote to Principal Chief Charles Thompson (Oochalata) requesting information about a 
school operating in Lightning Creek on behalf of the Department of the Interior.  The teacher 
at the school, Edward Derrick, had sought the assistance of the United States in operating 
the school which he said served “freedmen who were slaves of the Cherokees and many of 
them are doubtless mixed bloods of that nation.”383 It is implicit in Derrick and Marston’s 
comment on ancestry that the likelihood of Cherokee ‘blood’ legitimated the children’s right 
to education.  Interestingly, in October of the same year, fourteen freedpeople from 
Lightning Creek sent a petition to the Cherokee National Council in which they claimed to be 
“destitute of public schools” and pledged to be capable of meeting the minimum attendance 
requirements.384 They therefore entreated the establishment of a school at Lightning Creek 
and met with success as the National Council must have approved their request: fragmentary 
attendance records reveal that in the winter term of 1894 (September to December) an 
average of forty students attended the Lightning Creek Primary School.385 
 The victories won by freedpeople in relation to education were small, however.  
Freedpeople, with some support from federal officials, continued to pressure the Cherokee 
Nation to meet their obligations to freedpeople, though they received limited results.  For 
example, freedpeople protested only being taught by white or Cherokee teachers and, 
although there were still none in 1883 the Nation did hire fourteen black teachers over the 
next five years: nine of whom were “black native.”386 Since freedpeople preferred being 
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taught by teachers of their own race, this represented an improvement in employment 
practices.  The number of schools established for the children of Cherokee freedpeople also 
slowly increased throughout the next decades, reaching twelve out of a total of 100 in 1887 
and peaking at fourteen in 1892.  An 1898 list of school age citizens reveals that these schools 
served a potential 1523 freedpeople of school age out of a total of 11,538 children who met 
this criteria.387  Freedpeople were therefore underrepresented in terms of the number of 
schools they had access to, especially since other Cherokee citizens could still theoretically 
attend the schools established for freedpeople.  Coloured schools that did operate during 
this time were therefore heavily oversubscribed and struggled to provide the quality of 
education seen in other Cherokee schools.  A petition sent to the National Council and Board 
of Education in 1895, requesting an Assistant Teacher, illustrates the strain this placed on 
Coloured Schools: over 104 students attended Four Mile Branch Colored Primary School, 
with a daily average attendance of seventy to eighty.  The single teacher employed at the 
school understandably expressed concern at the prospect of teaching such huge classes on 
his own.388   
Furthermore, although the Cherokee Nation bowed to pressure from freedpeople to 
open a Colored High School in 1889 it did not fulfil the same functions as the Male and 
Female Seminaries.  Rather than suggesting the inclusion of freedpeople within the Cherokee 
high schools, however, the problems of the Colored High School highlight how reluctant the 
Nation was about providing services to freedpeople.  The Cherokee Nation provided the bare 
minimum rather than embrace freedpeople in the same manner as kin, in much the same 
way Julie Reed described in relation to the orphan fund.  Like its counterparts, the Colored 
High School was intended to provide a higher education for fifty students (although in this 
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case the institution would accommodate both male and female students) and although 
tuition would be free, board was charged at $5 per month.  The Colored High School received 
less funding than its counterparts, reflected in the wages of the Principal Teacher ($500 
rather than $900 for each of the Seminaries) and the budget afforded for expenses ($3000 
rather than the $7000 afforded for each of the Seminaries).  This was a considerable 
difference and clearly illustrates the lack of investment that the Cherokee Nation was willing 
to make to the higher education of freedpeople.389  The condition of the Colored High School 
quickly became a source of concern for its Principal Teacher, Nelson Lowery.  In 1892, Lowery 
wrote to the Superintendent of Education requesting that the cook range be replaced 
because “the present range is liable to set the building on fire.”390  Writing again in 1894, 
Lowery requested that the National Council provide a “badly needed” wash house.391  In 
1897, although proud of strong attendance figures,  his successor asserted that the building 
“needs repairs badly” and described significant damage to the roof amongst other necessary 
repairs.392  These were not requests made merely to improve the outward appearance of the 
school, but serve to confirm that at various points the Colored High School was an unsafe 
environment.  Plagued by low attendance, largely attributable to the $5 board which 
remained outside the means of most freedpeople families, the Colored High School 
continued under constant threat of closure.  In the eyes of some Cherokees, the struggle of 
the Colored High School validated their notions of black inferiority.393  In the 1891 Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Education, W. W. Hastings asserted that only six scholars 
were in permanent attendance and that “this is too great an expense for the education of so 
few.”394  He therefore recommended the high school be either temporarily closed or 
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permanently discontinued.  Daniel Littlefield has argued that, owing to the poor investment 
in and lack of a defined curriculum provided for the Colored High School, it provided such a 
poor education that “it was, for all practical purposes, a primary school.”395  In 1895, the 
National Council added a primary department to the Colored High School and by 1901 only 
twelve of the thirty-four students at the institution were studying at high school level.396 
Cherokee freedpeople struggled, then, to gain access to the schools provided by the 
Cherokee Nation to its citizens and those that did were likely to have received a 
comparatively poor education.  Although the Cherokee Nation may have surpassed its 
neighbours in the antebellum period, with its establishment of a nationally funded public 
school system, there was arguably much greater access for education to its freedpeople 
available in the United States in the decades following the Civil War.  Celia Naylor has 
therefore argued that the education received by Cherokee freedpeople was “limited” in 
comparison to the opportunities available to freedpeople in the United States.  Without the 
full support of the United States, freedpeople had little power with which to pressure the 
Cherokee Nation to treat them as equal citizens with the attached rights to services provided 
by the Nation. Although the federal government was made aware of the exclusion of 
freedpeople by the actions of freedpeople themselves, federal officials took limited action.  
Rather than enforcing the Treaty of 1866 and using it as a legal basis for intervening on behalf 
of freedpeople, federal officials collected information from freedpeople and the Cherokee 
Nation but showed little interest in the issue.  Scholars such as Naylor do not offer an 
explanation as to why freedpeople received minimal support in regard to securing their 
education. This stands in stark contrast to the unwavering commitment of the United States 
to defend the citizenship status of Cherokee freedpeople seen in the previous chapter.  Agent 
John B. Jones, for example, had advocated the intervention of the United States on behalf of 
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freedpeople when he forwarded the 1872 petition to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs but 
made no comment on the exclusion of freedpeople citizens from the Orphan Fund in 1873.  
The federal government then proceeded to enter a stalemate with the Cherokee Nation over 
the rights of freedpeople to education and the orphan fund where they collected information 
pertaining to the exclusion of freedpeople from the services of the nation but took no action.  
In hearings conducted by the federal government in 1885, Julie Reed describes Cherokee 
officials feigning ignorance that there were any orphaned freedpeople at all or that it was 
necessary that provision be made for such children.397  Despite this flagrant violation of the 
1866 treaty, the federal government subsequently took no action to secure the rights of 
freedpeople to access the services provided by the Cherokee Nation. 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas public education, or at least access to it, was an established component of 
Cherokee citizenship throughout the post-Civil War period, the education of freedpeople in 
the United States was not viewed in the same way.  Although the Freedmen’s Bureau did 
distribute funds in aid of the education of freedpeople this did not equate to a national public 
school system: the education of the formerly enslaved in the aftermath of the Civil War 
represented an anomaly since education was not considered a state responsibility.  The 
involvement of northern benevolent societies, that were private organisations that existed 
independently to the federal and state governments, further indicates that providing 
education was not considered the responsibility of the national government and not a right 
of citizenship.  In continuing to hold to that principle in relation to Cherokee freedpeople, 
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federal officials that oversaw the status of freedpeople in the Cherokee Nation denied them 
a key component of their Cherokee citizenship.   
Without the support of the federal government, freedpeople struggled to gain equal 
access to the social services associated with Cherokee citizenship and achieved only small 
victories in their pursuit of these rights.  As illustrated in the previous chapter, the federal 
government had been willing to support freedpeople as they pursued legal citizenship, 
entering into disputes with the Nation over the six-month deadline and who held final 
authority over who was and who was not a Cherokee citizen.  Federal officials only tentatively 
pursued the matter of Cherokee freedpeople’s rights to access the national schools and 
orphan fund, however, and did not enter into a similar jurisdictional disagreement.  They 
therefore proved themselves more willing to enforce some rights of Cherokee citizenship 
than others.  Enforcing the rights of freedpeople to claim legal citizenship and residency 
within the Nation allowed the United States to gain influence over decisions made regarding 
the protection of the Cherokee border (and claim sole control over the actions of their own 
military, despite treaty assurances they would remove intruders on behalf of the Cherokee 
Nation). On the other hand, enforcing the right of Cherokee freedpeople to services that had 
no parallel in the United States was more likely to prove costly than act as a meaningful 
inroad on the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation.  The relative indifference of the federal 
officials therefore allowed the Cherokee Nation to continue providing its freedpeople with 
limited access to the services it provided to its citizens.  As will be made evident in the next 
chapter of this thesis, however, freedpeople did manage to secure the support of federal 
officials as they pursued an equal share in the economic resources of the Cherokee Nation.  
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Chapter Four: Securing a Share in the Economic Resources of the Cherokee Nation 
 
Under their respective pleas of interest and obligation, concession and 
agreement are undoubtedly necessary, on the part of both, to a final settlement 
of the troublesome question…. Some body has to back down, and who shall it 
be?398 
‘Citizenship: Some Facts Not Generally Known In Reference to the Question’ (1882) 
 
The Cherokee National Council approved the 1880 national census in the hope that this 
would resolve the contentious issue of who was and who was not entitled to Cherokee 
citizenship.  As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the Nation had been plagued 
by this problem since the Civil War and it had caused considerable friction both within the 
boundaries of the Nation and between the Cherokee Nation and the United States.  Creating 
a definitive list of citizens would theoretically end debate over the status of individuals at 
that particular time as well as in the future (descendants would have to trace their ancestry 
to a name on the 1880 census in order to prove their claim to citizenship).399  In the two 
decades following the creation of the 1880 census, however, the issue of citizenship 
remained controversial.  Individual freedpeople continued to struggle to be recognised as 
citizens rather than intruders and, as discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, even those 
freedpeople accepted as citizens did not have equal access to national services such as free 
education in the final decades of the nineteenth century.  The Cherokee Nation and the 
United States both continued to claim final authority over who was and who was not a 
Cherokee citizen, which in turn prompted commentators within the Nation to question who 
would be the first to ‘back down.’  
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 The ongoing dispute over Cherokee freedpeople and their rights came to a head over 
Cherokee national economic resources.  At the beginning of 1883, the Cherokee Nation 
requested that the United States paid the balance of funds it owed the Nation for land used 
to relocate other Native nations after the Civil War.  Given to the National Council to use as 
they saw fit, the Council proposed that the money be evenly distributed to citizens who were 
‘Cherokee by blood’ as a per-capita payment in the spring of the same year.  Cherokee 
freedpeople, as well as other adopted citizens, were therefore denied a share of this 
payment.   Their exclusion from the 1883 distribution of Cherokee national funds prompted 
freedpeople to act collectively to secure their interests.  In response to this payment, 
Cherokee freedpeople organised and successfully navigated the United States legislature and 
courts to ensure they received an equal share in national resources and had their claim to do 
so validated by the United States legal system.  In doing so, Cherokee freedpeople exploited 
the different interpretations of Cherokee citizenship held by the Cherokee and United States 
governments to secure their own interests.  Daniel Littlefield has argued that prior to this 
moment, freedpeople had been unable to “directly” fight for their rights (having previously 
relied on the actions of federal and Cherokee officials).  Now they had identified a significant 
issue where their rights could be clearly tracked and “they had found a champion in the 
federal government.”400  The federal government was slow to offer their support, however, 
taking five years to pass the bill appropriating the $75000 necessary to provide freedpeople 
with an equal payment to that received by Cherokees by blood.  Furthermore, Cherokee 
freedpeople may have used familiar techniques to attempt to influence officials around them 
(petitions, for example) but they also acted independently to secure their own legal counsel 
and submit their suit to the Court of Claims.  In doing so, freedpeople utilised the knowledge 
of Cherokee and federal institutions (including the National Council, the Department of the 
Interior and Congress) they had amassed in previous attempts to gain full rights as well as 
taking their struggle in to the American judicial system.   The actions of freedpeople 
themselves therefore kept the issue of their rights at the forefront of interactions between 
the Cherokee Nation and the United States.  Although the federal government did express 
willingness to support freedpeople as they worked to secure an equal share in the resources 
of the Cherokee Nation, the growing hostility displayed towards freedpeople within its own 
borders - compounded by its goal of territorialisation of Indian Territory - suggests that they 
did so to further their own expansionist agenda.   
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The Most Dangerous Question: Cherokee Citizenship in the 1880s 
The 1880 Cherokee census did not provide a foundation for resolving the dispute over 
freedpeople and their citizenship.  The National Council’s 1883 payment (to citizens by blood 
only) was therefore made in the context of ongoing debate and growing frustration between 
Cherokee and federal officials as well as within the Cherokee citizenry.  At this time, the 
United States and the Cherokee Nation both continued to claim final authority over 
questions of citizenship and the lingering nature of this dispute was a cause for concern 
within the Cherokee Nation.  Articles considering citizenship featured heavily in the national 
newspaper, the Cherokee Advocate, reflecting its prominence as a political issue.    A series 
of three opinion pieces, written by an anonymous author (‘A’) in 1882, attempted to make 
sense of the problem for readers of the Cherokee Advocate. ‘A’, most likely an educated 
Cherokee man, laid out a brief summary of the interactions between Cherokee and federal 
officials over citizenship and intruders, criticised the refusal of Cherokee officials to work 
with federal officials to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, and advocated compromise 
to resolve the questions surrounding Cherokee citizenship.  ‘A’ incorporated extensive 
quotations from letters sent between Cherokee and federal officials as evidence for his 
argument.  In structuring the pieces in such a manner, the author endeavoured to share the 
‘facts not generally known’ with the residents of the Cherokee Nation and establish the 
history of how the issue had been handled, exactly what had been said and by whom.401  ‘A’ 
also shared his own opinion and opened the series with a scathing indictment of how the 
dispute had been handled by Cherokee officials prior to 1882: 
…those in authority at the time, under the plea of absolute autonomy as they 
were pleased to call it, ignored the recommendation [of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs] and tacitly denied, by non-compliance, the right of the 
Government of the United States to interfere in any matter involving any of the 
rights of self-government.  As a consequence the question remains and the 
same conditions exist today just as they did when the demand was made, 
complicated by the lapse of years and augmented by hundreds more exercising 
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all the rights of citizenship except representation, but enjoying instead, which is 
better, a complete exemption from the operation of our laws.402 
‘A’, called in to question the efficacy of “those in authority” by suggesting that their refusal 
to cooperate with federal officials, led to a deepening of the problem rather than its 
resolution.403  ‘A’ therefore depicted the actions of the Cherokee leadership as rash, 
stemming from a desire to reject cooperation with the United States at the expense of 
negotiating a fairer and more equitable agreement in regards to managing Cherokee 
citizenship.  Furthermore, ‘A’ suggested that by allowing the debate over jurisdiction to 
continue unresolved it actually presented a larger threat to the autonomy of the Nation as 
citizenship cases became increasingly difficult to adjudicate (given the time since 
emancipation, in the case of freedpeople) and the growing number of intruders entering the 
Nation.  These intruders, according to ‘A’, were able to live within the Cherokee Nation but 
operate outside of Cherokee law, which worked to the detriment of the Nation and its 
legitimate citizens.   
The urgency with which ‘A’ viewed the question of citizenship can be seen in the 
concluding line of the first piece, in which he referred to an 1876 letter sent by the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs: “Though his letter was written nearly six years ago, it is 
evident in the present condition of this, now the most dangerous, question to the peace of 
our government, that there is no let-up in the conditions he prescribed, and the disposition 
to see how long we will “kick against the pricks.””404  The evocative image of ‘kicking against 
the pricks’ likely refers to the tireless needling of Cherokee autonomy and authority by the 
federal government and its officials and Cherokee attempts to resist.  Evidently, the 
Commissioner anticipated that the Cherokee Nation would eventually concede to the 
authority of the United States.  ‘A’ returns to this notion in his second piece, published two 
weeks after the first, in which he claims that “the screws have been put to us and will be 
tightened until we yell ‘enough.’”405 Whereas ‘A’ discussed citizenship and intruders in a 
more general sense in his first piece, the status of Cherokee freedpeople featured 
prominently in ‘A’s second piece.  This reflects the central position freedpeople held in the 
disagreement over citizenship.  ‘A’ quoted an 1879 letter from Indian Inspector Watkins to 
the Commissioner which described a large number of freedpeople being rejected as citizens, 
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despite Watkins believing them to be “equitably entitled to citizenship,” and his subsequent 
recommendation that extending the January 1867 deadline by five years would make 
deciding these cases easier and fairer.406  ‘A’ therefore illustrated that federal officials were 
generally sympathetic to the position of freedpeople who struggled to prove they had 
returned to the Nation by January 1867 and that the same officials were sceptical of the 
deadline.  By suggesting that Watkins’ letter reveals the aims of the federal government to 
force the Cherokee Nation to accept freedpeople outside of the parameters established by 
the Reconstruction Treaty, ‘A’ warned readers that enabling the federal government to claim 
jurisdiction over citizenship would allow them to implement policies that were not in 
accordance with Cherokee notions of who was and was not entitled to citizenship.  
The solution ‘A’ proposed was put forward most explicitly in the second piece in 
which he argued that although the autonomy of the Cherokee Nation should be protected, 
compromise was necessary: 
Under their respective pleas of interest and obligation, concession and 
agreement are undoubtedly necessary, on the part of both [the Cherokee 
Nation and the United States], to a final settlement of the troublesome 
question…. Some body has to back down, and who shall it be?407  
It is implicit throughout ‘A’s pieces that, in the face of the federal government’s tireless 
determination to claim final authority over Cherokee citizenship, ‘backing down’ might 
represent the only course for the Cherokee Nation to protect its sovereignty and the best 
answer to the ‘troublesome question.’  Cooperation and negotiation between federal and 
Cherokee officials had the potential to protect the role of the Cherokee Nation in 
determining the citizenship status of residents as well as resolving a longstanding dispute 
that represented a ‘most dangerous’ threat to the Nation.  Daniel Littlefield, who described 
‘A’s series as a “long and informative campaign,” concluded that “there were few signs of its 
effects,” however, and the disagreement continued.408  Whereas ‘A’ counselled negotiation 
and compromise throughout his series, other features within the Cherokee Advocate 
reiterated that the Cherokee Nation was the ultimate authority over Cherokee citizenship.  
The Advocate published a letter from Principal Chief Dennis Bushyhead and the Cherokee 
delegation in Washington to the Secretary of the Interior, for example, that argued against 
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federal interference in decisions of citizenship.  Evidently, disagreements between federal 
and Cherokee officials were ongoing in 1882.  Over the course of the letter, Bushyhead and 
the delegates claimed jurisdiction over the Cherokee population and argued that federal 
officials violated treaties made between the Cherokee Nation and the United States when 
they failed to remove intruders: “You can understand the dangers that would threaten the 
Cherokee Government, if a United States officer, but little familiar with the subject, could 
subvert the Constitution of the Cherokee Nation, and declare who were and who were not 
her citizens.”409  The publication of ‘A’s opinion pieces and Bushyhead’s letter reveal the 
continued attention residents of the Cherokee Nation paid to the dispute over citizenship 
and that the creation of the 1880 census had not brought the ‘troublesome question’ to an 
end: instead it was being debated just as fiercely.   
 
A ‘Wrong so Unexpectedly Wrought’: Exclusion from the 1883 Per-Capita Payment 
At the beginning of 1883, the Cherokee Nation requested that the United States paid the 
balance of funds it owed the Nation for land used to relocate other Native nations after the 
Civil War.  The National Council received the first instalment of $300,000 of the agreed 
$678,655.55 payment which the Council was empowered to use as they saw fit.  The Council 
proposed that the money be evenly distributed to citizens who were ‘Cherokee by blood’ as 
a per-capita payment in the spring of the same year.  Freedpeople, as well as adopted 
citizens, were therefore denied a share of this payment.410 Daniel Littlefield has argued that 
the exclusion of freedpeople from the per-capita payment led to a “serious problem in 
Cherokee-freedmen relations,” as it prompted freedpeople to challenge the right of the 
Cherokee Nation to treat them as anything less than full citizens.411  The exclusion of 
freedpeople from the per-capita payment presented a “cause they [freedpeople] could rally 
behind” since it affected them all.412  The passage of the bill and subsequent payment to 
Cherokee citizens by blood only prompted freedpeople to act together to secure their right 
to a share in national funds and, in the process, affirm that they were entitled to full and 
equal citizenship.  After success in lobbying Congress to affirm that Cherokee freedpeople 
were entitled to a share of the 1883 payment, Congress made an appropriation from 
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Cherokee Nation funds held in trust to remedy their exclusion from the per-capita payments. 
Deciding exactly who was entitled to receive a payment proved controversial, however, since 
the Cherokee Nation insisted on using the 1880 census and federal officials deemed that 
census to be inaccurate.  The successful pursuit of the 1883 payment marked the beginning 
of a longer struggle for a share in national economic resources that concluded in 1897 with 
the dissolution of the Nation on the horizon. After being awarded their share by Congress, 
Cherokee freedpeople placed a suit with the United States Court of Claims that would render 
judgement on whether the Cherokee Nation could exclude freedpeople from payments 
made to its citizenry.  Again, freedpeople were successful.  Carrying out these payments to 
freedpeople proved difficult, however, since the Cherokee Nation and the United States 
continued to dispute the accuracy of the census information regarding Cherokee 
freedpeople and therefore which individuals were entitled to a payment and which were 
not.    
Freedpeople had paid close attention to the Council’s plan to distribute the funds 
amongst Cherokees by blood only and were quick to react. William Brown, a freedman from 
the Canadian District, wrote to Principal Chief Dennis Bushyhead in April 1883 enquiring after 
his position on their rights.  Brown’s letter is friendly and polite, “I take pleasure in wrighting 
(sic) you a few lines hoping they will find you well… I want to know if you will give us sitizens 
(sic) the same rights the treaty calls for.”413  Brown’s tone makes the dynamic between the 
two correspondents evident: Brown’s initial deference to Bushyhead illustrates his 
awareness that Bushyhead’s position gives him status and power.  Brown is clear about his 
objective in writing to Bushyhead, however, following his polite opening with a challenge for 
Bushyhead to meet the treaty obligations regarding freedpeople. Throughout the course of 
the letter Brown requests an audience with Bushyhead and pledges between 50 and 80 votes 
in Bushyhead’s favour (presumably from other freedmen) if he defends the right of 
freedpeople citizens to share in the payout.  Brown therefore reminded Bushyhead of the 
voting power freedpeople held in the Nation in the hope that he would cater to their 
concerns.  Dennis Bushyhead had served as national treasurer from 1871 and was elected 
Principal Chief with a clear majority in 1879: since the Principal Chief served four year terms, 
however, Bushyhead was up for re-election in 1883.  According to the 1880 census, 
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freedpeople formed approximately ten per cent of the Cherokee population and would 
therefore have been valuable political allies.414  
Dennis Bushyhead was the son of respected Cherokee Chief Justice Jesse Bushyhead 
and returned to the Cherokee Nation after his father’s death in 1844.415  Dennis Bushyhead 
quickly earnt “high esteem as a Cherokee leader and personage” and, although William 
McLoughlin has argued that the dissolution of the Cherokee Nation was inevitable regardless 
of who acted as Principal Chief, was a fervent defender of Cherokee sovereignty and 
autonomy during his tenure.416  As Principal Chief, Bushyhead had advocated equal rights for 
freedpeople (including removing the January 1867 deadline that was such an obstacle for 
many freedpeople seeking citizenship in the Nation) and appealed to the National Council to 
adopt all former slaves of Cherokees.  Bushyhead therefore argued that restricting the 1883 
payment to Cherokees by blood only was unconstitutional and vetoed the council’s bill to do 
so.417  Although it is difficult to ascertain how much influence Brown’s letter had on 
Bushyhead, they were at least in agreement that freedpeople should have a share in the per-
capita payment and Bushyhead acted accordingly.  Unfortunately, on May 19 1883 the 
council voted to overrule Bushyhead and passed a bill distributing the money to citizens by 
blood only over his objections.  Overruling Bushyhead’s veto required votes to do so from 
two-thirds of Council members, revealing that a clear majority of the National Council 
members were in favour of excluding freedpeople from the per-capita payments.  The 
disagreement between Bushyhead and the Council indicates that although the Cherokee 
leadership did not necessarily share the same views regarding freedpeople and other 
adopted citizens, with the majority continuing to reject freedpeople as full and equal 
Cherokee citizens despite the Treaty of 1866 made between the Cherokee Nation and the 
federal government.  
Whereas the first chapter of this thesis illustrated how freedpeople had largely acted 
to protect their own claims to citizenship, over the course of the 1880s it is evident that 
freedpeople were organising collectively to determine the nature of that citizenship: were 
freedpeople only entitled to a lesser form of citizenship or did the 1866 treaty that awarded 
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them citizenship secure them ‘all the rights of native Cherokees’?418  In direct response to 
the bill authorising the per-capita payment, freedpeople met in conventions throughout the 
Cherokee Nation in order to react as a collective (or collectives) rather than individuals.  On 
November 14th 1883, for example, a convention of freedpeople that met at Four Mile Branch 
forwarded a petition to the National Council that claimed to represent “the colored citizens 
of the Cherokee Nation.”419  Over the course of the petition, the authors succinctly argued 
that the exclusion of freedpeople from the per-capita payments violated the 1866 Treaty 
made with the United States that secured their rights and, by extension, the Cherokee 
Constitution which declared treaties to be the “supreme law of the land.”420   Through their 
references to the Cherokee Constitution and the 1866 Treaty, the petitioners challenged the 
legality of the Council’s decision and charged it was “a violation” of both.421  Signed by 
thirteen freedmen representing freedpeople from four districts in the Nation, the petition 
requested that the Council overturn its May decision and give “each citizen debarred of said 
funds his due portion.”422   
After gaining little success petitioning the Cherokee National Council, freedpeople 
attempted to utilise support from the United States government to secure their share of 
national funds and have their status as full and equal citizens affirmed.  A letter published in 
the Cherokee Advocate described the U.S. Congress as having received three petitions from 
Cherokee freedpeople (one of which was signed by more than 1200 individuals) by February 
1884, much to the consternation of its author.  The author disparaged “these (as they would 
have it appear) much abused citizens,” suggesting that their claims did not reflect reality in 
the Cherokee Nation.423  Conventions of freedpeople continued to meet and, following a 
meeting between freedmen and James Milton Turner (an African American politician-
turned-lawyer from Missouri) at the Lightning Creek School in Cooweescoowee District, 
freedpeople’s representatives from all over the Cherokee Nation met in Fort Gibson to create 
a single body that would pursue their interests in regard to the per-capita payment.  At the 
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subsequent meeting (held on December 21st 1883) the attendees selected Turner as their 
attorney and elected a committee of five people, specifically selecting two to travel to 
Washington, DC, and raise awareness of their exclusion.424  Having travelled to the Indian 
Territory as he sought a place for disillusioned African Americans to move to, Turner was 
familiar with the position of Cherokee freedpeople and encouraged them to pursue their 
interests.425  Turner had previously acted as a foreign diplomat during Rutherford B. Hayes’s 
presidency and, although he had lost influence by the 1880s, he had numerous contacts in 
Washington, DC.  Turner proved to be a controversial appointment and his biographer, Gary 
Kremer, has argued that the harder Turner worked on behalf of the freedpeople, the more 
frequently he was charged with being “an opportunist, a manipulator, and even a fraud.”426  
Under Turner’s guidance, however, the Cherokee freedpeople gained considerable success.  
The Fort Gibson meeting and his appointment marked the formal beginning of a long struggle 
to claim a share in national funds for freedpeople that would ultimately culminate in their 
suit in the Court of Claims being found in favour of the freedpeople. 
Following the meeting at Fort Gibson, the freedpeople and Turner created and sent 
a petition to the United States Congress, the Cherokee National Council and U.S. Indian Agent 
Ingalls.427 On March 16th 1884, both the Senate and House of Representatives received 
formally printed copies of the petition that detailed the exclusion of freedpeople from the 
per-capita payment of the previous year and proposed that the United States withheld 
money from the Cherokee Nation until the petitioners received equal payment.  Over the 
course of the petition, its authors encouraged the federal government to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of the Cherokee Nation on their behalf.  The authors stressed that the 
actions of the National Council were an “open and flagrant violation of the ninth article of 
the treaty of 1866” that guaranteed them equal rights and would establish an “unjust 
precedent” which would enable the Cherokee leadership to give freedpeople a lesser form 
of citizenship or exclude them entirely.428 In doing so, the petitioners encouraged the United 
States Congress to see the exclusion of Cherokee freedpeople from national funds as being 
within the jurisdiction of the federal government (as a party to the 1866 treaty) rather than 
as a purely domestic concern of the Cherokee Nation.  According to the wording of the 1866 
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treaty, Cherokee freedpeople and their descendants should be entitled to “all the rights of 
native Cherokees.”429  As such, freedpeople argued, they were not just entitled to use 
national land but they had a stake in the communal ownership of national land in the same 
manner as citizens of Cherokee ancestry.  Furthermore, the authors stressed that their 
history of enslaved labour and their commitment to citizenship after emancipation rendered 
their exclusion particularly unjust: 
the unrequited toil of your petitioners went toward up-building the millions of 
Cherokee National wealth, and to the uplifting of the Cherokees themselves to 
a higher plane of civilization, while your petitioners and their ancestors were 
totally denied reward… that your petitioners have accepted in perfectly good 
faith the boon of freedom and citizenship as guaranteeing them in “all the rights 
of Native-born Cherokees” through the treaty of 1866.  They have entered upon 
pastoral life, and have tilled the soil… therefore, to endure this wrong so 
unexpectedly wrought would indeed prove a dire and discouraging 
circumstance.430 
In depicting themselves as virtuous citizens, with a legitimate claim on the resources of the 
Cherokee Nation, the petitioners aimed to illicit the support of members of Congress to 
protect the interests of Cherokee freedpeople, in a similar manner to that seen in the letters 
and petitions discussed in previous chapters.  The opposition of the Cherokee Nation 
leadership to awarding freedpeople their rights after emancipation (whether legal 
citizenship and the right to remain within the Nation, or access to the national education 
system) had made it evident to freedpeople that federal support would be necessary to 
pressure the National Council into awarding freedpeople a share in the payment.  However, 
the proposal included within the petition, that the United States should withhold Cherokee 
national funds until the Cherokee freedpeople were afforded their share of the per-capita 
payment, differentiates it from those that came before.  The petitioners therefore explicitly 
encouraged the federal government to exploit their position as trustee to influence domestic 
affairs within the Cherokee Nation.  The proposal therefore rested on the specific grievance 
of the petitioners, the nature of the relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the 
United States (which held Cherokee funds in trust) as well as the potential willingness of the 
United States to intervene as party to the 1866 Treaty.   
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 Initially, the actions of Turner and the freedpeople appeared to illicit little response 
beyond continued debate and only the determination of the freedpeople to secure their 
rights kept the per-capita payment on the national agenda.  Opinion pieces debating the 
merit of the claim made by freedpeople appeared regularly in the Cherokee Advocate, often 
taking a similarly informative tone to the one taken by ‘A’ in 1883.  For example, in ‘Mistaken 
Notions in Regard to Cherokee Citizenship’, a ‘voter’ stressed that the citizenship rights of 
freedpeople resulted from the 1866 treaty and that the nature of that agreement therefore 
limited the autonomy of the Cherokee Nation in regard to defining the status of 
freedpeople.431 Furthermore, the author emphasised that only the National Council had the 
constitutional right to negotiate with the United States.  Other articles, which similarly 
considered and attempted to clarify the question of who was and who was not entitled to a 
share of national funds, criticised freedpeople for inviting the United States to intervene.  
Such articles reveal the bias against Cherokee freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation and 
the resentment some Cherokees felt in response to their determined pursuit of equal rights.  
One article published in December 1885, for example, argued that since the per-capita 
payments were a domestic matter, any disputes should be handled internally (ie. by the 
Cherokee Supreme Court).  At the conclusion of the article, the author reveals resentment 
of the freedpeople that was grounded in their actions and the author’s belief that their claim 
to the payment was illegitimate: “…they ought not go whining to the Department at 
Washington to force the Cherokees by blood to divide money with them which they never 
paid a cent for.”432 In depicting freedpeople as ‘whining’ cowards that would not accept the 
judgement of the Cherokee National Council, the author endeavoured to persuade readers 
that the complaints made by freedpeople had little merit.  Such depictions of Cherokee 
freedpeople echo Oochalata's assertion, cited in chapter two, that freedpeople who sought 
protection from eviction from federal officials were "disrespectful."433  Despite the vehement 
protests of Cherokee freedpeople and Cherokees who believed they were entitled to full 
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rights, the Cherokee National Council continued to insist that only Cherokees by blood were 
entitled to a share in funds derived from the sale of national lands.  At Principal Chief 
Bushyhead’s request, the Council issued a statement in April 1886 clarifying that, under their 
understanding of the law, Cherokees by blood had always owned Cherokee land in common 
and since adopted citizens, such as freedpeople or intermarried whites, had not they could 
only claim ‘political rights’ (such as residing in the Nation or the right to vote).434  This 
statement therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to limit the per-capita payments to 
Cherokees by blood only and appeared to offer a final judgement on the matter.  Fay 
Yarbrough has argued that the decision of the National Council disproportionately affected 
freedpeople and placed them “in the least tenable position of all adopted citizens,” since 
intermarried whites could share in payments received by their spouses and adopted Native 
Americans, such as the Shawnee, could negotiate a share in national resources.435  As a result 
of their unique position in relation to Cherokee land, freedpeople therefore held “the bare 
minimum” of rights to be considered citizens of the Cherokee Nation.436 
Although the Cherokee National Council remained steadfast in its exclusion of 
freedpeople from the per-capita payment, federal officials proved receptive to the 
arguments made by and for Cherokee freedpeople.  Turner agitated on the behalf of 
Cherokee freedpeople in Washington, DC., for five years from his appointment in December 
1883.  Although the efforts of Turner and the freedpeople did not appear fruitful at first, 
Turner used his contacts in Washington to build support for congressional intervention and 
won President Grover Cleveland’s recommendation with an eighteen-page petition.437    In 
March 1886, Senator Dawes introduced a bill to the Senate that would have seen Congress 
implement legislation to secure freedpeople their share of the per-capita payments.  The bill, 
which did not pass until October 1888, proposed appropriating funds from the United States 
treasury to distribute payments to freedpeople and charging said funds against the Cherokee 
Nation.438 The passage of An Act to secure to the Cherokee Freedmen and others their 
proportion of certain proceeds of lands secured $75000 to provide Cherokee freedpeople 
with equal payments to those received by Cherokees by blood ($15.50 per person) and cover 
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the costs of organising the distribution of those funds to freedpeople.439  In the preamble of 
the act, federal lawmakers asserted that Article 9 of the Reconstruction Treaty ensured that 
freedpeople would be "incorporated into and ever after remain a part of the Cherokee 
Nation, on equal terms in every respect with native Cherokees" and that Article 6 of the same 
treaty guaranteed that "all laws of the Cherokee Nation shall be uniform throughout said 
nation."440   As encouraged to do so by Cherokee freedpeople, then, the federal government 
claimed authority through the Reconstruction Treaty.  This was a considerable victory for 
freedpeople that validated their claims to a share in national funds derived from the sale of 
lands owned in common, affirmed their full and equal citizenship, and illustrated the 
willingness of the federal government to act on their behalf.   
The actions of Congress (and the subsequent $75000 bill) prompted wildly 
contrasting responses within the Cherokee Nation.  In his 1889 report to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, U.S. Indian Agent Leo Bennett described Cherokee freedpeople as being 
“greatly elated to learn that Congress had recognised their rights” whilst “the Cherokee 
authorities are quite wrathful at this interference on the part of the United States.”441  
Bennett’s use of ‘wrathful’ is striking since it is unclear as to whether the wrath of the 
Cherokee leadership is directed at the federal government or the Cherokee freedpeople.  
Both the Cherokee freedpeople and the Cherokee authorities had much at stake in this issue: 
federal action on behalf of freedpeople in this instance may have secured freedpeople their 
right to a share in tribal resources but it also again challenged the right of the Cherokee 
Nation to govern itself.  Congress essentially overrode the decision of the Cherokee National 
Council in putting through payments of Cherokee national funds to Cherokee freedpeople. 
The belligerence of the Cherokee Nation government in relation to this matter expressed 
itself in an outright refusal to cooperate with federal officials attempting to make the 
payments to freedpeople.  Expressing concerns about the accuracy of the 1880 census, the 
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federal government appointed Special Agent John Wallace to create a new roll of 
freedpeople entitled to the per-capita payment.  Although Wallace intended to cooperate 
with Cherokee officials to create a fair list of freedpeople citizens, the Cherokee Nation 
refused to work with him and instead only provided a copy of the 1880 census for Wallace 
to work with.442  In petitions to the Principal Chief, the President of the United States and 
Congress, however, freedpeople expressed their appreciation of Wallace’s dedication and 
thoroughness.  In the face of opposition from the Cherokee Nation, over 6000 applications, 
and accusations of fraud and impropriety, the Wallace Roll took four years to complete and 
was rejected by the Cherokee Nation as hugely inaccurate.  After beginning the payments of 
$15.50 to freedmen on the roll revealed inconsistencies, the Wallace Roll was re-evaluated 
by a joint U.S and Cherokee  court comprising of eight officials and finally closed in July 1893 
with 3524 names.443  Daniel Littlefield has described the refusal of the Cherokee Nation to 
work with Wallace as a “costly mistake” as it embroiled the Nation in lengthy disputes over 
which freedpeople were entitled to citizenship and which would stretch through to the 
beginning of the twentieth century.444   
 
“The just rights in law and equity of the freedmen of the Cherokee Nation”: Bringing a 
Successful Suit to the Court of Claims445 
Although the 1888 Congressional act did ensure that freedpeople received their share of the 
1883 per-capita payments, it did not prevent the Cherokee Nation from excluding 
freedpeople from later payments.  In April 1886, the Cherokee National Council had received 
a payment of $300,000 in grazing rights from the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association which 
it again directed to be shared amongst Cherokees by blood only.  The ongoing controversy 
surrounding the exclusion of Cherokee freedpeople from per-capita payments led Congress 
to pass an act on October 1st 1890 empowering the U.S. Court of Claims power to adjudicate 
the dispute over this second payment. As the Nation continued to receive and share funds 
(it received another $300,000 from the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association on October 25th 
1890 as well as $295,736 and an additional $8,595,736 in trust from the sale of the Cherokee 
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Strip to the United States in 1893), resolving whether freedpeople were entitled to per-capita 
payments became increasingly urgent.446   
 In March 1890, representatives of freedpeople held a series of meetings in which 
they began organizing themselves for the battle to secure their rights and ensure that the 
successful outcome in relation to the 1883 payment, which affirmed their full and equal 
citizenship, became the rule for all future per-capita payments rather than an exception.  
They first elected an executive committee comprising of freedmen who would lead the call 
for freedpeople's rights in regard to per-capita payments.  They also organised a convention 
of freedmen at Fort Gibson over the 27th to 29th of October of the same year and began 
considering means by which they could secure their share of per-capita payments in the 
future.  In response to the 1890 act that empowered the U.S. Court of Claims to hear a suit 
between Cherokee freedpeople and the Cherokee Nation, the executive committee moved 
to make a claim.  At the Fort Gibson convention, the committee elected Moses Whitmire, an 
elderly and illiterate freedman, as the trustee for the freedmen in the U.S. Court of Claims 
and James Milton Turner was again appointed attorney.447  Turner was quickly replaced by 
Robert Kern after several freedpeople expressed concerns over his suitability for the role.448    
The dissent amongst attendees of the convention reveal the importance which freedpeople 
placed on their choice: an adverse decision in the Court of Claims or accusations of fraud and 
impropriety in securing a decision in their favour could permanently damage the status of 
freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation.  
In 1895, five years after the suit was first made, the Court of Claims reached a verdict 
in favour of the Cherokee freedpeople.  In accordance with the earlier Congressional decision 
that awarded the $75000 payment to freedpeople, the U.S. Court of Claims cited the 
constitutional and treaty obligations of the Cherokee Nation as making the exclusion of 
freedpeople from per-capita payments unlawful: 
And it appearing to the Court that under the provisions of Article 9 of the treaty 
of July 19th, 1866, made by and between the Cherokee Nation and the United 
States, the said freedmen… were admitted into and became a part of the 
Cherokee Nation and entitled to equal rights and immunities, and to participate 
                                                          
446 Littlefield, Cherokee Freedmen, 162-173. 
447 Ibid. 164-5. 
448 Ibid. 168. 
151 
 
in the Cherokee National funds and common property in the same manner and 
to the same extent as Cherokee citizens of Cherokee blood.449 
The decision “held and decreed void and contrary to and in derogation of the Constitution 
of the Cherokee Nation” the previous acts made by the Cherokee National Council in which 
they excluded freedpeople from per-capita payments and affirmed the right of Cherokee 
freedpeople to share in the common property of the Cherokee Nation.450  The decision 
therefore included payments made after the claim was filed (such as the 1893 payment from 
sale of Cherokee land to the United States), capping the payments to be made to freedpeople 
at $256.34 per-capita.451  With its ruling, the U.S. Court of Claims prevented the Cherokee 
Nation from establishing a tiered system of citizenship in which freedpeople would not hold 
rights connected to the ownership of communal land, insisting instead that the Cherokee 
Nation be “prohibited from making any discrimination between the Cherokee citizens of 
Cherokee blood or parentage and Cherokee citizens who are or were freedmen.”452  Under 
this judgement, then, the Cherokee National Council would not be able to pass any more 
acts excluding freedpeople from per-capita payments.  This incredible victory, the result of 
the determined and organised actions of freedpeople over more than a decade, therefore 
protected the rights of Cherokee freedpeople to a share in national economic resources 
where they had previously been excluded.   
Although the Court of Claims found in favour of Cherokee freedpeople, 
implementing the ruling of the Court proved to be difficult since the decree defined the 
Wallace Roll as the definitive list of freedpeople entitled to payment and the Cherokee 
Nation refused to recognise it as such.  Anticipating the response of the Cherokee Nation 
authorities, the decree argued that since the Cherokee Nation had elected not to take part 
in its creation, despite “ample opportunity” to do so, their complaints were illegitimate.453  
The previous refusal of Cherokee officials to cooperate with Wallace therefore had wider 
implications as the roll would be used again for this much larger payment.  The payment of 
the freedpeople had been closely covered in the Cherokee Advocate throughout the 1880s 
and 1890s, making it an important political issue.  Samuel H. Mayes and Robert B. Ross, the 
two nominees in the election for Principal Chief in 1896, published a ‘joint protest’ in 
response to the decree of the Court of Claims in June 1895.  Interestingly, the two authors 
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did not argue against the larger decision but instead disputed using the Wallace Roll to 
determine which freedpeople were entitled to a payment.  Mayes and Ross both questioned 
the accuracy of the Wallace Roll, suggesting that a number of the freedpeople on it were not 
entitled to citizenship.  They therefore urged an appeal to the Supreme Court so that “those 
not so recognized as citizens may be stricken from the roll.”454  The joint action of the two 
political hopefuls suggests that concerns over the Wallace Roll were held by members of 
both political parties and that their position held wide appeal for the Cherokee citizenry.  
Appealing against the use of the Wallace Roll represented a savvy political move for the two 
nominees as it would both illustrate a willingness to defend the sovereignty of the Cherokee 
Nation and assuage concerns over intruders posing as citizens and reaping the rewards of 
Cherokee citizenship.   
 Repeated appeals on the part of the Cherokee Nation forced negotiations between 
the Cherokee freedpeople and the Nation to facilitate an end to the dispute and bring about 
the payment of freedpeople.  The Cherokee freedpeople proposed using the 1880 census as 
the payment roll rather than the Wallace Roll and bringing the per-capita payments to 
$295.65 under the agreement that both the Cherokee Nation and its freedpeople would 
agree to abide by that final decision.  The Cherokee Nation agreed to the proposal and 
authorised a three-person commission comprising of William Clifton, Robert Kern and 
William Thompson to modify the 1880 census to reflect births and deaths since its creation, 
therefore using the Cherokee’s preferred roll to make the payment decreed by the Court of 
Claims.455  The commissioners met between May and August of 1896 to assess claimants and 
were instructed to make no challenge to individuals who were either listed on the 1880 
census themselves or had a parent on the census.  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Daniel 
M. Browning, also included a list of recommended questions that would confirm whether 
claimants met the criteria established in the 1866 Treaty (whether the claimant or their 
ancestor was held in slavery by a Cherokee and if they were in the Nation when the Treaty 
was agreed, for example).456 Like John Wallace before them, both Kern and Clifton were 
subject to accusations of fraud and struggled to complete their task.  The Cherokees proved 
difficult to convince of citizenship and extensively questioned claimants, creating an 
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unanticipated workload whilst simultaneously accusing Kern and Clifton of adding 
freedpeople to the list that were not entitled to citizenship.  After missing a series of 
deadlines, the Kern-Clifton Roll was completed and the payments were paid by the August 
of 1897.  The payment totalled $400,000. The Cherokees expressed their dissatisfaction at 
the huge payout by levelling accusations of misconduct at Kern and Clifton.  Daniel Littlefield 
has argued that although the lack of evidence may make it impossible to ascertain the validity 
of these accusations (although he does suggest that there was “some evidence corruption 
did exist”), the vehemence with which the Cherokees attacked the Kern-Clifton roll reflects 
the suspicion with which they viewed freedpeople as well as their own frustration with the 
hugely expensive compromise.457  The decision of the Court of Claims may have protected 
the right of freedpeople to be included within per-capita payments but it re-enflamed older 
disputes over exactly which freedpeople were entitled to citizenship and who held final 
authority over that question.  
 
The Federal Government and Freedpeople in the United States 
The exclusion of freedpeople from the 1883 per-capita payment brought a longstanding 
dispute to a head as freedpeople refused to accept that they were not entitled to a share in 
national economic resources.  Their success in Congress and the U. S. Court of Claims 
revealed the United States to be a powerful ally of freedpeople, securing them a tangible 
marker of their inclusion in the form of payments equal to that received by Cherokee citizens 
of Cherokee ancestry.  The inconsistency between how the federal government supported 
Cherokee freedpeople and the increasingly vulnerable position of freedpeople in the United 
States raises a key question about their decision to intervene on behalf of Cherokee 
freedpeople: Why did the federal government defend the rights of Cherokee freedpeople?  
In securing equal rights for Cherokee freedpeople, the federal government deviated from its 
own domestic policies that failed to do the same for African Americans.  Importantly, 
although the federal government ensured that Cherokee freedpeople received a share of 
national funds, these were Cherokee Nation funds not United States funds.  This was made 
most evident in the 1888 Congressional act in which Congress decided to appropriate $75000 
against the Cherokee Nation seemingly without input from the Nation.  This figure was 
dwarfed by the later costs following the triumph of freedpeople in the U.S. Court of Claims 
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which at least afforded the Cherokee Nation with the opportunity to put forward its own 
argument and appeal the result.     
As Cherokee freedpeople struggled to secure their right to a share in national 
economic resources through the 1880s and into the 1890s, the relationship between the 
federal government and former slaves throughout the United States was undergoing a 
profound transformation.  Whereas the federal government had previously acted to protect 
the rights of African Americans under Radical Reconstruction, the end of Reconstruction and 
Redemption of the South - with the attendant erosion of protections established in the 
decade following emancipation - ushered in the rise of Jim Crow and racial segregation.  
There was therefore a clear disparity between how the federal government treated 
freedpeople residing within the United States and its actions to secure full rights for 
Cherokee freedpeople: the federal government consistently held that former slaves of 
Cherokees (as well as their descendants) were entitled to equal citizenship and all the rights 
attached to that citizenship (including their share of national economic resources) whilst 
failing to protect the citizenship rights of former slaves in the United States.  In the decade 
following the Civil War, considerable achievements were made as the Radical Republicans 
that comprised the majority of Congress worked to ensure the protection of the newly 
emancipated freedpeople.  Radical Republicans, having largely pushed the abolitionist 
agenda before and during the war, stressed that Reconstruction represented an opportunity 
for transformation.  Historian Eric Foner has described them as holding a "utopian vision of 
a nation whose citizens enjoyed equality of political and social rights."458   In doing so, the 
federal government continued to act on the notion of itself as a “powerful national state 
protecting the fundamental rights of American citizens,” as established during the Civil 
War.459  The Three Reconstruction Amendments passed between 1865 and 1870 
endeavoured to define the status of these freedpeople and incorporate them as United 
States citizens.  The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, abolished the institution of 
slavery and ensured that it could not be legally reintroduced.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States, ratified in 1868, affirmed the citizenship of freedpeople and stated that 
all citizens should be equal before the law.  The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, 
prohibited discrimination of a citizen’s voting rights on the basis of their “race, color, or 
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previous position of servitude.”460  These amendments represented an important 
reimagining of the position, or potential position, of African Americans in American society.  
Although imperfect in many respects (freedpeople in the United States did not gain access 
to land in the same manner as Cherokee freedpeople, for example) Reconstruction afforded 
freedpeople opportunities that would have been unthinkable a decade previous: paid labour, 
access to education and a political voice.  Historian Eric Foner has argued that “black 
participation in Southern public life after 1867 was the most radical development of the 
Reconstruction years.”461   
The Compromise of 1877, in which Rutherford B. Hayes was awarded the presidency 
of the United States and ‘home rule’ returned to the former Confederate states, is typically 
considered to mark the end of Reconstruction.  In his seminal work, The Strange Career of 
Jim Crow (1955), historian C. Vann Woodward argued that, in the years following 
Reconstruction, white Southerners came together at the expense of African Americans, the 
federal government abandoned freedpeople as “ward[s] of the nation,” and the nation 
conceded to Southern demands that race relations should be left for white Southerners to 
determine.462  Amongst others, these circumstances enabled the disfranchisement of African 
American men, the rise of Jim Crow segregation and racial violence.  The 1896 Plessy v. 
Ferguson decision gave racial segregation the sanction of the United States Supreme Court 
and enabled the larger system of Jim Crow laws that would come to characterise race 
relations in the first half of the twentieth century to flourish.    Woodward argued against the 
assumption that Jim Crow America immediately and inevitably followed Reconstruction, 
suggesting instead that there was an “unstable interlude” in which race relations were varied 
and poorly defined.463 The processes of reconciliation between the former Confederate 
states and the northern states, however, facilitated the re-emergence of racial discrimination 
and white supremacy.  The Lost Cause, a selection of arguments proffered by former 
Confederates, argued for “the relatively benign nature of slavery, the states’ rights origins of 
the Civil War, the ruthlessness of Reconstruction and the necessity for keeping the races 
                                                          
460 The text of all three Reconstruction amendments can be found in ‘The Constitution of the United 
States’ in Give Me Liberty! An American History, E. Foner, A-51 (New York and London: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2014.  Seagull Fourth Edition). 
461 Foner, Reconstruction, xxiii. 
462 C. V. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955.  Fourth 
edition, published 2002.), 6. 
463 Ibid, 32.  See Chapter Two, ‘Forgotten Alternatives’ (pages 31-66)  
156 
 
separate.”464  In the ground-breaking Race and Reunion (2001), David Blight concluded that 
public recognition of the role played by African Americans and the importance of the 
emancipation of the enslaved was overwhelmed by white supremacist and reconciliationist 
interpretations of the war.465  According to Race and Reunion, the white supremacist 
narrative that spread throughout the post-war South preserved the racial hierarchy and 
became increasingly indistinguishable from reconciliationist narratives that stressed the 
brotherhood and shared sacrifice of white Civil War veterans.  Post-war and post-
Reconstruction rhetoric therefore encouraged white Northerners to ally themselves with 
white Southerners rather than African Americans on the basis of their shared skin colour. 
The alliance between white Americans enabled their government to enact legislation 
that disfranchised African American men and codified racial segregation in the years 
following Reconstruction.  Beginning with the 1883 Supreme Court decision in United States 
v. Stanley, which placed acts of discrimination by private persons under state authority, and 
culminating with Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, the federal government first eroded the 
protections against discrimination and then sanctioned segregation with the doctrine 
“separate but equal.”466  States throughout the South employed ‘grandfather clauses’ and 
poll taxes as obstacles to African American voters in the 1890s, making it incredibly difficult 
to exercise the rights of franchise granted during Reconstruction and eroding the political 
power of African Americans.  The number of registered African American voters in Louisiana 
declined from 130,344 in 1896 to 1,342 in 1904, for example: a drop of 90% in less than a 
decade.467  The disfranchisement of African Americans coincided with the legalisation of 
segregation practices that had previously been extra-legal.  Plessy v. Ferguson affirmed state 
laws that required segregation in public spaces (such as railway cars) since separate facilities 
did not necessitate discrimination if they were equal, allowing a flood of segregation laws to 
pass in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Such laws controlled African Americans in 
all aspects of public life, affecting their employment as well as recreation activities.  The 
South Carolina code of 1915 prohibited labourers of different races from sharing a work 
space or using the same entrances, for example, and Woodward argues that many employers 
simply stopped hiring African Americans to avoid the complications of a racially diverse 
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workforce.468  The Separate Park Law of Georgia (1905) implemented the same ideas of 
separation in relation to recreational spaces (whether indoor and outdoor) and insisted that 
African Americans kept twenty-five feet from white Americans whilst using separate 
entrances and ticket windows.469  African Americans resisted the restrictions of Jim Crow and 
the rise of consumerism in the early twentieth century offered a space in which segregation 
could be “tested” as African Americans exercised their right to make purchases and buy 
services.470  In refusing to allow the marketplace to “join the ballot box as an era of racial 
exclusion,” African Americans challenged the larger system of segregation but Jim Crow 
would continue to legally operate until the Supreme Court declared segregation to be 
inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.471  
The regressive nature of race relations in the 1880s and 1890s was made painfully 
evident in the lived experience of African Americans.  Woodward has argued that evidence 
of “violence, brutality and exploitation in this period is overwhelming.”472  Racial violence 
took a variety of forms in the post-Reconstruction South but lynching came to represent such 
violence at its most extreme. Lynching, the execution of an individual without sanction of the 
law, peaked in the 1880s and 1890s.473 Bruce Baker has argued that the nature of lynching 
shifted in the early 1890s to become “the most extreme means of enforcing the laws and 
customs of segregation against African American victims.”474  Merlin Jones, who grew up in 
Mississippi, described numerous acts of violence made against African Americans in his town, 
including witnessing a mob seeking a man accused of theft as a child.  Jones and his 
neighbours were intensely afraid and hid within their homes: “Everybody had the lights off; 
everybody was quiet.”475  Jones later highlighted the vulnerability of black men to the lynch 
mob, recounting the death of a Mr. Fields: “You will never guess why he was killed. One of 
his dogs jumped on this white man’s dog and beat him up.  They killed him because he should 
have been able to control his dogs. They killed him because “my dog beat your dog.””476  
                                                          
468 Ibid. 98. 
469 Ibid. 99-100. 
470 G. E. Hale, ‘“For Colored” and “For White”: Segregating Consumption in the South’ in Jumpin’ Jim 
Crow: Southern Politics from Civil War to Civil Rights, J. Dailey, G. E. Gilmore & B. Simon (eds.), 163 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
471 Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, 147. 
472Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow, 43. 
473 Ibid. 43, 87 
474 B. E. Baker, ‘Lynch Law Reversed: The Rape of Lula Sherman, the Lynching of Manse Waldrop, and 
the Debate Over Lynching in the 1880s,’ American Nineteenth Century History, 6:3 (2005): 275. 
475 ‘Merlin Jones’ in Remembering Jim Crow: African Americans Tell About Life in the Segregated 
South, edited by W. H. Chafe et al, 18 (New York: The New Press, 2002). 
476 Ibid. 
158 
 
Jones’s repetition indicates his disbelief at the vulnerability of men such as Mr. Fields to the 
whim of their white neighbours. 
 The complicity of the federal government in the disfranchisement and segregation 
of African Americans, as well as its failure to adequately protect African Americans from 
racial violence, stands in stark contrast to the manner in which the federal government 
supported the struggle of Cherokee freedpeople to secure economic rights in the Cherokee 
Nation.  The comparatively good quality of life experienced by freedpeople in the Cherokee 
Nation as opposed to those in the United States was evident to Cherokee commentators in 
the Cherokee Advocate who gloated that Cherokee freedpeople “showed more 
improvement since the war than any other community of the same race in the United 
States.” 477  Such commentators attributed their ‘improvement’ to the advantages of 
communal land ownership and highlighted the gap between United States rhetoric and 
reality:  “Every one must have a fair and equal chance in the Cherokee Nation while he 
remains a Cherokee citizen – which is no theory here, as it is in the States.  It is a fact.”478  The 
article was published after the 1888 Congressional response to the 1883 per-capita payment 
and, although it is self-congratulatory and sidestepped Cherokee attempts to exclude 
freedpeople from such payments, it serves to emphasise the disparity between the United 
States’ attempts to secure equal rights for Cherokee freedpeople and its own domestic 
situation.  It may be impossible to definitively answer whether the United States acted out 
of a sense of justice towards Cherokee freedpeople or for its own interests (or, most likely, 
a combination of the two).  Certainly, in relation to ensuring freedpeople were included in 
per-capita payments, federal officials consistently argued that their exclusion violated the 
1866 Treaty and the Cherokee Constitution and was therefore unjust.  Furthermore, the 1888 
payment authorised by Congress and the subsequent suit in the U. S. Court of Claims was 
made possible through Congressional action when Congress could have chosen to let the 
matter remain a domestic issue of the Cherokee Nation.  This indicates a willingness to 
intervene despite not being obligated to do so.  The United States did not spend any of its 
own funds on behalf of Cherokee freedpeople, however, since it used its position as trustee 
to distribute Cherokee funds in 1888 and the judgement of the U.S. Court of Claims did the 
same.  On the other hand, in making the per-capita payments to its freedpeople and covering 
the costs of doing so, the Cherokee Nation spent over $475,000.  The adverse decisions 
against the Nation were expensive and struck a blow against the sovereignty of the Nation 
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as the United States government more aggressively pursued its agenda to dissolve the 
Cherokee Nation and incorporate the Indian Territory in to the United States in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century.  The 1895 Court of Claims decision in favour of Cherokee 
freedpeople was issued eight years after the Dawes Act signalled the intent of the federal 
government to denationalise Native nations and allot their land, and three years before the 
Curtis Act made the Cherokee Nation subject to the same without their consent.  It therefore 
seems likely that the federal government used the dispute over Cherokee freedpeople as a 
means of eroding the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation and to illustrate its growing power 
in Indian Territory.  
 
Conclusion 
The victories Cherokee freedpeople found in defending their right to an equal share of 
national funds were made possible through enlisting the support of the federal government.  
Although freedpeople had cooperated with federal officials in pursuit of their citizenship 
rights in the 1870s, their exclusion from the 1883 per-capita payment prompted them to 
organise in formal conventions that endeavoured to secure equal rights for all Cherokee 
freedpeople.  The appeals these freedpeople sent to federal officials and Congress 
encouraged Congress to award them with the 1888 $75000 payment and enabled them to 
successfully file suit against the Cherokee Nation in the U. S. Court of Claims.  The process of 
securing and distributing these payments laid bare the hostilities between the Cherokee 
Nation, freedpeople and the United States in the 1880s and 1890s.  Not only did the 
Cherokee National Council refuse the assistance of federal officials in this endeavour, even 
charging them with fraud and corruption, it also expressed distaste for the actions of 
freedpeople in seeking relief.  Meanwhile, federal officials repeatedly rejected Cherokee 
arguments for sovereignty and self-government, and Cherokee freedpeople argued that 
their claims to citizenship (and therefore a payment) were not being assessed fairly.   
As seen in the previous chapter, the federal government and its officials were not 
obligated to support freedpeople.  They did, however, vigorously defend Cherokee 
freedpeople’s right to share in national funds.  Given the abandonment of African Americans 
to a Jim Crow racial order in the years following Reconstruction, it is probable that federal 
officials did not necessarily see themselves as striking a blow against injustice.  Instead, 
defending the rights of freedpeople on this issue served to further weaken the sovereignty 
of the Cherokee Nation as the federal government moved to bring about its 
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denationalisation and absorb its lands into the United States.  The actions of the federal 
government following the passage of the 1897 Curtis Act and subsequent allotment of 
Cherokee land further support the argument that any alliance between Cherokee 
freedpeople and the United States was vulnerable to the larger goal of expansion.  Although 
federal officials did secure an equal sized allotment for Cherokee freedpeople, they quickly 
abandoned them to a hostile racial order that proved them to be only temporary allies.   
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Chapter Five: Freedpeople and the Allotment of the Cherokee Nation 
 
The orgy of exploitation that resulted [from allotment] is almost beyond belief.  
Within a generation these Indians, who had owned and governed a region 
greater in area and potential wealth than many an American state, were 
almost stripped of their holdings, and were rescued from starvation only 
through public charity.479 
(Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run) 
 
In the final decades of the nineteenth century the federal government implemented a policy 
of allotment that dramatically transformed the relationship between the United States, 
Native nations and Native peoples.  As the Whitmire case for a share in the Cherokee 
economic resources made its way through the federal court system, the Nation struggled to 
resist the expansionist agenda of the United States; where the federal government had 
previously removed individuals who trespassed on Indian land, from the 1880s it began 
openly working to achieve its ultimate goal of opening the Indian Territory to white settlers.  
The federal government did so despite treaty assurances that the lands held by the Five 
Tribes in the Indian Territory would remain theirs in perpetuity.  Although initially exempt 
from the 1887 Dawes Act, which brought about the involuntary allotment of Native lands 
held in the reservation system across the United States, the federal government ended its 
negotiations on this issue with the Cherokee Nation through the passage of the Curtis Act in 
1898 and began the process of breaking down the Cherokee land base into individual, private 
plots and dismantling the Cherokee government.  A clearly defined and communally owned 
land base was integral to maintaining the Cherokee Nation as a distinct community in the 
                                                          
479 A. Debo, And Still The Waters Run (New York: Gordian Press, Inc., 1966), viii. 
162 
 
face of aggressive federal policies of assimilation and integration.  The division of national 
lands held in common by its citizens therefore represented a threat to the survival of the 
Cherokee Nation. Both the Dawes and Curtis Acts were implemented without the consent of 
the Native nations they targeted and brought about a catastrophe for these peoples.     
As the Dawes Commission worked to determine who was entitled to an allotment, 
the Cherokee Nation again challenged the right of freedpeople to share in the national land 
in 1898.  Cherokee Nation representatives lobbied the Dawes Commission to give 
freedpeople an allotment smaller than that received by those who claimed Cherokee 
citizenship through blood, reiterating the argument that they had made in relation to the per 
capita payments detailed in the previous chapter (that the 1866 treaty only gave freedpeople 
political rights and did not award them a share of the Cherokee land base).  On July 1st 1902, 
Congress directed that every Cherokee citizen would receive 110 acres of land of average 
value (or its equivalent in cash), forty of which would be designated as a homestead.480  
Within the same act, the homestead was declared both non-taxable and inalienable “during 
the lifetime of the allottee, not exceeding twenty-one years from the date of the certificate 
of the allotment,” whilst the ‘surplus’ land was inalienable for five years from the passage of 
the act (so sale was restricted until July 1907).481  Despite strong opposition from the 
Cherokee delegates at negotiations with the Dawes Commission, freedpeople pushed to be 
fully included in the process of allotment.  With the support of federal government officials, 
freedpeople and their advocates ensured that those who could prove their citizenship before 
the Dawes Commission gained an allotment of Cherokee land equal in value to that received 
by other citizens. 
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 Historians such as Celia Naylor and Daniel Littlefield have considered securing 
allotments to be a victory for freedpeople (albeit a “jaded” one) given that their counterparts 
in the United States received nothing of the sort. 482  Yet, as Daniel Littlefield points out, the 
processes of enrolment and its aftermath reveal the federal government to have been an 
unreliable and inconsistent ally of freedpeople since the declaration of Cherokee 
emancipation in 1863.483  The swift abandonment of Cherokee freedpeople to land 
speculators and the Jim Crow racial order that came with Oklahoma statehood suggests that 
the federal government utilised debates over the position of freedpeople within the 
Cherokee Nation as an arena in which they could illustrate their dominance over the 
Cherokee Nation rather than out of concern for freedpeople.  The federal government 
therefore exploited the vulnerable position of freedpeople in much the same way it exploited 
the larger Cherokee Nation to gain control of its land.  
The Dawes Commission created new and final rolls of Cherokee citizens and listed 
freedpeople separately to other Cherokee citizens.  Freedmen made a single application on 
behalf of their families but individual freedmen and freedwomen could also apply for 
citizenship (guardians or responsible adults made applications on behalf of orphaned 
minors).  As a result of negotiations with the Cherokee Nation, the Dawes Commission 
agreed to use the 1880 authenticated Cherokee census as the base roll for freedpeople so 
applicants had to either identify themselves or an ancestor on that roll to secure their 
enrolment.  Federal officials pushed for a more expansive reading of their directions, 
however, and allowed freedpeople to apply even if they were not on the 1880 authenticated 
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census in the name of “justice.”484  In doing so, these federal officials rejected the 
qualifications for citizenship established by the Cherokee Nation. Their actions make the 
triangular relationship between Cherokee freedpeople, the Cherokee Nation and the United 
States evident: the Cherokee Nation and the United States both vied for authority in this 
matter whilst freedpeople attempted to protect and secure their equal rights as Cherokees.  
The differing interpretations of who was entitled to citizenship held by Cherokee and federal 
officials enabled many freedpeople who claimed to be unjustly excluded from said roll to 
make new applications, infuriating the Cherokee Nation which insisted that the 
authenticated roll was the most accurate.485  Many freedpeople struggled to prove that they 
met the provisions of the treaty, however, given the lapse of four decades between the 
January 1867 deadline and their application for enrolment on the Dawes Rolls.  The 
inconsistency of previous rolls compounded this problem since they often figured as 
contradictory evidence in the hearings (an applicant may have appeared on one roll but not 
another).  If applicants could prove their right to citizenship they were awarded an allotment 
of land but this did not prevent freedpeople from being dispossessed of the rights or lands 
they claimed during allotment.   
Unlike the ‘Cherokee by Blood’ roll, the ‘Freedmen’ roll did not record blood 
quantum and is evidence of the assumption made by federal officials that Cherokee citizens 
who were phenotypically black did not have Cherokee ancestry.  This administrative detail 
seems insignificant but almost immediately began to affect the lived experience of Cherokee 
freedpeople.  First, the restrictions placed on the property of Cherokee citizens to ensure 
that they would remain in the hands of Cherokee citizens were quickly lifted as opportunists 
scrambled to gain control over the lands that formerly comprised the Cherokee Nation. As a 
result of the Appropriations Act of 1904, freedpeople were amongst the first to have these 
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restrictions lifted (the act removed the restrictions on the sale of ‘surplus’ lands of all citizens 
who did not have Cherokee blood), leaving them particularly vulnerable to grafters who 
dispossessed many of their land.  In 1908, Congress lifted the restrictions on all land owned 
by freedpeople and intermarried white citizens.   As Daniel Littlefield has stressed, some 
freedpeople lost the legal protections afforded them by the restrictions of their land before 
they had even received their allotment since their rolls did not close until 1907.486  Second, 
the lack of blood quantum recorded for individuals listed on the ‘freedmen roll’ left the 
descendants of those who were enrolled as freedpeople unable to prove that they had 
‘Cherokee blood.’  Since the Cherokee Nation continues to use the Dawes Rolls as the means 
by which they assess claims to citizenship, applicants who claim citizenship through an 
ancestor on the ‘freedmen roll’ have been made vulnerable to expulsion from the Cherokee 
Nation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.   
The Dawes Act and subsequent allotment of Native lands effectively legislated the 
Native nations of Indian Territory out of existence, breaking apart their land bases and 
imposing United States citizenship on their citizens.  Furthermore, the transfer of Indian 
Territory lands in to private hands made the merger of Indian Territory and Oklahoma 
Territory into a single state possible.  Oklahoma Territory comprised of land formerly owned 
by the Native nations of Indian Territory which had been ceded to the federal government 
as part of the treaty negotiations following the Civil War.  Pressure from persistent intruders 
and squatters, known as ‘boomers,’ led to the federal government opening up these 
‘unassigned lands’ to United States citizens from 1889 but did not lessen the demand for 
more land.487  The actions of these largely white settler intruders violated various treaties 
made with the nations of Indian Territory and, in their study of Oklahoma, historians W. 
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David Baird and Danney Goble have concluded that “Tribal land ownership and tribal 
government meant nothing to them [settlers] – nothing, that is, except as barriers to what 
they believed were their rights as American citizens.”488  Oklahoma entered the Union in 
November 1907, incorporating the citizens of the Cherokee Nation into a racial hierarchy 
that compounded freedpeople’s problems in relation to claiming the rights of their Cherokee 
citizenship.  The creation of Oklahoma as a state privileged whiteness and placed those with 
African ancestry – regardless of whether they claimed Cherokee rights and privileges or were 
migrants from the United States - firmly at the bottom of the social order.  Freedpeople and 
Cherokees alike scrambled to protect themselves within this new environment and, whilst 
many Cherokees attempted to align themselves with white society, Cherokee freedpeople 
stressed their Cherokee citizenship to differentiate themselves from the African Americans 
that had relocated to Oklahoma. Under the authority of the United States rather than the 
Cherokee Nation, however, Cherokee freedpeople quickly found themselves subject to the 
racial discrimination seen throughout the American South.489  Settlers and the new state 
government made no distinction between Cherokee freedpeople and African Americans, 
subjecting both to Jim Crow laws and social practices. Ultimately, then, both the larger 
Cherokee citizenry and Cherokee freedpeople were left devastated by allotment and the 
subsequent dismantling of their tribal government.    
‘Oklahoma Fever’: The Cherokee Nation and Forced Allotment  
Although the removal treaties signed by the Cherokee Nation and its neighbours in the Indian 
Territory had guaranteed they would own these lands in perpetuity, legislation had been 
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introduced in every Congress from 1870 proposing statehood of some form for the Indian 
Territory.490  The pressure to incorporate Cherokee land and citizens into the United States 
increased throughout these decades and challenged previous federal policies that kept 
Native peoples separate and apart from the United States. The federal government had 
guaranteed the Cherokee Nation title to its land in perpetuity, however.  The controversial 
1835 Treaty of New Echota, which formed the legal basis for the removal of the Cherokee 
Nation and its citizens to the Indian Territory, contained the following provision: “the land 
ceded to the Cherokee nation in the forgoing article shall, in no future time without their 
consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory.”491  
The treaty also ensured the continued existence of the Cherokee government in its new 
home and its ability to set its own laws, as long as said laws did not conflict with the United 
States Constitution, and that the United States would protect the Cherokee Nation from 
intruders.   
The Treaty of New Echota guaranteed the protection of Cherokee lands but the 
federal government indicated its desire to eventually absorb the land of the Cherokee Nation 
and transfer it into private hands in Article 20 of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty: “Whenever 
the Cherokee national council shall request it, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause the 
country reserved for the Cherokees to be surveyed and allotted among them, at the expense 
of the United States.”492 The Reconstruction Treaty contained a series of provisions that 
extended the power of the federal government into the Cherokee Nation, such as the 
establishment of a United States court to adjudicate cases involving American citizens, the 
freedom to construct military posts and the construction of a railroad through the Cherokee 
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Nation.493  Article 20 of the Reconstruction Treaty, if enacted, would have ended Cherokee 
national control over their land base and provided a means by which Cherokee land could be 
transferred to citizens of the United States.  Importantly, whereas the Dawes and Curtis Act 
brought about the transition from communal to private landownership without the consent 
of Native nations, Article 20 relied on the Cherokee Nation voluntarily requesting the 
allotment of its own land.  In 1866, then, the federal government hoped to gain access to 
Cherokee land but was unwilling to forcibly take it from the Cherokee Nation.  The language 
of Article 20 implied that allotting Cherokee land would be a service or ‘request’ carried out 
by the federal government, indicating that the federal government was hoping to persuade 
the Nation to allot its land of its own accord.  The Cherokee Nation did not elect at any time 
to put Article 20 in to effect, however, and continued to hold Cherokee land in common until 
the Nation was allotted under the 1898 Curtis Act.   
Federal encroachment on the sovereignty and land base of the Cherokee Nation 
occurred within a wider context of growing aggression on the part of the federal government 
towards Native nations.  As the nineteenth century progressed, the federal government 
shifted away from its policy of relocation (exemplified by the Cherokees’ removal to the 
Indian Territory) and began to consider the means by which Native people and their land 
could be absorbed within the United States.  After the American Civil War, the federal 
government used military force to confine Native peoples to reservations and therefore open 
lands for white settlement and facilitate the westward expansion of United States.  Many 
historians consider the infamous 1890 massacre of Lakota Sioux at Wounded Knee to 
represent the “symbolic end of Indian freedom” and the inevitable conclusion of this violent 
and deliberate policy.494  In his study of the acquisition of Native American land, historian 
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Stuart Banner argues that it was no coincidence that huge amounts of land were being ceded 
to the United States at the same time as the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century since 
“the fighting was about land.”495  With the majority of Native American tribes confined to 
reservations, the Superintendent of the Census for 1890 declared the frontier to be closed 
that year.496  Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, first delivered in 1893, celebrated the 
role that westward expansion and the frontier had played in the creation of a national 
American character.  Turner’s thesis prioritised the perspective of white American citizens 
and paid little attention to the effect of westward expansion on Native peoples, asserting 
that maintaining the frontier had united colonists and then American citizens, providing a 
space in which American citizens kept alive “the power of resistance to aggression.”497  
Importantly, in Turner’s vision of the frontier it is the Native Americans who figure as the 
aggressor and not the United States government or its citizens.  The vast majority of Native 
peoples were confined to reservations by the 1880s and the federal government began to 
question whether the reservation system provided a protected space within which Native 
society and culture would endure rather than encouraging progress and its ultimate goal of 
assimilation within the United States.  In his study of Indian Territory, historian Murray 
Wickett described this shift in federal attitudes, to viewing reservations as being obstacles 
to civilization rather than a site of survival, as a “profound transformation” which would have 
huge ramifications for Native peoples.498  Ending the reservation system therefore became a 
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cornerstone of federal policy towards Native nations in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century and this new resolve culminated in the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887.  
  Both reformists and opportunists were impressed by the potential benefits 
of forcing Native peoples to adopt private rather than communal landownership and their 
shared vision placed the federal government under pressure to bring about the allotment of 
tribal lands.  Reformists considered private landownership to be “one of the most powerful 
tools that could be used to bring about assimilation” since they viewed owning and managing 
land as an exercise through which Native Americans would learn the capitalist and 
individualist values of the United States.499  Senator Henry L. Dawes, who became 
synonymous with the allotment of Native lands, was a highly regarded reformist who 
considered himself to be a friend of Native Americans.  In her classic monograph, And Still 
The Waters Run, Oklahoman historian Angie Debo recounts an 1883 speech given by Dawes 
at Lake Mohonk in which he asserted that Native nations will not be able to ‘progress’ until 
they abolish their system of communal landownership: 
The head chief told us that there was not a family in that whole nation that had 
not a home of its own.  There was not a pauper in that nation, and the nation 
did not owe a dollar. […] They have got as far as they can go, because they own 
their land in common […] and under that there is no enterprise to make your 
home any better than that of your neighbours.  There is no selfishness, which is 
at the bottom of civilization.  Till this people will consent to give up their lands, 
and divide them among their citizens so that each can own the land he 
cultivates, they will not make much more progress.500  
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On the one hand, Dawes described an idyllic society in which there was no national financial 
debt or individuals living in poverty, while on the other he argued that Native Americans 
would not ‘progress’ without adopting individualist and capitalist ideals.  Debo describes this 
“illogical” position as being the result of ethnocentrism, in which white reformists placed 
their own values above the cultural practices and lived experiences of the peoples they 
claimed to extend their friendship to.501  Reformists such as Dawes believed that absorbing 
Native people within the United States’ economic system would force Native people to learn 
the necessary skills and ambitions that would bring about their ‘civilization’ and assimilation 
within the United States.502   
Opportunists and expansionists shared the reformists’ goal of absorbing Native 
peoples into the United States economy but did so with the agenda of gaining access to tribal 
resources (i.e. land) rather than with regard to the welfare of Native people.  United States 
citizens and settler intruders in the Indian Territory grew frustrated that the communal land 
ownership practices of the Native nations prevented them from gaining possession of 
land.503  Furthermore, interested parties argued that Native people did not make best use of 
the land, since they did not cultivate it for crops, and that they should therefore not be 
allowed to retain it. This reflected the racialized agrarianism of the time: white farmers could 
achieve independence through owning land whilst Native land practices of communal 
landownership corrupted that goal.504 Throughout the 1880s, boomers such as David L. 
Payne agitated for the right to claim ‘unused’ lands and were repeatedly removed from the 
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Indian Territory whilst attempting to establish a settlement within its borders. 505  The desire 
boomers had for Native lands in Indian Territory therefore found expression itself in 
aggressive land intrusions and seizures. William Osburn, an associate of Payne’s, described 
his own desire to settle in the Indian Territory after his crop failed as “Oklahoma fever.”506  
Upon his return to Indiana following a prosperous visit to the Indian Territory, Osburn 
distributed Payne Oklahoma Colony Certificates “everywhere,” promising that said 
certificates would secure a plot of land in the Indian Territory.507  As evident in previous 
chapters, settler intruders were a “chronic problem” in the Indian Territory as they ignored 
the direction of their government and attempted to illegally claim tribal lands or resources 
for themselves.508  Settler intruders also caused problems for individuals seeking recognition 
of their legitimacy to reside within Native nations, such as Cherokee freedpeople, because 
they made it difficult for Native officials to differentiate between their claims and the illegal 
actions of United States citizens. Such intruders entered Native lands in growing numbers as 
the nineteenth century progressed, however, and Murray Wickett asserted that from the 
1880s “the United States seemed unwilling or unable” to prevent them from doing so.509 
The vast majority of Native peoples resisted the pressure to introduce private 
landownership and enter the American free market, recognising that allotment would bring 
about the denationalisation of their nations.  In 1878, Cherokee Principal Chief Dennis 
Bushyhead argued that the Cherokee Nation had a working and even superior land system 
to that seen in the United States: “we have a land system which we believe to be better than 
any you can devise for us.  Cannot you leave us alone to try our plan while you are trying 
yours?”510  The Cherokee Nation was not unanimous in its rejection of private landownership, 
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however, since some saw private landownership and territorial governments to be a way of 
surviving as a community in the nineteenth century.  Most famously, Elias Cornelius 
Boudinot, a controversial figure both during his lifetime and today, campaigned for the 
dissolution of the Cherokee government and the end of communal landownership from the 
1860s until his death in 1890.  In 1879, Boudinot published a letter, complete with a map, in 
the Chicago Times that explicitly encouraged United States citizens to settle on the 
unassigned lands without the sanction of their government.  Although James Parins has 
argued that the letter’s significance has been overstated, Boudinot’s letter did serve to 
enflame the growing desire to settle the area exemplified by David Payne and William 
Osburn.511  Accused of being an opportunist (Boudinot managed many business ventures 
with mixed success), Boudinot argued instead that Native sovereignty was a “dead issue” 
and that in the face of inevitable denationalisation the Cherokees should negotiate the best 
position they could.512   
 Bowing to pressure from boomers and expansionists, Congress passed the General 
Allotment or Dawes Act in 1887 which allotted the lands of Native peoples living on 
reservations throughout the American west and dissolved their governments.  Under the 
terms of the act, families were to receive 160 acres of land, individual adults and orphaned 
children received 80 acres of land, other children received 40 acres and any ‘excess’ was 
placed on the open market for sale.513  The Dawes Act was passed over the objections of the 
Native nations it targeted and, in certain instances, without their knowledge.514  Lands made 
available through the Dawes Act were quickly incorporated into the United States as new 
states (large portions of North and South Dakota, for example, were formerly Sioux 
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reservations).  The allotment of these lands coincided with the opening of the Oklahoma 
Territory with its first land run on April 1st 1889 which saw nearly two million acres of land 
being claimed by homesteaders in a single day.515  This violent entrance on to formerly Native 
lands has entered the national American imaginary as an “iconic moment,” demonstrating 
the freedom and courage of American citizens.516  David Chang has argued that, instead, 
settlers “used their colonial authority to enforce a rigid racial and gender inequality” in these 
areas.517           
The Five Tribes and other Native nations in the Indian Territory were initially exempt 
from the Dawes Act since they held title to their land as a result of their removal treaties 
(Cherokee lands were not a part of the reservation system).  Furthermore, Angie Debo has 
argued that the Five Tribes escaped the Dawes Act due to the “extraordinary diplomatic skill 
and legal ability of their leaders and the determined opposition of their entire citizenship.”518  
In 1893, the Dawes Commission was created by Congress and directed to begin negotiations 
with the Five Tribes that would bring about the allotment of their land and dismantling of 
their governments.  The Commission was explicitly ordered that their goal was to incorporate 
their lands within the United States.519  In turn, the Cherokee Nation recognised the danger 
allotment represented to their existence as a nation and repeatedly rejected the 
Commission’s proposals to discuss allotment, refusing to negotiate on the issue.  In the face 
of strong resistance from the Five Tribes, the Commission delivered misleading reports that 
depicted the Five Tribes as being incapable of self-government and prone to incompetence 
and corruption.520  These allegations served to justify the dissolution of the Native 
governments whilst similar assertions that a few elites exploited the communal land practice 
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at the expense of the larger Indian population worked to cast allotment as an act of 
protection rather than an attack.521  By 1898, the Dawes Commission had made little progress 
with their negotiations and on June 28th a frustrated Congress passed the Curtis Act, which 
would end tribal land ownership and dissolve tribal governments without their consent.522   
 
An ‘Odious Feature’: The Proposal to Award Freedpeople Only Forty Acres 
With the passage of the Curtis Act, allotment shifted from threat to reality and the Cherokee 
Nation entered into negotiations with the federal government to define the exact terms of 
this process.  The entitlement of freedpeople was a key point of dispute within the 
negotiations held in Muskogee in the winter of 1898-1899.  Freedpeople were caught up in 
the fight between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government over the former’s efforts 
to retain an element of sovereignty during the process of allotment.  The disagreement over 
Cherokee freedpeople afforded the federal government with an arena in which it could 
demonstrate its dominance and ultimate authority.  Despite the decision rendered in Moses 
Whitmire’s suit, the Cherokee Nation continued to argue that freedpeople had no right to a 
share in Cherokee land and proposed that freedpeople received forty acres rather than the 
110 acres proposed for other citizens.  If this proposal was approved, Cherokee freedpeople 
would receive the same size allotment as a Native child under the distinctions established in 
the Dawes Act.  Given their recent defeat in the U. S. Court of Claims, their insistence that 
freedpeople were only entitled to a lesser form of citizenship reveals the determination of 
the Cherokee Nation to resist federal pressures to afford freedpeople equal rights.  
Freedpeople were not invited to attend the meetings between the United States Commission 
to the Five Civilized Tribes and the Cherokee Commission, leading Daniel Littlefield to 
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conclude that “the freedmen had little say concerning their future; once more, their destiny 
became a central issue of debate between Washington bureaucrats and Cherokee 
politicians.”523  Despite their absence from the negotiations, freedpeople did express their 
concerns and opinions, however, and their interests were defended before the commission 
by Robert H. Kern as well as Cherokee citizens who advocated full and equal rights for 
Cherokee freedpeople. 
  On December 23rd 1898, the Cherokee Commission first officially presented 
its “allotment feature” to the United States Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, which 
contained their proposals as to how the allotment of Cherokee land should be managed. 524  
Within this document, the Cherokee Commission proposed that freedpeople who were 
either on the authenticated 1880 Cherokee census themselves or had an ancestor on the roll 
would receive an allotment of forty acres “including their present residences and 
improvements.”525  This was substantially smaller than the 110 acres proposed as the 
allotment size for citizens of Cherokee ancestry.  The Commission had also included a 
provision that would prevent freedpeople enrolees from receiving any future per capita 
payments.  The proposals brought by the Cherokee Commission therefore worked to limit 
the rights of Cherokee freedpeople to tribal resources.  The joint commission debated the 
question of freedmen on the 30th December and Tams Bixby, a commissioner for the United 
States, insisted that the Cherokee delegates clarified their proposal: “Do you gentlemen 
intend to cut the portion of the freedmen down to 40 acres?”526   Bixby therefore framed this 
proposition negatively rather than as the generous offer the Cherokee commissioners 
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imagined it to be, since they saw the freedmen as entirely lacking in entitlement to land 
regardless of the size of the allotment.  Despite Bixby having previously expressed 
reservations about whether the U. S. Congress would ratify a treaty that contained such a 
provision, the Cherokee commissioner affirmed the proposal and asserted that they 
“intended to insist on that proposition.”527  Bixby, on the other hand, argued for an 
agreement that was “absolutely fair and square and equal: absolutely.”528  The two 
commissions quickly found themselves at an impasse over the issue of Cherokee freedpeople 
as the Cherokee commission reminded the United States commissioners that any agreement 
“has to run the gauntlet in the Cherokee Nation as well as Congress.”529  This statement not 
only illustrates the likely resistance of the Cherokee citizenry to allow freedpeople an equal 
share of the land but is also an incredible assertion of sovereignty in the face of coerced 
denationalisation.  The commissioners refused to accept that the democratic processes of 
the United States held any more weight than those of the Cherokee Nation and insisted that 
the negotiations were considered to be between the representatives of two governments.  
 As the debate continued, the joint commission heard arguments both for and against 
the inclusion of freedpeople which revealed the conflicting interpretations of the Treaty of 
1866.  Although the Cherokee commission firmly argued against awarding freedpeople 
allotments of an equal size, the differing opinions held by two Cherokee citizen speakers, Mr 
Sanders and Mr Gunter, indicated that the Cherokee Nation was not unanimous on this issue 
even if the machinery of the Nation moved consistently to limit the rights of freedpeople. Mr 
Sanders, a Cherokee citizen who had served with the Union Army in the Civil War, argued 
that the intention of the 1866 treaty was to provide freedmen with political rights, not a 
share in the ownership of Cherokee land.  This was in accordance with the majority opinion 
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of the Cherokee Nation explored in the previous chapter.  Through an interpreter, Mr 
Sanders described awarding freedmen equal citizenship as a betrayal of his military service 
since he had fought for their freedom and should not therefore have to also award them a 
share of Cherokee resources: 
…he was also a party to when the consideration of those rights was up; that he 
understood it; that [freedpeople] would be one amongst the family, enjoying 
the use of the soil only.  He says when the cause of the rebellion arose and the 
southern states seceded and war was declared, and volunteers were called, he 
says on account of his being a ward of the great father that he shouldered his 
musket for that purpose.  He says now at this late day to believe that he would 
come in and share equally in the assets and all property is very hard for him to 
stand; to think such is the case.  And he says that he thought that in order to do 
equity to this class of freedpeople that he did and would favour the proposition 
of giving them forty acres as a home.530 
Mr Sanders emphasised his military service with the Union to illustrate his loyalty to the 
United States and to encourage them to understand awarding freedpeople property rights 
as a betrayal of his trust and others like him.  Under Mr Sanders’ interpretation of the treaty, 
then, freedmen occupied a lesser form of citizenship in which they were a member of the 
Cherokee family but were entitled to the ‘use of the soil only.’  Sanders’ use of the word 
‘family’ is evocative since it implied personal connections yet Sanders continued to make a 
distinction between freedpeople and other citizens.  Interestingly, his concession that 
providing freedmen with a small homestead would ‘do equity’ to them suggests that he 
thought the Cherokee Nation had some measure of responsibility for the welfare of 
freedpeople.  
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 In response to Mr Sanders’ argument, Mr Gunter countered that the 1866 Treaty 
secured equal rights for Cherokee freedpeople.  Professing “all the feeling and sympathy that 
any man of honor could have for his full blood Cherokee brother,” Mr Gunter argued that 
the Treaty of 1866 was explicit in ensuring freedpeople attained “all the rights of ‘native born 
Cherokees.’”531  Gunter therefore dismissed Mr Sanders’ argument that a distinction could 
be made between the citizenship of freedpeople and citizens of Cherokee ancestry and 
grounded his own interpretation in the written text of the treaty rather than the intention 
of its creators.  Gunter viewed freedpeople as equals rather than competitors or outsiders 
and claimed that “when I define my rights then I define the colored man’s rights.”532  Gunter 
concluded by declaring his readiness to press the claim of freedpeople: “I am willing to stand 
and defend the rights of these people.”533  Gunter’s declaration reflected his understanding 
that the Cherokee Nation and its citizenry had a moral obligation to include freedpeople on 
an equal footing with themselves, even if that meant disagreeing with other Cherokee 
citizens.  
 As the negotiations between the Cherokee Nation and the United States continued, 
freedpeople and Cherokees alike expressed confusion and concern over enrolment and 
allotment.  After receiving numerous queries from freedmen, Robert H. Kern offered his 
services to the joint commission as a representative for their interests.  In a letter sent in 
December 1898, Kern reminded the commissioners of the 1895 Whitmire decision that had 
affirmed the full and equal citizenship of Cherokee freedpeople and his subsequent belief 
that “no treaty would be tolerated by your commission that would be prejudicial to their 
rights.”534  Furthermore, Kern suggested that freedmen would be more likely to vote to ratify 
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any agreement made by the joint commission “should justice be done these freedmen.”535 
He therefore not only reminded the commission that catering to  freedpeople’s demands 
may help them gain their objective but that doing so would be just and fair.  Kern made a 
brief appearance before the joint commission on December 30th 1898 to speak on behalf of 
Cherokee freedpeople.  First Kern argued that the Court of Claims had settled the matter of 
whether freedpeople were entitled to a share of Cherokee land in favour of freedpeople and 
that therefore any decision to the contrary would conflict with that decision.  Furthermore, 
Kern refused to debate the intentions of the Cherokee Nation delegates that agreed the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty and instead insisted on using the literal text of the treaty and the Court 
of Claims decision.  In doing so, Kern acknowledged that interpretation of the Treaty had 
been “a question” within the Cherokee Nation and that he did not know “whether they 
thought they were giving them property rights.”536 By dismissing these questions, however, 
Kern made these details seem superfluous to the central issue of whether discriminating 
against freedpeople was legal; he argued it was not.    
Paying close attention to the proceedings, freedmen contacted the Dawes 
Commission directly to clarify what they would be entitled to under allotment and the 
processes by which they would be enrolled.  A letter sent from freedman W. H. Vann on 
January 2nd 1899 asked the commission to answer questions formulated at a mass meeting 
of Republican freedmen in Goose Neck, Cherokee Nation.  The introduction of the letter 
asserted that freedpeople were entitled to full and equal citizenship through the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty but the anxiety of the freedmen, who were unsure if their rights were 
being considered in the ongoing negotiations, is evident and the author described the issue 
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as being “all important to us.”537  The letter reveals the desire of freedmen to influence the 
negotiations in order to secure their rights. First, the letter argued that being awarded a 
smaller allotment was an abrogation of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty and asked whether 
it is “practicable that a Treaty can be made in violation of the only obligation by which our 
citizen[ship] is maintained in this country.”538  This both questioned the legality of any 
agreement that would discriminate against freedpeople and encouraged the Dawes 
Commission to see that it would be creating a dangerous precedent by which all the 
citizenship rights of Cherokee freedpeople might be lost.  Vann then asked whether an 
agreement which would award freedpeople only forty acres was likely to be reached and 
whether a delegate representing freedpeople would be heard by the Dawes Commission.  
The freedmen that met in Goose Neck evidently hoped that appearing before the 
commissioners might encourage them to champion their cause and subsequently elected 
Vann as their delegate.539  On January 4th, Vann sent supplementary questions to the Dawes 
Commission that focused on the practical considerations of enrolment rather than its 
outcome and reflected the difficulties freedpeople had faced previously.  For example, Vann 
asked whether freedpeople needed to be represented by an attorney before the Dawes 
Commission and if their witnesses had to be Cherokee by Blood or if freedpeople would 
suffice.540  The Cherokee Nation had previously alleged that freedpeople had made 
fraudulent applications supported by bought testimony from Cherokee freedpeople and 
these freedpeople clearly anticipated that their enrolment will be closely scrutinised.541   
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 The final agreement reached between the Cherokee Nation and the United States 
awarded Cherokee freedpeople allotments the same size as those received by citizens of 
Cherokee ancestry: 110 acres of land of average value or its equivalent.   On January 16th 
1899, Robert Kern wrote to Moses Whitmire that the “odious feature” of the agreement, 
which would have afforded freedpeople an allotment comprising of only forty acres, was 
rejected.542  In the face of the determination of the Cherokee Nation representatives, this 
decision represented a considerable victory for freedpeople who could now look forward to 
allotment knowing that they would receive the same amount of land as other Cherokee 
citizens.  The decision also appeared to affirm the equal citizenship of Cherokee freedpeople.  
The final agreement instructed the Dawes Commission to create a new roll under the 
direction of the February 3rd Court of Claims decree, which made the authenticated 1880 
Cherokee census the basis of the new roll.  According to Daniel Littlefield, the decision to use 
the authenticated roll represented a considerable victory for the Cherokee Nation since it 
had long viewed the Kern-Clifton Roll as fraudulent and bloated with the names of people 
who did not meet their criteria for citizenship.543 Although the Cherokee Nation had been 
forced to award freedpeople an equal allotment, then, it did manage to secure the use of a 
roll it approved of.  Kern urged Whitmire to share the news and encourage freedmen to vote 
to ratify this agreement as it would secure them a full and equal allotment.544  Although the 
agreement itself was ratified by the Cherokees but not in Congress, the provisions regarding 
freedpeople were carried into effect and their enrolment began in 1901.545   
 The agreement made between the Cherokee Nation and the Dawes Commission 
regarding freedpeople appeared to secure them equal right to land but freedpeople 
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remained sceptical that they would be treated fairly during allotment.  Freedmen met in 
convention at Fort Gibson on December 18th 1900 and drafted a series of resolutions 
regarding enrolment that were sent to the Secretary of the Interior for his consideration as 
the Commission looked to begin enrolment.  According to the Resolutions of the Freedmen 
Convention, a convention of Cherokees met in Tahlequah to make a “complete protest 
against [their] vested rights in the lands and property of the Cherokee Nation.”546  This 
protest, closely following the negotiations discussed above, lends credence to freedmen’s 
fears that their rights to an allotment were vulnerable.  Over the course of the resolutions, 
the freedmen pointed to numerous practical concerns that may have adversely impacted 
their attempts to gain an allotment.  First, the document argued that freedpeople had “no 
authenticated roll” as the basis of their citizenship and that they therefore “insist” and 
“earnestly request” that the Commission adhere to the Whitmire Decree issued in the Court 
of Claims on May 8th 1895.547  This would make the Wallace Roll the base roll for enrolment, 
which the freedmen considered “the most correct rolls of the Cherokee Freedmen,” rather 
than the 1880 authenticated Cherokee census.548  Second, all freedpeople applicants would 
have to appear before the Dawes Commission to prove that they met the terms of Article 9 
of the 1866 Reconstruction Treaty and were listed on the base roll.  This would entail all 
freedpeople applicants having to secure an attorney at their own expense, subjecting them 
to “great hardship” to secure their place on the Dawes Rolls.549  Third, the petitioners 
requested that they be allowed to select a member of the commission themselves to ensure 
that “justice may be done.”550  Evidently, freedmen had concerns that United States and 
Cherokee officials may not assess their applications fairly: as seen previously, freedpeople 
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and federal officials had alleged that Cherokee officials were biased against awarding 
citizenship to freedpeople.  In suggesting the addition of their own commissioner, freedmen 
hoped to ensure that their applications for enrolment were decided justly.  The Resolutions 
of the Freedmen Convention represented an attempt by freedmen to influence the process 
of enrolment and reflect their previous problems attaining citizenship.    
 
‘It’s Hard to Recall Back 40 Years’: The Task of Enrolment 
The Dawes Commission elected to enrol Cherokee citizens by blood before approaching the 
freedmen roll on April 1st 1901, anticipating that enrolling freedpeople would be a 
complicated and potentially lengthy task.551  Applicants were considered by three 
commissioners (the Cherokee Nation, the freedpeople and the Dawes Commission having 
selected one each) that would either reject, accept or mark an application as ‘doubtful.’ A 
majority opinion decided each case (although rejection by the Cherokee Nation 
automatically got names placed on ‘doubtful’ cards, even if the two other commissioners 
deemed the application successful).  The greater weight given to rejections by Cherokee 
officials implies that the Nation retained an element of sovereignty during this process. 
Applications deemed ‘doubtful’ were set aside for closer scrutiny at a later date.  
Freedpeople faced considerable obstacles in meeting the demands of the Dawes 
Commission, given the difficulty in providing evidence for events that happened nearly four 
decades previously and the inconsistency of the existing rolls.  The complexities of the 
citizenship claims of freedpeople also represented a huge endeavour for the commission: 
over its first three months, the commission created forty thousand sheets of type written 
testimony, admitted 3150 freedmen, marked 2428 freedpeople as ‘doubtful’, and rejected 
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285.552  Enrolment was placed on hold in July of the same year as the commission struggled 
with the unmanageable quantity of evidence it had amassed.  Although enrolment did 
resume after a brief pause, disagreements between the Cherokee Nation and the Dawes 
Commission brought enrolment to a halt again as the Commission began considering cases 
of applicants who were not on the 1880 authenticated census but who the commissioners 
believed held a legitimate claim to citizenship.  In October 1901, federal court upheld the 
protests of the Cherokee Nation, who claimed that the commission had overstepped its 
powers in considering applicants that were not covered by their agreement, but the 
injunction against enrolling such applicants was lifted in August 1903.  Federal officials again 
enraged the Cherokee Nation by insisting that the six-month deadline specified in Article 9 
of the Reconstruction Treaty should be measured from February 1867 rather than January 
1867 (the date of ratification rather than signing) which led to hundreds of cases being 
reopened.553  From the Cherokee perspective, then, the Dawes Commission violated the 
terms of their agreement and opened Cherokee citizenship to applicants the Cherokee 
Nation did not consider to be legitimate.    
As discussed in chapter two, freedpeople faced unique obstacles in securing 
recognition as Cherokee citizens.  In 1901, proving that they had met the January 1867 
deadline for their return to the Cherokee Nation represented a particular challenge for 
applicants and witnesses given the amount of time that had lapsed between emancipation 
and enrolment.  The Cherokee Nation continued to insist that the deadline was enforced 
despite the difficulty of both remembering and proving details from thirty-four years 
previously.  This was made even more difficult for applicants who had been born after 
emancipation and secured their citizenship through a deceased parent since they relied on 
their parent having been accepted on the authenticated 1880 roll. Freedpeople and 
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Cherokees alike struggled to provide adequate evidence for the commissioners. During her 
application interview, freedwoman Siney McCoy was asked to confirm who her neighbours 
were when the Civil War began and when she was unsure of the relationship between two 
local families asserted that “People growing old, their knowledge grows slim.”554  Applicants 
and witnesses insisted that any gaps in their knowledge did not illustrate dishonesty but were 
instead down to normal lapses in memory.  F. H. Nash, a freedman testifying in relation to 
Lewis T. Brown’s application to citizenship, was unable to definitively state when Bill Brown 
took over the management of his local barbershop, for example.  Lewis Brown’s claim to 
citizenship rested on being able to prove that his father had returned to the Cherokee Nation 
prior to the January 1867 deadline. Although Bill Brown was listed on the 1880 authenticated 
roll the commissioners still questioned Lewis Brown’s claim.  Nash refused to swear to an 
exact date in his testimony, prompting his interviewer to ask: “your memory is clear entirely 
on that point?”555 Nash rejected any suggestion that his memory was particularly poor, 
responding that “It is as clear as any one else’s I expect could be.”556  Another witness in the 
same case, Sallie Loving, insisted that she would not be pressured into making a definitive 
statement if she was not certain it was true: “I am not swearing only to what I know.”557  
Despite classing Lewis Brown as ‘doubtful,’ the commission went on to accept his application 
and he was included on the final roll.558   
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Cherokee witnesses were subject to the same intense questioning and the same 
problems of memory as freedpeople.  Joe Thompson, George Thompson’s former master, 
testified on his behalf in October 1901.  Thompson’s ownership of George Thompson before 
the war was easily established but whether Thompson returned to the Cherokee Nation 
before the January 1867 deadline proved to be difficult to ascertain.  As he was examined by 
the commissioners, Joe Thompson was repeatedly asked to clarify dates and locations as he 
recounted his own whereabouts and that of George Thompson for the years following the 
Civil War.  Failing to provide precise answers, Joe Thompson responded that he couldn’t be 
“positive” of exact dates as “it has been so long, nothing to keep dates for.”559  When asked 
to provide his “best judgement,” Thompson again argued that “It’s hard to recall back 40 
years when there was nothing to keep the dates for.”560  The high standards of evidence 
demanded by the commissioners plagued the enrolment process and reflected Cherokee 
concerns that many freedpeople claimed citizenship fraudulently.  Even when witnesses or 
applicants did provide a record, the commissioners challenged its accuracy.  Amelia Winship, 
testifying in relation to the application of Lewis Gibson, told the commissioners that she 
based her knowledge of when she knew Gibson on the record she made of her children in 
her bible: her husband had given the Gibson family food to celebrate the birth of their niece.  
Although the commissioners first disallowed Winship from using that record within her 
testimony they later admitted the evidence.  They did, however, question why the 
information was recorded and therefore its legitimacy:      
Q. Have you got the record of it at home? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where is it? A. In the bible. 
Q. What is it doing there? A. She was my niece. 
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Q. Born at your house? A. No, sir. 
Q. Did she have a father and mother? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you put it down in the bible for? A. Because the 16th February was 
a rather noted day. 
Q. Why did you put it down in the Bible? A. Because I wanted to. 
Q. Where is that Bible? A. At home on my table.561 
Over the course of the interview the commissioners continued to imply that Winship’s 
recording of her niece’s birth was nonsensical and, in doing so, attempted to discredit her 
evidence.  Importantly, whilst the commissioners lamented the lack of written evidence 
available, they only considered documentation produced within certain contexts (i.e. by 
white or Cherokee officials) to be trustworthy.  This aligns with the historical dismissal of 
sources created by marginalised people (such as ex-slave narratives or interviews with the 
formerly enslaved recorded by the Works Progress Administration).562   Lewis Gibson’s 
application was ultimately rejected and his name was not added to the rolls.563      
The inconsistency of former rolls further complicated the enrolment process as 
applicants appeared on some rolls and not others, or members of the same family even 
appeared on different rolls.  For example, the aforementioned Siney McCoy applied on 
behalf of herself, her brother, and her six grandchildren.  Both herself and her brother had 
been held in slavery within the Cherokee Nation but they had been separated before the 
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War.  McCoy was unable to provide an exact date for her return to the Cherokee Nation from 
the Choctaw Nation, arguing that she worked until she could afford to bring her children back 
with her. McCoy also travelled the Indian Territory in the years following the Civil War 
attempting to locate her brother since he was “not sound in his mind.” 564  McCoy answered 
all the commissioners’ questions regarding herself and her brother, Dempsey, but her name 
was found only on the Kern-Clifton Roll and his was not found on any Cherokee roll.  Their 
deceased mother was not found on any rolls and, although her deceased daughter was on 
the Kern-Clifton Roll, only five of her grandchildren were listed thereon.565  All claimants in 
this case were therefore marked as ‘doubtful,’ meaning that their application was set aside 
for reassessment at the end of that session, but were not added to the Dawes Rolls.    
If an applicant’s name appeared on a roll other than the authenticated 1880 census, 
the discrepancies between the rolls were particularly frustrating as the Dawes Commission 
was directed to use the authenticated 1880 roll.  Despite being instructed to only consider 
applicants who based their claim on the authenticated 1880 roll, however, the commission 
heard cases from claimants who were either listed on other rolls or who had never been 
officially recognised as citizens.  In May 1901, Commissioner Tams Bixby defended the right 
of the commission to do so as a matter of fairness: “justice demanded that all freedmen 
claiming a share in the Cherokee Nation have a fair and impartial hearing.”566  The 
Commission therefore reinterpreted their instructions to include individuals on the 
authenticated 1880 and others who claimed citizenship through Article 9 of the 1866 
Reconstruction Treaty or had been previously included on other rolls.567  Rather than 
immediately rejecting applicants who were not on the authenticated roll, the commissioners 
                                                          
564 ‘Department of the Interior, Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, Vinita, I.T., May 15th 1901, in 
the matter of the application of Siney McCoy of herself, her brother, Dempsey Wright, and her six 
grandchildren for enrolment as Cherokee Freedmen.’  
565 Ibid. Page 5. 
566 T. Bixby, quoted in Littlefield, Cherokee Freedmen, 226.   
567 Littlefield, Cherokee Freedmen, 225. 
190 
 
marked them as ‘doubtful’ citizens that needed to be more closely considered.  The actions 
of the commission represented a considerable expansion of its powers without the consent 
of the Cherokee Nation and in violation of the agreement that had defined the terms of 
enrolment. Although a rejection by the Cherokee Nation commissioner held greater weight 
than one made by the commissioners for the United States or freedpeople, the Cherokee 
Nation was unable to prevent the applications made by those it did not deem legitimate from 
being kept open for review.  The Cherokee Nation was outraged by the actions of the 
commission and, after filing a suit in the federal court at Muskogee, won an injunction in 
October 1901 which prevented such cases being heard.568   
As a result of the injunction, applications such as that of freedwoman Martha Gales 
remained unresolved.  On 18th April 1901, Gales presented a convincing case before the 
commission that she should be entitled to citizenship but she was only listed on the Kern-
Clifton Roll, not the authenticated 1880 roll.569  The decision regarding her application was 
subsequently suspended due to “the protest of the Cherokee Nation upon legal points” (i.e. 
she should not have been able to apply under the requirements agreed between the 
Cherokee Nation and the Dawes Commission).570  Commissioner Needles noted, however, 
that “the Commission is fully satisfied that she is entitled to be enrolled as a Cherokee 
freedman.”571  Although the 1901 injunction suggested that the United States would respect 
its agreement with the Cherokee Nation regarding the enrolment of freedpeople, this proved 
to be temporary as federal officials increasingly imposed their own understandings of who 
was entitled to Cherokee citizenship on the enrolment process. Enrolment of Cherokee 
freedpeople progressed within the agreement made with the Cherokee Nation until Judge 
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Charles Raymond of the Western District of the Indian Territory dissolved the injunction 
against the Dawes Commission in August 1903.  This enabled the commission to hear 
applications from citizens who were not listed on the authenticated 1880 roll, such as Martha 
Gales, and sanctioned their expansive reading of their directions.  Although applications had 
been closed since September 1902, applications that had been suspended as a result of the 
injunction were therefore added to the ‘doubtful’ list and reconsidered.  By October 1903, 
the Dawes Commission had approved applications from 3320 freedpeople, rejected 381, and 
was yet to decide 3123 cases.572 In January 1904, the Assistant Attorney General from the 
Department of the Interior further complicated the enrolment of Cherokee freedpeople by 
asserting that the six-month deadline specified by the Reconstruction Treaty should actually 
be considered the 11th of February 1867 and not the January deadline used up to this point.573  
According to historian Kent Carter, this small amendment led to “hundreds” of cases being 
reopened.574  The January 1867 deadline had been a key qualification for Cherokee 
citizenship and, as seen in chapter two, the Cherokee Nation had enforced it consistently.  
Although the United States had previously pressured the Cherokee Nation to remove this 
deadline and offer citizenship to all former slaves of Cherokees, they had never been able to 
achieve that goal.  The dominance of the federal government in the enrolment process did 
enable federal officials to amend this deadline, however, and allowed them to open 
Cherokee citizenship to individuals who were previously excluded.  In doing so, the United 
States officials denied the Cherokee Nation the right to set the rules by which their own 
citizenry was defined and forced them to adhere to federal definitions of who was and who 
was not Cherokee.  The federal government’s actions regarding Cherokee freedpeople 
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during allotment illustrate both its power and its dismissal of Cherokee sovereignty at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
The shifting terms by which freedpeople were entitled to citizenship prolonged their 
enrolment and when the Dawes Commission was dissolved in 1905 the rolls remained open.  
As Commissioner to the Five Tribes, Tams Bixby continued to assess applications and when 
he finally closed the Dawes Rolls in 1907 the Cherokee Freedmen accounted for 4919 of the 
41835 Cherokee citizens listed.  Freedpeople therefore represented approximately ten 
percent of successful applicants. The manner in which freedpeople had been recorded on 
the Dawes Roll differed from their Cherokee counterparts, however, since federal officials 
did not record the blood quantum of individuals on the Freedmen Roll.  Although the 
Cherokee Nation had differentiated between citizens by blood and freedpeople in previous 
rolls they had never quantified the Cherokee ancestry of citizens.  Imposing blood quantum 
bureaucratised identity and was a means by which federal officials attempted to measure 
Native ancestry mathematically (recorded as a fraction).  All applicants who appeared black 
were enrolled as freedmen regardless of whether they had Cherokee ancestry.  Some 
applicants made their claim solely through the Ninth Article of the 1866 Reconstruction 
Treaty but others were descended from Cherokees and could therefore claim citizenship as 
Cherokees ‘by blood’.  This distinction was therefore lost, as the failure to record the blood 
quantum of such enrolees effectively operated as zero blood quantum.  The omission of 
blood quantum from their roll therefore imposed American notions of hypodescent – the 
‘one drop rule’ – on Cherokee freedpeople, meaning that their African ancestry negated any 
possible Cherokee ancestry.  In her study of the shifting legal definitions of race, Ariela Gross 
has argued that, through dividing freedpeople from citizens by blood in this way, the Dawes 
Commission imposed and fixed a binary racial order that made a ‘Black Indian’ or ‘African 
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Cherokee’ an impossibility.575  This separated Cherokee freedpeople from their Cherokee 
identity, redefining them as black which had huge implications for Cherokee freedpeople 
after Oklahoma entered the Union and, by extension, the Jim Crow social order of that era. 
 
Gaining and Retaining an Allotment 
Allotments were subject to certain restrictions that prevented recipients from selling their 
land.  These restrictions gave the racial distinctions made during enrolment “enormous 
import” since they were lifted according to racial classification: the protected status of an 
individual’s land therefore depended on their blood quantum.576 Like all Cherokee citizens, 
freedpeople awarded citizenship by the Dawes Commission gained an allotment of 110 acres 
of Cherokee land of equal value (or its equivalent), with forty acres designated as a 
homestead.  Under the initial terms of allotment, all allottees were permitted to sell their 
‘surplus’ land after five years of receiving it but the forty-acre homestead was non-taxable 
and inalienable for twenty-one years or the lifetime of the allottee.577  The restrictions on 
sale were intended to protect the property rights of allottees whilst they adjusted to their 
new position as land holders. White Americans and Cherokees alike debated the merits of 
this system, with some viewing it as a patronising means of denying allottees the freedom to 
lease or sell the land as they saw fit whilst others saw it as a defence against fraudulent 
opportunists.  Under pressure from settlers, Congress amended the restrictions in the years 
following allotment, lifting them entirely for freedpeople by 1908, and the “confused legal 
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situation” of landownership in Indian Territory gave land speculators, or ‘grafters,’ 
opportunities to either lease or buy allotted land for distorted prices.578   
 The restrictions attached to Cherokee land were controversial and remain so today.  
Angie Debo has described the restrictions on allotted land as evidence of the irreconcilable 
nature of justice and the free market.579  The clamour for the land of Oklahoma Territory had 
revealed that settlers were determined to claim land in the west and opponents of allotment 
had argued that the policy would ultimately transfer Native lands away from Native peoples 
and into the hands of United States citizens.  The restrictions on allotted lands worked to 
convince reformists that Native peoples would not be taken advantage of in the years 
following allotment.580  The restrictions rested on the paternalistic notion that Native 
peoples would be unable to manage their own property and therefore the federal 
government needed to protect them from unsavoury ‘grafters.’581  David Chang has argued 
that the restrictions were “suffused with white supremacy,” which equated indigenous 
ancestry with incompetence and vulnerability.582   The assumption of incompetence 
pervaded early scholarship on the allotment era, with Angie Debo describing the “vast 
helplessness and inexperience of the average Indian.”583 Later work considers the agency of 
Native peoples during this time, with historians such as Stuart Banner convincingly arguing 
that an impoverished allottee may have chosen to lease or sell their land for non-competitive 
rates given that it was their only asset.584  Rather than the result of trickery or fraud, then, 
the decision to sell or lease lands can be a means of managing an individual or family’s 
economic situation.  Current scholarship attempts to reconcile the problems and advantages 
of these restrictions and historians of allotment have argued that the “paternalistic 
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provisions” may have been based on racialized notions of incompetence but they did offer a 
defence against the aggressive pursuit of Cherokee land by non-citizens.585   
 As allotment of the Cherokee Nation progressed and was eventually completed, land 
speculators pressured the federal government to lift the restrictions on allotted land.  
Grafters had been able to secure access to Indian lands through leases, often made with the 
allottee at very low rates and then leased to a client for a huge profit, but the restrictions 
limited their ability to completely wrest the lands away from its owners.  Although grafters 
had found means to sidestep the law through suspect lease agreements, removing the 
restrictions would allow them to buy and sell said land at great profit and they therefore 
lobbied the federal government to do so.586  Speculators were not alone in pushing for the 
removal of restrictions on allotted lands: some Native citizens advocated their abolition.  
David Chang has argued that citizens who were adept at managing business and property 
found the restrictions to be “meddlesome, intrusive, and patronizing.”587   
 Scholarship has largely emphasised that the removal of restrictions operated against 
the inclination and welfare of Cherokee citizens in general and freedpeople in particular.  
Angie Debo, for example, has argued that freedpeople were particularly vulnerable to the 
removal of restrictions on their land and represented the “most unfriended” class in the 
Cherokee Nation, “regarded by the general populace with hate and envy while they owned 
their allotments, and with hate and contempt after they lost them.”588  Cherokee officials 
had made it evident with the Whitmire case and their longstanding resistance to giving 
freedpeople an equal allotment that the majority of the Cherokee citizenry did not believe 
that freedpeople had a right to Cherokee land.  They were therefore unlikely to advocate the 
continued protection of the property rights of freedpeople following allotment. In his 
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monograph, Daniel Littlefield likewise stressed the exploitation of Cherokee freedpeople at 
the hands of land speculators who endeavoured to “shake the freedmen loose from their 
land.”589  Murray Wickett argued that the lesser restrictions of the land of freedpeople from 
1904 made them particular targets of speculators who were less likely to face legal obstacles 
in such purchases.590  Furthermore, Wickett argued that the relative lack of education 
available to freedpeople made them vulnerable to deceptive contracts.  Wickett concluded 
that freedpeople of Five Tribes lost a “staggering” amount of land through such practices 
(see figure 1).591   
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Figure 1.  Department of the Interior Commission to the Five Civilised Tribes Map Showing 
Progress of Allotment in the Cherokee Nation, 1904.  Shaded areas of land denote 
allotments held by Cherokee citizens in 1904. The removal of restrictions in subsequent 
years made these lands vulnerable to sale away from Cherokee citizens.592   
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A number of Cherokee freedpeople elected to remove the restrictions from their 
land for their own purposes, however, which challenges their monolithic status as victims of 
allotment in the historiography.  The applications made by such freedpeople before their 
restrictions were lifted entirely in 1908 offer a record of both why and how freedpeople 
would choose to sell their land.  Lewis Daniels, for example, applied to have restrictions on 
sale lifted from the area of land defined as his homestead in November 1907.  Daniels, a 62 
years old freedman, hoped to sell his homestead for townsite purposes since he had retired 
from farming and now worked in haulage in the town of Lenapah, I. T.593 Over the course of 
his application, Daniels took pains to establish his competency by drawing attention to his 
ability to read and speak english as well as ability to manage business and money.  Clerk John 
B. O’Neill surveyed Daniels’ land and interviewed Daniels himself, concluding that he “is a 
bright intelligent Freedman” and “well able and capable of transacting his own business.”594  
Upon O’Neill’s recommendation, the Department of the Interior approved Daniels’ request 
and allowed him to sell his land. 
 In the same manner as Lewis Daniels, freedman James French hoped to sell a portion 
of his allotment for townsite purposes in Lenapah.  Unlike Daniels, however, French was 
subjected to extensive examination that reveals the views held by federal officials in regard 
to his race.   French lived with his wife and child on his wife’s allotment and, since he was 
farming those lands with success, hoped to take advantage of the demand for land by selling 
his own at a good price.  Over the course of French’s appearance before the Commissioner, 
French asserted that he was capable of reading and writing in English, demonstrated his 
understanding of land prices in Lenapah and produced evidence that his plan to sell his lands 
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has been endorsed by the Lenapah mayor and town council.595  The Commissioner raised 
questions about French having used money from a previous sale to pay off a debt (implying 
that French was unable to manage his own affairs) but French’s attorney later established 
that these debts were accrued paying legal fees for his brother’s defense in court after being 
accused of murder.596  When interviewing W. H. Buffington as a character witness, French’s 
attorney questioned whether Buffington thought French could manage his business affairs 
as “the ordinary man does” (i.e. is as competent as white men were perceived to be) and 
Buffington answered in the affirmative.597  The Commissioner expanded on this question, 
first asking whether Buffington was a relative of French (he was not) and then asking if French 
had a reputation for “truth and veracity.”598  Buffington confirmed that French was 
considered trustworthy and had not been accused of any misconduct in relation to the 
previous sale of his surplus lands but the Commissioner’s questions revealed the suspicion 
that freedmen such as French could be dishonest.  When interviewing a later character 
witness, Frank Little, the Commissioner revisited this issue in relation to alcohol 
consumption:  
Q.  Is he a sober and industrious man or not?  
A. Well. He drinks occasionally, but he don’t make a habit of it and he works 
pretty near every day. 
Q. When he gets full, does he spend much money? 
A. Well I don’t know, really, I have never made a practice of going with him 
when he has been full.  I never heard of his family complaining of being in 
need or anything of that kind.  I don’t know just how much he does spend. 
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Q. How often does he drink too much? How often is he liable to get drunk? 
A. I never saw him get real drunk in my life, so he couldn’t walk, I never did see 
him that way. 
Q. How often does he drink to excess? 
A. I suppose whenever he can get to it, he will drink a little bit.599 
The Commissioner’s persistent questions about excessive drinking, despite the witness only 
conceding that French consumed alcohol occasionally, suggests that he associated men such 
as French with alcoholism and incompetence.  Little clarifies, under questioning from 
French’s attorney, that French was generally a very temperate man and that he was not likely 
to be “taken advantage of”, as the Commissioner put it, as a result of drinking too heavily.600  
Although the Commissioner’s assumptions about French did not damage his application (the 
removals of restrictions were ordered in November 1907), they do reveal the racial 
stereotyping freedmen were subjected to as they endeavoured to claim control over their 
property. 
 Although the majority of freedpeople who applied to have the restrictions removed 
from their allotment were men, some freedwomen did make applications.  Laura 
Scarborough, for example, filed an application in October 1907 to have the restrictions 
against sale of her homestead lifted, citing her proximity to Sandtown and a rail station as 
evidence of its potential value.  The clerk who investigated her application forwarded a series 
of concerns to United States Indian Agent Dana Kelsey, however, and recommended the 
application be denied.  First, there were inaccuracies within the application: the clerk found 
Sandtown to be “no town” but instead a small collection of buildings centred around a post 
office and the rail station was not at Sandtown but was three miles away and therefore of 
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little consequence.601  Second, the clerk raised concerns that Laura Scarborough was being 
exploited by her husband, a non-citizen who had “complete control [sic] of his wife’s 
affairs.”602  The clerk speculated that this would explain the discrepancy between the 
application and his investigation.  Following a conversation with Laura Scarborough, the clerk 
concluded that she was not competent and cautioned that “she depends absolutely on her 
husband, who has not used good judgement in this matter.”603  Laura Scarborough’s 
application was rejected without the applicant appearing before the Commissioner so there 
is little evidence available by which the clerk’s assertion that she was incompetent can be 
assessed.  Her application does highlight the perceived dependence of wives on their 
husbands at this time, however: rather than being assessed purely on her own merit (as 
Lewis Daniels and James French were) perceptions of Laura Scarborough were considered in 
relation to her status as a wife (and thus a legal dependent). 
 In her March 1908 application for the removal of restrictions on her homestead, 
twenty-nine-year-old Mollie Townsend provided ample evidence of her competence to 
manage her own affairs, illustrating that freedwomen were not necessarily dependent on 
husbands.  According to her petition, Townsend had attended school for eight years, 
managed the allotments owned by herself and her three children, and had at times been in 
possession of “considerable sums of money.”604  Townsend was therefore not just 
competent but seemed to have gained success as a businesswoman in the Indian Territory.  
The removal of restrictions from all property owned by freedpeople in May 1908 rendered 
Townsend’s application unnecessary, however, and allowed her to sell her land without the 
consent of the Department of the Interior.   
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Although applicants such as Daniels, French, Scarborough and Townsend had chosen 
to apply for the removal of the restrictions on their property, abolishing the restrictions on 
lands owned by Cherokee freedpeople entirely in 1908 made them all vulnerable to the 
grafters and land speculators without consideration for their own preferences.  The decision 
to lift restriction on lands attained through allotment was made by Congress and not by the 
individuals it would effect.  Given that restrictions endured on land owned by allottees with 
a high degree of Indian ancestry, David Chang has emphasised how freedpeople in Indian 
Territory were made especially vulnerable by the “graduated level of protection” afforded 
by the restrictions.605  This reflected a significant shift in federal policy towards Cherokee 
freedpeople.  Following the Civil War, federal officials had ardently pushed for the 
recognition of the rights of freedpeople within the Cherokee Nation (particularly in relation 
to their claim on Cherokee land).  As illustrated in previous chapters, the federal government 
repeatedly acted on behalf of Cherokee freedpeople over these decades and its officials had 
cast themselves as the defenders of freedpeople, stressing the ‘justice’ of their actions in 
doing so.  The United States chose to strip Cherokee freedpeople of the protections of 
restriction, however, whilst continuing to protect the allotments of allottees with Cherokee 
ancestry.  In doing so, the federal government exempted freedpeople from its paternalistic 
notions of incompetence, protection and assimilation even though interviews, such as that 
of James French, illustrate that freedpeople were not generally considered to be competent.  
As the Cherokee citizenry were incorporated into the larger United States with the advent of 
Oklahoma statehood in 1907, then, the processes of allotment had placed freedpeople at a 
particular disadvantage.    
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Conclusion 
With the passage of the Curtis Act, the United States dismissed the sovereignty and authority 
of the Native nations within Indian Territory and claimed complete jurisdiction over the 
Territory.  Oklahoma statehood entailed the dissolution of the Native governments within 
Indian Territory and the extension of federal authority over its residents.  Although federal 
officials secured an equal allotment for Cherokee freedpeople, their negotiations with 
Cherokee officials revealed that the Nation still adhered to their argument that freedpeople 
had no claim on Cherokee land.  The allotment of land to individual citizens necessitated the 
creation of rolls that delineated freedpeople separately from the larger Cherokee citizenry.  
The creation of these rolls again highlighted differing interpretations of who was entitled to 
Cherokee citizenship and federal officials challenged the authority of the Cherokee Nation 
by allowing freedpeople who were not listed on the agreed base roll to apply.  Although this 
expansive reading of Cherokee citizenship appeared to indicate federal support for 
freedpeople and their struggles for equal citizenship, federal officials quickly abandoned 
them once allotment was nearing completion.  The removal of restrictions on the sale of 
allotted land, beginning in 1904, left Cherokee freedpeople open to fraud and exploitation 
whilst the categorisation of Cherokee freedpeople as being racially distinct from the 
Cherokee citizenry afforded them little protection against the Jim Crow social order that 
came to power in the new state.  The vulnerable position of freedpeople at the beginning of 
the twentieth century therefore suggests that the federal government used them as tools to 
encroach on the authority and sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation rather than supporting 
them because of a genuine belief in their full and equal rights as Cherokee citizens.  Once 
allotment was complete and Oklahoma had attained statehood, assisting Cherokee 
freedpeople no longer benefitted the federal government. 
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Epilogue: Cherokee Freedpeople in the Twenty-first Century 
 
To promote, collect, and preserve Oklahoma Freedmen Genealogy, History and 
Artifacts and study the unique cultural diversity of Freedmen Descendants for 
the general benefit and good of the individual and collective Tribes and 
Representative Communities, in the State and Nation, and to improve the 
quality of life, to reinvigorate and promote cultural awareness and events 
relating to our heritage. 
(Mission of the Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes 
Association)606  
 
The ramifications of the forty years covered by this thesis continue to be felt today by 
Cherokee freedpeople and the Cherokee Nation through the practice of exclusionary 
citizenship policies.  The legacies of the nineteenth century therefore continue to have real-
life consequences for Cherokee freedpeople over a century later.  As we have seen, federal 
intervention on the behalf of freedpeople led many within the Cherokee Nation to associate 
affording them equal rights with attacks on Cherokee sovereignty in the nineteenth century.   
Marginalised by the Cherokee Nation and abandoned by the federal government, 
freedpeople occupied an uncertain position at Oklahoma statehood.  Although this thesis 
concludes with the enactment of the Curtis Act in 1898, which dissolved the Cherokee Nation 
government and brought about Oklahoma statehood in 1907, freedpeople have continued 
to pursue equal and full citizenship within the Cherokee Nation until the present day.  This 
thesis therefore places the current struggles of freedpeople for inclusion within its historical 
context.  Since the relationship between the Cherokee Nation, Cherokee freedpeople and 
the United States remains essentially triangular in nature, exploring this historical context 
may provide a clearer understanding of the positions held by the Cherokee Nation and the 
United States over Cherokee freedpeople.  
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In the first decade of the twenty-first century, individuals such as Lucy Allen and 
Marilyn Vann brought the issue of Cherokee freedpeople and their exclusion from the 
Cherokee citizenry to national and international attention through the courts of both the 
Cherokee Nation and the United States.  As a result of Allen’s 2004 lawsuit, filed in the Judicial 
Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee Nation, measures denying freedpeople citizenship were 
declared unconstitutional.  This victory proved short-lived, however, after a 2007 
amendment to the Cherokee Nation Constitution again limited citizenship to individuals who 
could trace their ancestry to the ‘by Blood’ register of the Dawes Roll.607  Since efforts to 
reclaim Cherokee citizenship through the Cherokee legal system had proved ineffectual, a 
group of Cherokee freedpeople led by Marilyn Vann filed a case against the Cherokee Nation 
in the United States Federal Court in 2006. The creation of the Cherokee Freedmen’s 
Association in the 1940s, as well as Reverend Roger Nero’s failed 1984 attempt to secure 
voting rights for freedpeople, reveals that these contemporary legal cases do not exist in 
isolation but instead represent part of a longer battle for full citizenship.  This battle is not 
limited to the courtroom, however, as organisations such as the Descendants of Freedmen 
of The Five Civilized Tribes lead a push to make those descended from freedpeople of the 
former Indian Territory more visible and more involved in their respective tribal 
communities. As this thesis has made clear, this larger struggle for inclusion has spanned 150 
years and is deeply rooted in nineteenth century discourses surrounding nationhood, 
citizenship and identity.  After the Civil War, the Cherokee National Council repeatedly 
charged that Cherokee freedpeople were not Cherokee and attempted to provide them with 
a lesser form of citizenship.  They claimed the right do so through their nation status.  In 
response to their exclusion from citizenship rights in the Cherokee Nation, Cherokee 
freedpeople encouraged the federal government to intervene on their behalf to secure them 
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equal citizenship.  In doing so, Cherokee freedpeople exploited the differing notions of 
citizenship held by the United States to further their own agenda.  The United States proved 
to be an unreliable ally, however, and not only did the federal government selectively defend 
the rights of Cherokee freedpeople but they also used this contentious issue as an 
opportunity to display their growing power in the Cherokee Nation and the larger Indian 
Territory. 
 As of September 2016, the federal case to determine whether the descendants of 
slaves held within the Cherokee Nation can be denied Cherokee citizenship remains 
unresolved.  The complex issues surrounding Cherokee freedpeople have proved difficult to 
disentangle: it is a decade since Marilyn Vann first filed her case against the Cherokee Nation 
over the disenfranchisement of herself and other freedpeople and no decision has been 
made.   Opinion pieces and editorials frequently point to the uncertain future of Cherokee 
freedpeople, describing them in terms such as “waiting,” “still waiting” and “in limbo.”608  
Through temporary injunctions, freedpeople who trace their Cherokee ancestry to the 
Freedmen Roll only retain their status as full citizens of the Cherokee Nation (with all the 
rights associated with that citizenship) until a decision is made regarding their status by the 
United States federal court.609  Coverage in The Oklahoman described this court case as being 
the result of an “unusual agreement” that condensed all questions connected to freedpeople 
and their status within the Cherokee Nation in to a single case. 610  The Cherokee Nation, 
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freedpeople, and the Department of the Interior hope to reach a final decision on various 
disagreements by limiting the discussions to one issue: whether the 1866 Reconstruction 
Treaty prevents the Cherokee Nation from amending its constitution to rescind the 
citizenship of freedpeople.  The federal court case, and the citizenship status of freedpeople 
in the twenty-first century, therefore rests on how Senior U.S. District Judge Thomas F. 
Hogan interprets that agreement between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.   
In regards to Native American law, Judge Hogan is most renowned for presiding over 
the landmark Cobell vs Salazar class-action lawsuit in 2011 and finding in favour of the Native 
American plaintiffs.  Judge Hogan’s ruling, that the U.S. government had mismanaged the 
income of trust assets, represents the largest settlement against the United States in its 
history, totalling $3.4 billion.611  With his reputation as a likeable and competent judge, as 
well as having previously defended the rights of Native Americans against the federal 
government, it seems fair to assume that Judge Hogan will be received more readily by 
citizens of the Cherokee Nation than a judge who has proven themselves to be hostile to the 
sovereignty of Native peoples and nations.612   Judge Hogan announced in May 2014 that he 
expected to reach a decision in the near future.  In her coverage of the case, Jenni Monet 
describes Judge Hogan as being “poised to make a landmark decision for Indian country – 
one that legal observers say will be discussed for many years to come.”613  In much the same 
way as in the decades following the Civil War, the federal government has relatively low 
stakes in this legal battle: an adverse decision for Cherokee freedpeople and the Cherokee 
Nation will mean a collective loss of tribal citizenship or a devastating blow to Cherokee 
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sovereignty respectively, however.  Despite assurances that resolution is near, Judge Hogan 
is yet to proffer judgement on this case and given its contentious nature, it seems likely that 
his decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court by either the Cherokee freedpeople 
claimants or the Cherokee Nation.   The issue may therefore prove painfully slow or even 
impossible to resolve. 
As discussed in Chapter One, media coverage of the Cherokee freedpeople 
controversy has repeatedly identified tribal sovereignty and racial discrimination against 
freedpeople as the key points of debate.  Individuals who advocate the disenfranchisement 
of freedpeople argue that control over citizenship is central to self-government and that 
therefore any attempt by an outside power to prevent the Cherokee Nation from excluding 
freedpeople is an attack on the sovereignty of the Nation.   Chad Smith, Principal Chief of the 
Cherokee Nation from 1999 to 2011 and a prominent advocate of disenfranchisement, has 
claimed that the Cherokee Nation’s ability to exclude freedpeople “was a fundamental right 
of sovereignty... to not only determine your own future, but to determine your own 
identity.”614  In Smith’s vision of the conflict over Cherokee freedpeople, then, the federal 
government acts as an aggressor  by preventing those who are Cherokee ‘by blood’ from 
freely deciding whether to recognise freedpeople as Cherokee citizens.  Like other advocates 
of Cherokee disenfranchisement, Smith does not expand on the rationale behind excluding 
freedpeople from the Cherokee citizenry but rather affirms the right to do so.  
For many observers, resisting federal pressure to incorporate freedpeople does not 
represent an expression of sovereignty but rather a situation which could enable the United 
States government to exert its authority over Native nations.  Like the unnamed Indian elder 
who feared the implications of Tiya Miles’s work on Cherokee slavery, Jenni Monet situates 
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the conflict over Cherokee freedpeople within a broader context of relationships between 
the United States and all Native tribes, remarking that “the weight of the issue boils down to 
treaty rights, and not just for the Cherokee or freedmen, but in essence for all of Indian 
country.” 615    According to Monet, allowing the Cherokee Nation to exclude its freedpeople 
citizens would release it from its commitment to incorporate former slaves and their 
descendants, sending “the wrong message; that tribes undervalue their treaty obligations 
much in the same way the United States has woefully cast aside these agreements over 
time.” 616  The controversy over Cherokee freedpeople may therefore establish a dangerous 
precedent: that a federally recognised tribe can disregard its treaty obligations.  This would 
challenge the unique position Native nations hold within the United States, and in turn 
suggest that the United States could disregard its own treaty obligations to Native people.  
The outcome of the federal court case therefore holds implications beyond the status of 
freedpeople: at the least an adverse decision could redefine what citizenship means for 
citizens of all Native nations in the United States, at most it could threaten all treaty 
protections afforded to Native nations and citizens. 
Much of the mainstream media coverage of the Cherokee freedpeople controversy 
in the United States considers racial prejudice rather than tribal sovereignty to be the most 
pressing issue in the debate over Cherokee freedpeople.  Although coverage has become 
more nuanced in recent years, by recognising that matters of sovereignty and self-
government complicate any decision made by the federal government, national newspapers 
have been quick to explicitly accuse advocates of disenfranchisement as being motivated by 
racism. In doing so, such observers risk underplaying the question of sovereignty and ignore 
the history of federal aggression towards the Cherokee Nation and Native nations more 
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generally.   A columnist in the Washington Post, for example, has drawn parallels between 
attempts to exclude Cherokee freedpeople and racist questions surrounding Barack Obama’s 
citizenship, attributing both to the “enduring nastiness of slavery.”617  An article for a local 
Tulsa radio station sympathetically profiles two Cherokee freedpeople whilst failing entirely 
to explore the history of the dispute, leaving readers to conclude that this is simply twenty-
first century racial prejudice.618  Similarly, an editorial by Marcos Barbery in Salon magazine 
champions the cause of Cherokee freedpeople.  The editorial quotes David Cornsilk (the lay 
advocate who represented Lucy Allen) extensively: “The Freedmen died a long time ago.  You 
are not Freedmen.  You are Cherokee, and it is time you begin to recognize who you are.”619  
The author’s sympathies are further demonstrated through numerous case studies of 
Cherokee freedmen who both hold citizenship currently or whose claims will not be 
processed until the court case is resolved.  For example, Barbery’s description of a single 
black family taking part in the Cherokee Holiday Parade, and the mixed reactions they 
received from other attendees, highlights the human cost of rejection and 
disenfranchisement to his readers.620  
In the twenty-first century, then, Cherokee self-government and the equal rights of 
the descendants of Cherokee freedpeople still appear irreconcilable.  In her 2014 article 
‘Race, Sovereignty, and Civil Rights: Understanding the Cherokee Freedmen Controversy,’ 
Circe Sturm argues that race and tribal sovereignty should be considered together instead of 
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separately, however, since “that is in fact how they function in the world” and that “racial 
dynamics can both empower and undermine tribal sovereignty.”621  Sturm traces the ways 
in which race has affected the ability of the Cherokee Nation to exercise its sovereignty in 
relation to the citizenship of freedpeople and identifies three examples: outside observers 
who classified racist Cherokees as ‘white’ in acting so and therefore not ‘authentic’ Indians; 
the Cherokee Nation’s use of propaganda that cast freedpeople as ‘non-Indians’ and framed 
the vote on the constitutional amendment as a decision on whether the Nation should 
remain Indian or not; and “historical amnesia” surrounding the historic connections between 
the Cherokee Nation and Cherokee freedpeople which encouraged the larger Cherokee 
citizenry to simply view them as black (and therefore not Cherokee).622  Notions of 
sovereignty and race therefore operate together rather than separately and, at the 
conclusion of the article, Sturm argues that greater attention to the interaction between 
these ideas is necessary: “only then will our work empower tribes to act as moral sovereigns 
committed to protecting the civil rights of their own citizenry.”623 
Sturm’s conclusion, that challenging the established wisdom that the rights of 
freedpeople and the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation is necessary and productive, is 
echoed by the actions of freedpeople today who are engaged in campaigns to increase the 
visibility of Cherokee freedpeople and illustrate that they are a part of the wider Cherokee 
community. According to Kyle Mays, Cherokee freedpeople are not “sitting idly by” whilst 
their future is decided in a courtroom.624 Instead, freedpeople are attending Cherokee 
classes, meetings and holidays in an effort to establish connections amongst themselves and 
with other Cherokee citizens.  According to Marilyn Vann, actively participating in Cherokee 
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community activities will encourage all citizens (regardless of which roll their ancestors can 
be found on) to feel “more comfortable” with each other.625  This corresponds directly with 
the stated objectives of the Descendants of Freedmen of the Five Civilized Tribes Association, 
headed by Vann and formed in response to various attempts by native Nations to 
disenfranchise their freedpeople descendants.  In their mission statement, alongside 
securing citizenship rights, the Association pledges to “improve the quality of life, to 
reinvigorate and promote cultural awareness and events relating to our heritage” for “the 
general benefit and good of the individual and collective Tribes and Representative 
Communities.”626  Rather than rely on victories in the courtroom, which have historically only 
facilitated temporary and fragile protections for freedpeople, the Association looks to a more 
inclusive future made possible through engagement between citizens and a relationship 
based on a shared history and “unique cultural diversity” rather than a combative present.   
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